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A bstract:
Plato’ s U se o f A ttic Oratory

The philosophical works o f Plato are characterized by the Socratic dialogue, the
dialectical style o f conversation Socrates em ploys with his interlocutors. H owever, Plato
also occasionally departs from the Socratic dialogue to experiment in genres outside his,
own. The Menexenus and the A pology are tw o o f his works that feature ‘ inserted’ genres
/
o f A ttic oratory: the funeral oration and forensic oratory. W hile these tw o works are
typically characterized as Plato parodying or criticizing oratory, this thesis examines
philosophy and oratory in both the M enexenus and the Apology and argues that Plato
deliberately uses A ttic oratory to com m unicate his philosophy to the Athenians and the

polls as a w hole. Plato uses these genres not to parody them, but uses them in a serio
com ic way to show that philosophy too, by means o f oratory, can be capable o f political
action.
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I n t r o d u c t io n

Plato’ s vast corpus o f philosophical works and his intriguing character o f Socrates
have com m anded the attention o f scholars for centuries. The issue o f authorial intent in
these works is som etim es difficult to discern, since Plato never speaks any words in his
ow n v oice, rather it is Socrates w ho holds the main position in (m ost o f) the dialogues.
This contributes to one o f the m ost distinguishing factors o f Plato’ s works: the Socratic
interview. This is Socrates’ typical philosophical modus operandi, w hich he uses in
pursuit o f virtue and know ledge. Plato, as author, uses Socrates’ reasoned discourse with
his interlocutors to com m unicate his philosophical ideas and commentary on
contem porary society and its figures. W e see many significant political and intellectual
figures o f fifth century ( b c e ) classical G reece in conversation with Socrates, such as
A lcibiades, Aristophanes, Critias, G orgias, and Protagoras, among others. In this method
o f the Socratic interview (or elenchus), Plato’ s discourse is primarily a personal and
private m ode o f com m unication.

'

Plato, how ever, does not restrict him self to this particular elenctic genre. A t times,
he experiments with other genres, but these experimentations occur within Plato’ s ow n
particular genre. In this way, they are ‘ inserted’ genres. In the Menexenus and Apology,
Plato uses tw o different form s o f public discourse, in contrast to his private elenchus.
Specifically, Plato uses tw o genres o f A ttic oratory: the Athenian funeral oration

(epitaphios logos ) and forensic oratory. These tw o dialogues stand out from the Platonic
corpus, since they have the potential to stand on their ow n; that is to say, they could have
been presented (b y Socrates or not) without an interlocutor.

2
Public oratory was an essential elem ent in the 7i6A.iq. Jean-Pierre Vem ant notes,
;

“ The system o f the polis implied, first o f all, the extraordinary preeminence o f
speech over all other instruments o f power. Speech became the political tool
par excellence, the key to all authority in the state, the means o f commanding
and dominating others.... Speech was no longer the ritual word, the precise
formula, but open debate, discussion, argument. It presupposed a public to
which it was addressed, as to a judge whose ruling could not be appealed, who
decided with hands upraised between the two parties who came before him.” 12
3

Even in Plato’ s time, the dichotom y between written and oral com m unication was still in
transition. In Plato’ s ow n works, there are treatments o f oratory in contemporary
society. Plato, it seems, was not im pressed with the orators o f his day, w ho flattered the
crow ds and aimed at gratification, caring nothing for the truth o f their words.4 What,
then, is Plato’ s intent when he inserts genres o f oratory into his Socratic dialogues? Plato
cannot possibly operate in the exact same way he does in the Socratic elenchus when
delivering a speech.
This ‘ discrepancy’ between Plato’ s apparent condem nation o f the contemporary
orators, and his subsequent use o f oratory in his dialogues has led many scholars to label
the use o f (inserted) oratory in the M enexenus and A pology as ‘parody’ , ‘ satire’ , or
\

‘ irony’ . They believe that Plato could not possibly be using oratory in earnest, or for any
purpose other than as a demonstration o f the sort o f flattery the orators use, or a m ockery
in further condem nation o f it. There are unfortunate im plications o f characterizing the
inserted genres in the Menexenus and A pology as parody, or the like. It is clear that Plato
is a very skilled and versatile writer, capable o f writing in various prose styles.5 He is not

1 Vem ant, Jean-Pierre. [trans.]1982 (1962). The Origins o f Greek Thought, pp. 49-50
2 Guthrie, W .K .C . 1975. A History o f G reek Philosophy, vol. 4. p. 58
3 C f. especially Phaedrus, Gorgias, and Republic.
4 Grg. 462c, 464b-466a
5 N othing shows this versatility better than the Symposium, where each symposiast
delivers a speech fitting to his character.

trying to beat the orators at their ow n gam e, or sim ply show that he is just as capable o f
writing prose oratory as his ow n Socratic dialogues. I f the use o f oratory in these two
dialogues is relegated to parody and other non-serious uses, then the dialogues
them selves are given a low er status: they are given less importance in relation to the rest
o f the (philosophical) Platonic corpus as a w hole and do not contribute any further to our
understanding o f Plato as an author. M ost importantly, I submit, failing to properly
account fo r Attic oratory in Plato rem oves him from the social construct o f the nokic,
where he lived and operated, even i f he w as not ‘ active’ in the typical way o f many
Athenian citizens.
It is true, that in som e cases o f inserted genre, Plato does intend to parody.6
H ow ever, “ each instance where Plato incorporates poetry (or rhetoric) into his
d ialogu es... deserves a separate investigation.” 78The label o f ‘ parody’ , I submit, assigns to

o

the Menexenus and Apology a different purpose than I believe Plato intended. Plato
consciously addresses his philosophy to the Athenians and the 7i6X,k; as a w hole by means
o f Attic oratory, thereby proving that oratory is not only the tool o f the politician, but that
\

philosophy too (by means o f oratory) can be capable o f political action. Furthermore, I
w ill argue, Plato intends his use o f oratory to be taken seriously, and that it is a
misunderstanding o f Socratic sipcoveia (irony) that leads scholars to take the Menexenus
and A pology as parodies. The term inology currently used to describe Plato’ s use o f Attic
oratory is insufficient and, in som e cases, wrong. I w ill instead submit a new term to

6 C f. The use o f (Euripidean) tragedy in the Gorgias, 485e-494a.
7 Nightingale, Andrea. 1995. Genres in Dialogue, p. 92 n.84
8 Henderson notes that elsewhere in the Socratic dialogues, Plato does not hesitate to
name the person he is parodying, e.g. Lysias in the Phaedrus. There is no such explicit
mention o f a target in the Menexenus or Apology. (Henderson, M .M . 1975. “ Plato ’ s
“ M enexenos” and the Distortion o f H istory.” AClass 18: 25-46. p. 28.)

4

properly define how Plato uses oratory in these tw o cases. In order to prove this thesis, I
w ill first need to disprove specific beliefs about the Menexenus and then the A pology .9
Scholars have a hard time reconciling Socrates as an orator in the Menexenus with
Socrates the philosopher that w e see elsewhere in the Platonic corpus. The dialogue is not
interpreted as philosophically significant in and o f itself, but rather as sim ply showing
that philosophy is important for politics. I, on the other hand, argue ( Chapter 1) that the
/
Menexenus is philosophically significant in its use o f inserted oratory. It displays— and
contributes to— many o f the philosophical ideas expressed elsewhere in the dialogues. In
dealing with the Apology , I argue ( Chapter 2) that Plato has specifically com posed
Socrates’ defense to be rhetorical and that it is, in many ways, consistent with other
examples o f forensic oratory. I also argue, in contrast to m odem scholars, that Socrates’
use o f oratory is consistent with his other opinions on oratory expressed elsewhere (as in
the Gorgias and Phaedrus).
B y proving that the Menexenus is philosophically significant, and that the

A pology is rhetorically consistent, seeing both philosophy and oratory in both dialogues,
it becom es possible to prove ( Chapter 3) that Plato is using these inserted genres as a way
o f com m unicating his philosophy to the nokxc,. Plato has appropriated a new use o f
oratory fo r his philosophy. Under this interpretation, these dialogues becom e an integral
part o f the Platonic corpus, not m erely o n e -o ff departures into inserted genres o f oratory.
This interpretation also brings into view a m ore civ ic aspect to Plato, w ho, through the

9 Examining the Menexenus and A pology together, as examples o f A ttic oratory, is also a
benefit to this thesis. T o the best o f m y know ledge, they have not been studied together
under the grouping I propose.

5
inserted genres o f A ttic oratory, shows his concern for the TtoXu; and not merely
condem nation.

A ‘ S e r io u s ’ N o t e :

r
/
KAA: ei7te got, oa Xaipe(pdov, O7toi)5d^ei tai)Ta ScoKpaxiv; fj
XAI: epoi pev Sokev, coKaXXiK^iq, vnepcpv&q ojcouSa^eiv
Callicles: Tell m e, Chaerephon, is Socrates serious about these things, or is he
joking?
Chaerephon: He seems to me to be exceedingly serious, Callicles.

(Grg.

481b)10

Whether or not w e are to take Socrates (and Plato) as ‘ serious’ in the dialogues is a
constant issue.11 Socrates often asserts that he is being serious about matters when his
responses and actions provoke mirth in his interlocutors. Those that really know Socrates,
like Chaerephon, recognize that Socrates is being serious in these moments. This is
Plato’ s way o f showing us— through the social interactions o f the characters— that w e too
are to take Socrates as being serious. But when w e don’ t have direct confirm ation from
som eone like Chaerephon, how can w e recognize Socrates as being serious or jok in g?
(Since he certainly jok es at times as w ell.)
There are certain Greek w ords that Plato em ploys that can be used as a sort o f
diagnostic to whether or not Socrates (or his interlocutors) is being serious or playing.
W hen w e are to understand seriousness, w e see words like cnrouSfj (cnrouSaTo«;,
OTtooda^a)), Ttoiobpai 7tepi TuXeiovoq, and verbs o f ‘ care’ or ‘ concern’ , like psXsco or kt|8©.

10 Translation m y own.
11 Guthrie (1975 vol. 4) treats the issue o f “ Play and Earnest” in the dialogues as part o f
his preamble to his study o f the dialogues (pp. 56-66).

6

In contrast, when w e are to understand play, w e see words like TtaiÇo), yekaa, yskoioq, or
KaraysXaaxog (Karays^dco). A s w ill be discussed further in Chapter 3, the Platonic
dialogues are a ‘ serio-com ic’ genre, in that they blend elements o f seriousness and its
contrastives. Over and over again in the dialogues, w e see that the philosopher appears
ridiculous to those w ho do not understand philosophy j even though he is in earnest about
his pursuits. Play has ultimate m otives for Plato: it is a com ic means to a serious end.
■/
Plato is seriously jok in g, or jok in g seriously, in his dialogues, and this serio-com ic
(aîtouôoyéXoïoç) aspect o f the dialogues is also present in his use o f inserted genres. Plato
‘ plays’ with inserted genres for a serious ultimate purpose. Unfortunately, this aspect o f
the dialogues in the case o f the Menexenus and A pology (and their inserted oratory) has
been either m issed or misunderstood by scholars w ho label these works as ‘parody’ . They
are selling Plato short o f his intended purpose. A fter all,
“ Com edy is sim ply a funny w ay o f being serious.”
-Peter Ustinov 1
2

12 C f. R. 536e and the discussion in Chapter 3, p. 91 & n.69.

7

A d d it io n a l N o t e s :

It may seem at times in m y writing that I am using the terms ‘ oratory’ and
‘ rhetoric’ (or their adjectives and adverbs) indiscriminately. For m e, these terms represent
the Greek ‘ fj pt|TopiKn tsxvt)’ , and I have sim ply used whatever term felt natural to m e in
writing m y prose. It is not m y intent to cause any confusion in the reader.

/'
A ll Greek texts used in this thesis are from Burnet’ s O xford Classical Texts o f
Plato, with the exception o f D odds’ (1959) superb edition o f the Gorgias. A ll
abbreviations for the dialogues o f Plato (and other authors’ w ork) found in the text are
those used in the LSJ.

8

C h apter O ne
The Menexenus: Fragmentary in its Entirety

T oo often scholars o f history and literature are confronted with the com plete loss
o f an author’ s work, or struggle with very few fragments. It is extremely fortunate for
scholars when a corpus as large as that o f Plato is extant. What is even m ore rewarding
for students o f Plato is the w ide range o f his works and their characters. Indeed, the figure
o f Socrates is m ost prominent, along with his style o f conversation: the Socratic
interview. Plato, how ever, does not restrain him self to the Socratic interview, but
som etim es experiments with other genres o f discourse. R ecognizing these departures is
extremely valuable to understanding both the w ork in question and the author’ s ow n
intentions. The Menexenus is an exam ple o f this experimentation, in which Plato em ploys
the genre o f the A ttic funeral oration. This w ork is extremely valuable since it is one o f
the very few examples o f the funeral oration that has been transmitted.1 Since the

Menexenus does not include a Socratic interview, and is not otherwise overtly
philosophical, scholars have struggled to place this dialogue in the greater scheme o f
Plato’ s w orks. It has been described as a “ continual puzzle” ,2 the “ m ost baffling
dialogue” ,3 and “ Plato’ s m ost confusing w ork, and am ong his numerous portraits o f
S ocrates,... his m ost paradoxical” .4 This difficulty is com pounded by the fact that

1 Other examples include: Thucydides 2.34-46 (Pericles’ Funeral Oration), Gorgias, D K
82, B5a, 5b, 6 (fragmentary), H yperides 6 (many lacunae), Lysias 2, [Ps.] Demosthenes
60. Som e scholars often com pare these epitaphioi to Isocrates’ Panegyricus and ;
Panathenaicus.
2 Stem 1974: 503.
S
3 Carter 1991 :21 8 .
V,
4 Friedlander 1964: 216.

9

Plato’ s funeral oration, w hile displaying many o f the conventions o f the genre, does not
com e across as serious,5 and is often labeled a parody6 or ironic.78
9
A s opinions on the Menexenus have varied, so has the direction o f scholarship.
Earlier scholarship was concerned with whether or not the dialogue itself was properly
A
attributed to Plato. O nce the dialogue was firm ly placed in the Platonic corpus, scholars

diverged on various topics. The link to Thucydides and his Periclean funeral oration has

9

/

been explored, with varying conclusions. Som e have tried to explain Plato’ s intent for
the Menexenus as being a funeral oration for his dear Socrates,10 w hile others have
focused on the anachronism— that is, that Socrates narrates events beyond his
execution— o f the dialogue for other reasons.111
2M ost recent scholarship has focused on
the links presented by the play o f philosophy in a rhetorical/political speech

and the

5 Henderson 1975: 39.
6 D odds 1 9 59 :24 , Coventry 1983: 3.
7 Kahn 1963: 226, A llen 1984: 322.
X
8 Huby, P.M . 1957. “ The M enexenus R econsidered.” Phronesis 2: 104-114. That
Aristotle cites this w ork tw ice ( Rhetoric 1415b, 1367b), in the same manner he cites Plato
elsewhere, is strong evidence for the inclusion o f the dialogue in Plato’ s corpus, not to
forget that C icero {O rator 44.151) says the Athenians o f his day recited Plato’ s funeral
oration yearly.
,
9 Kahn, C.H . 1963. “ Plato’ s Funeral Oration: The M otive o f the M enexenus.” CPh 58:
220-234 and C ollins, Susan D , and D evin Stauffer. 1999. “ The Challenge o f Plato’ s
‘ M enexenus’ ” . The Review o f Politics 61: 85-115.
10 Stem, H.S. 1974. “ Plato’ s Funeral Oration.” 77ie New Scholasticism 48: 503-508.
11 Henderson, M .M . 1975. “ Plato’ s M enexenus and the Distortion o f H istory.” A Class 18:
25-46, Dean-Jones, Lesley. 1995. “ M enexenus— Son o f Socrates.” CQ 45: 51-57, and
Rosenstock, Bruce. 1994. “ Socrates as Revenant: A Reading o f the M enexenus.” Phoenix
4 8 :3 3 1-3 4 7 .
12 D u ffy, B .K . 1983. “ The Platonic Function o f Epideictic Rhetoric.” Ph&Rh 14: 79-93;
Coventry, Lucinda. 1989. “ Philosophy and Rhetoric in the M enexenus.” JH S 1 0 9 :1 -1 5 ;
and Salkever, Stephen G. 1993. “ Socrates’ Aspasian Oration: The Play o f Philosophy and
Politics in Plato’ s M enexenus.” The American Political Science Review 87:133-143.
D u ffy sees the Menexenus as confirm ing “ the importance o f epideictic rhetoric as a tool
not only o f statescraft, but o f popular philosophy” (79), Salkever believes the Menexenus
“ presents a Socrates w ho influences politics indirectly, by recasting Athenian history [by

10

ritual aspects connected to the funeral oration.

11

O f course, the Menexenus has been

included in surveys o f the Athenian funeral oration,*1
3
14 in addition to studies o f the
different genres in Platonic w orks.15 That one dialogue can give rise to so many different
discussions is im pressive, especially since at first glance the dialogue seems quite simple.
The Menexenus opens in the same w ay as many other Platonic dialogues: Socrates
chances upon a young com panion, M enexenus,16 and they begin to engage in a dialogue.
/
One w ould not be surprised at this point i f the dialogue progressed into an elenchus on
virtue, courage, or the like. H owever, after a b rief excursus on the orators and their
abilities (Mx. 234c-235d), the two turn to discuss the upcom ing funeral oration. Socrates
says he heard Aspasia giving such a speech the day before (one partly com posed on the
spot, partly made up o f remnants from Pericles’ epitaphios), and Menexenus im plores
him to repeat it (Mx. 236a-d). Reluctantly (or so he w ould have us believe) Socrates gives
the oration (Me. 236d-249c), w hich is in many ways a typical epitaphios logos. He

means o f the speech] and thus transforming the terms in w hich its political alternatives
are conceived” (133), that is to say that he believes philosophy is a tool o f the politician.
Coventry believes that the dialogue shows the “ necessity o f philosophy to a state’ s w ell
being” (15). I w ill argue that the Menexenus (in and o f itself) is using the political speech
to com m unicate Plato’ s philosophical ideas, and noting the occurrence o f these ideas
elsewhere in the Platonic corpus allow s better understanding both o f the Menexenus and
the com pared dialogue.
13 Carter, M ichael F. 1991. “ The Ritual Functions o f E pideictic Rhetoric: The Case o f
Socrates’ Funeral Oration.” Rhetorica 9: 209-232, and W ickkiser, Bronwen L. 1999.
“ Speech in Context: Plato’ s ‘ M enexenus’ and the Ritual o f Athenian Public Burial.” RSQ
29: 65-74.
14 Loraux, N icole. 2006 (1981). The Invention o f Athens: The Funeral Oration in the
Classical City. Transi. A lan Sheridan, and Poulakos, Takis. 1990. “ Historiographies o f
the Tradition o f Rhetoric: A B rief H istory o f Classical Funeral Orations.” Western
Journal o f Speech Communication 54: 172-188.
15 Nightingale, Andrea. 1995. Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the Construct o f
Philosophy. Regrettably, Nightingale does not pursue the Menexenus in any great detail
(it is m entioned, then subsequently set aside in the discussion o f encom iastic speeches).
16 M enexenus also appears in the Lysis, at a m uch younger age, and is named by Phaedo
as one o f those present at the death o f Socrates (Phd. 59b). See n. 44 below .

praises the ancestry o f the deceased warriors, extols the virtue o f the war dead and the

polls, and consoles the parents and children left behind. H owever, his historical account
o f Athenian actions in war (and peace) is riddled with errors and has som e glaring
om issions (like Athenian imperialism, or Athens’ defeat at Aegospotam i). He does speak
a few w ords in the character o f the deceased themselves ( Mx. 246d-248d), w hich appears
m uch m ore sincere than the rest o f the speech. A fter he concludes the speech, Socrates
.

/
and M enexenus exchange a few m ore w ords, and Socrates ends on the prom ise to share
many m ore fine political speeches with M enexenus (Mx. 249e).
Fine political speeches are not what one w ould expect o f Plato, but the Menexenus
is an exam ple o f ‘ inserted’ genre (as are the Phaedrus, Protagoras, Symposium, etc.).
Nightingale notes that Plato has “ a positive hankering for the hybrid in so many o f his
texts: again and again, Plato m ixes traditional genres o f discourse into his dialogues and
disrupts the generic boundaries o f both his ow n texts and the texts that he targets” .

17

Nightingale refers to these types o f w orks as “ m ixed” or “ hybrid** genres, but in truth
(especially in the Menexenus), these genres are ‘ inserted’ into his ‘normal’ Socratic
discourse. Often, Plato’ s intent with the inserted genre is parody or criticism , but in the
non-parodic passages,1
7
18 he “ remains open to the possibility that a genre may in fact make
a positive contribution to the philosopher’ s enterprise” .19 This is indeed, I submit, what
he intends to prove in the Menexenus. It is possible to see the links between this w ork and
other Platonic dialogues that display his philosophical ideas (especially those that are

17 Nightingale 1995: 2.
18 Such as at the end o f the Menexenus, after Socrates com pletes his historical treatment
o f Athens and turns his attentions to those (im agined) present at the delivery o f the
oration (Mx. 246a-249c).
19 Nightingale 1995: 12.

12

ethical) m ore plainly. It is also possible to see similarities in the Menexenus to other
important Socratic ideas on oratory. Furthermore, I believe Socrates is doing something
significantly philosophical, and not sim ply oratorical, by ‘ inserting’ the genre o f the
Funeral Oration into one o f his ow n conversations. R ecognizing the connections— and
whether or not w e are to take them seriously— to other areas o f the Platonic corpus makes
it possible to elucidate the philosophy and ideas o f Plato (and Socrates) from other
/
dialogues and to reinforce the connection o f the Menexenus to the rest o f the corpus.

It is the Athenian funeral oration (epitaphios) that Plato targets in the Menexenus.
This is no real surprise as a selection, since Plato “ targets genres that have currency in
classical Athens— genres w hich make som e claim to w isdom or authority” .

The

Athenian funeral oration was in fact a product o f classical Athens. It came to be recited
yearly as part o f the Patrios Nomos. 21 Loraux dates the inclusion o f the epitaphios to 4612
0
1

20 Idem: 5.
21 It was a traditional ancestral custom o f the Athenians to bring their dead hom e to bury
in their ow n soil (except at Marathon and Plataea). Around 470 BCE, the Patrios Nomos
was m odified, and the Demosion Sema was set up on the Academ y R oad as an exclusive
public cem etery for the Athenian war dead. (Plato cites the war dead o f Oenophyta [457
b c e ] as the first to be buried here at Mx. 242b-c. He is the only one o f our sources to
suggest any date, but Loraux calls it a “ calculated error” [Loraux 2 0 0 6 :1 0 1 ].) Soon
afterward, the epitaphios logos was added, and epitaphioi agones follow ed (Skinner,
A shley. 2010. “ Death in Fifth Century Athens: Public G lory, Private G rief ” p. 6. See
also Clairmont [1983] Patrios Nomos, K ierdorf [1966] Erlebnis und Darstellung der
Perserkriege.). Thucydides gives us our best description o f the Patrios Nomos: “ In the
same winter the Athenians gave a funeral at the public cost to those w ho had first fallen
in this war. It was a custom o f their ancestors, and the manner o f it is as follow s. Three
days before the cerem ony, the bones o f the dead are laid out in a tent w hich has been
erected; and their friends bring to their relatives such offerings as they please. In the
funeral procession cypress coffin s are borne in cars, one for each tribe; the bones o f the
deceased being placed in the co ffin o f their tribe. A m ong these is carried one empty bier
decked for the m issing, that is, for those w hose bodies could not be recovered. A ny
citizen or stranger w ho pleases, join s in the procession: and the female relatives are there

s
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BCE.

W hile it is typically classed as an exam ple o f the epideictic genre, Loraux cautions

not to m erge the epitaphios with the epideictic genre or make it a set speech for an
occasion.

It is, in a way, its ow n genre, with its ow n tropes and themes. And although

the war dead are the reason for the occasion, “ each epitaphios can easily be reduced to an
encom ium o f Athens, in relation to w hich the praise o f the dead becom es secondary” .2
2
3
242
5
6
Indeed, the focus on the polis is easily seen in the Menexenus, but the degree to w hich

/

Plato’ s encom ium o f Athens is serious is doubtful.

25

Since Plato’ s seriousness is questionable, it is necessary to seek his underlying
m otive. Nightingale notes “ whether it is bestow ed upon one individual or the city as a
w hole, the discourse o f praise is antithetical to the project o f the philosopher” .

By

contrast, I w ould argue (along with others) that Plato uses the Menexenus to show that
even the discourse o f praise— in thé form o f the epitaphios— is able to aid the
philosopher in com m unicating his ideas. B y using a genre that does have currency at the
time o f its com position, Plato is perhaps hoping to reach a wider audience than his
Socratic dialogues w ould norm ally have. Coventry (JH S 1989) notes various links to the
other Platonic dialogues, whether similarities or differences: “ Apparent resemblances

to w ail at the burial. The dead are laid in the public sepulchre in the m ost beautiful suburb
o f the city, in w hich those who fall in war are always buried; with the exception o f those
slain at Marathon, w ho for their singular and extraordinary valor were interred on the
spot where they fell. A fter the bodies have been laid in the earth, a man chosen by the
state, o f approved w isdom and eminent reputation, pronounces over them an appropriate
panegyric; after w hich all retire. Such is the manner o f the burying; and throughout the
w hole o f the war, whenever the occasion arose, the established custom was observed.”
(Thucydides 2.34).
22 Loraux 2 0 0 6 :1 1 3 .
23 Idem : 39.
24 Idem : 88.
25 Idem : 87.
26 Nightingale 1995:107.
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[between the Menexenus and other dialogues] in practice and ideas need therefore to be
examined carefully; they may prove to be superficial similarities which serve only to
underline a basic opposition. This is true o f the passages in Aspasia’ s speech w hich m ost
An

clearly recall ideas expressed in other dialogues” .

She continues, “ where Aspasia’ s

speech seems to recall Platonic ideas, the effect is ... to make apparent the g u lf between
the Athens portrayed here and Plato’ s ideal state. In itself, the com parison points to the
necessity o f philosophy for statesmanship” .2
7
28 Indeed, Plato does believe philosophy is
needed for one w ho is to properly engage in politics, but I believe that these links are not
lim ited to the purpose Coventry suggests, nor are they as ‘ superficial’ as she believes. I
w ill undertake to make a greater survey o f the links between the Menexenus and the
Platonic corpus. These links w ill help to clarify som e o f the questions w hich arise from
the Menexenus in addition to allow ing greater understanding (and scope) for the
philosophical ideas expressed in other dialogues.
Socrates, upon learning where M enexenus is com ing from (the C ouncil m eeting),
supposes that his young friend thinks he has com e to the end o f schooling and philosophy
and, since he is sufficiently educated, that he is now prepared to enter upon more
important ventures (xa psi^co), namely p olitics (Mx. 234a-b). This progression o f
philosophy into politics is seen elsewhere in the Platonic dialogues. Socrates makes the
same charge o f A lcibiades, telling him that he is “ rushing into politics before [he’ s] got
an education” (Ale. 1 118b). W hile the assumption that Socrates makes o f Menexenus is
not as serious as the accusation he makes o f A lcibiades, it nevertheless has the same
underlying tone that shows that Socrates thinks that neither o f these young men is ready

27 Coventry 1989: 11.
28 Idem : 14.
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to enter into politics. Indeed, in the Alcibiades, Socrates goes so far as to say that he
thinks m ost o f the politicians (except perhaps Pericles) o f Athens are in this same “ sad
state” (d7topia, Ale. 1 118b-c). Socrates takes this statement further in the Gorgias, when
speaking with C allicles,

concluding that Athens has not known any man w ho proved to

be g ood at politics (Grg. 517a). From these passages, the inference is clear that politics,
for Socrates, is secondary to philosophy. He concludes the Gorgias by telling Callicles
/
that only after they have practiced excellence (acnceiv &perf[v) should they turn their
attentions to politics, chastising C allicles fo r encouraging him to abandon philosophy
earlier in their conversation (Grg. 527d-e). W e as readers know that C allicles’
■v
exhortations fall on d eaf ears; Socrates vow ed to never cease to practice philosophy (Ap.
29d). This explicit link between politics and philosophy expressed in the opening
exchange o f the Menexenus focuses the attention o f the reader: philosophy should com e
before politics, and in the political2
9
30 speech (and rest o f the dialogue) that is to follow , the
reader should be aware o f philosophical ideas expressed. M oreover, the inform ed
Platonic reader w ill be able to relate these ideas in the Menexenus with other Platonic
philosophy.
<r

'

1 ''

'

29 C allicles too, was young and eager to turn his attentions to politics. D odds (1959: 23-4)
notes both C allicles’ and M enexenus’ zeal for ta peiÇcù as a similar theme to argué the
Menexenus as an afterpiece to the Gorgias. Since the tw o dialogues were approximately
contem porary (Henderson 1975: 25), I w onder whether this theme signifies Plato’ s
intention to m ove to m ore important themes in his ow n works, as in the Gorgias and
Phaedrus. Carter (1 9 9 1 :2 1 9 ) notes the link between the tw o by labeling the Menexenus
as the “ practical illustration” to the Gorgias’’ “ theoretical discussion” .
30 See Loraux (2006) Introduction and Chapter 1 for the strong links between Athenian
politics and the Patrios Nomos and Epitaphioi Logoi. The funeral oration is especially
‘ political’ as it has the praise o f the polis as its ultimate topic.
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Once the topic o f the upcom ing epitaphios is reached, Socrates explains the
pow er o f the orators.

Through die pow er o f their em bellished words, they “ ensorcel the

souls” 3
1
323(yor|xeoeiv zag \|/uxa<;, Mx. 235a) o f the listeners, and Socrates, having been
charmed (Kq^eiaOai), believes he has becom e greater in status and m ien; the ringing o f
the orators’ words along with a high and m ighty feeling (aspvoxr|<;) remain for four or
fiv e days until Socrates remembers h im self (dvapipvficJKopai epauxob, Mx. 235c). These
/
terms o f enchantment and witchcraft appear elsewhere in Plato where the effects o f
certain types o f speech are discussed. Both M eno and A lcibiades describe their
experiences in a similar way when speaking o f their participation in the Socratic
elenchus. M eno says that Socrates ensorcels (yorixeueiv), beguiles (cpappdxxsiv), and puts
him under a spell (KaxercqSeiv), making both his m ind and tongue numb (Men. 80a-b),
when he is questioned by him . A lcibiades explains that he feels sim ply out o f place and
confused (Ale. 1 116e) w hile being questioned, but in the Symposium he says that
Socrates doesn’t need instruments like Marsyas to cast spells (Krjtaxv) on people, he does
what Marsyas does with words alone (v|/iX,oi Xdyoi, Smp. 215b-d), and likens the effect o f
his w ords to being drunk (peGueiv, Smp. 215e). The m iopia induced by the Socratic
elenchus is described in terms o f the m agic and witchcraft that Socrates’ words em body.

31 He begins with speaking o f the w onderful praise each man receives, regardless o f his
social status. H ow ever, even i f Plato may not have respected the orators for their ‘ knack’
o f speaking on things they knew nothing about, the purpose o f the genre must have
appealed to him. In the Laws, Clinias and the Athenian determine that deceased citizens
w ho have perform ed excellent achievem ents and have obeyed the laws during their
lifetim e are suitable subjects for panegyrics, whereas men should not be honoured while
living (Lg. 7.801e-802a). Socrates also notes that the orators ascribe traits to the deceased
that they may not have possessed (Mx. 234e-235a). B efore he begins his speech in the
Symposium, he notes that ‘ to praise’ is (rather, appears to be) to ascribe the m ost beautiful
qualities to the thing praised, whether it displays them or not (Smp. 198d-e).
32 A ll translations are m y own, unless otherwise noted.
33 A lso noted by Coventry (1 9 8 9 :1 0 ) and Salkever (1 9 9 3 :1 3 7 ).
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H owever, this type o f description is not reserved for the Socratic elenchus, but is
also applied to the effects o f speeches and rhetoric in Plato (not only in the Menexenus).
In the Gorgias, Socrates m arvels that oratory itself (and not just its effects) is something
“ supernatural” (Saipovia, Grg. 456a). The pow er o f oratory is also described as it is in
the Menexenus. Protagoras is described as talking to groups o f foreigners w ho fo llo w him
like a chorus, charmed (icr|XsTo0ai) by his v oice {Prt. 315a-b),34 Socrates him self also
/
falls under Protagoras’ spell (icr|A,8Ta0ai, Prt. 328d), and Hades is described as perfect
sophist, since he knows how to speak such beautiful words that he is able to enchant
(KaxaicnXetv) everyone— including the Sirens (Cra. 403e).35 W hile speeches are not what
w e w ould regularly associate with Socrates, he does call him self a lover o f speech

{(p&okoyoq, Phdr. 236e,36 spacrrij«; xtov Xoycov, Phdr. 228c). A s he walks with Phaedrus
outside the city, he says that Phaedrus, w ith speech in hand, has found a “ drug” (to
(pappxiKov) to make him follow , since Socrates w ill follow Phaedrus anywhere i f waves a
speech in front o f him {Phdr. 230d-e). O f the similar effects o f wbrds, Socrates says he
was “ alm ost carried away” by the speech o f his accuser (Ap. 17a), he says that the words
o f the Laws echo in his ears and resonate (PopPsiv), leaving him unable to recognize any
other noise ( Cri. 54d)37 and after A gathon’ s speech at the sym posium , Socrates notes that
he is at a loss (dutopeiv) and struck dumb (sKTcXiixxeiv) by his words (Smp 198a-199b).
From these other exchanges, it w ould seem that the pow er o f words is not lim ited to the
Socratic elenchus.

34 A lso noted by R osenstock 1994: 342 n. 18, and Vlastos 1981:189 n.3.
35 A lso noted by Dean-Jones 1995: 56.
36 OiXoXoyo«;, how ever, does not necessarily mean that Socrates is a lover o f the orator’ s
Xoyoi, but m ore likely his ow n Socratic 'koyoq, and the elenchus-style discussion with
words.
37 A lso noted by Salkever 1993:142 n.27.
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H owever, in the case o f the Menexenus, immediately after Socrates gives his
account o f the orators and their craft, M enexenus chides him for always making sport o f
(7ipocr7taiÇeiv) the orators (Mx. 235c). In this w ay, Plato has signaled to readers that
Socrates is not being serious about his ‘ effects’ from the orators’ speeches. This appears
to be something not out-of-the-ordinary, judging by M enexenus’ reaction: he dismisses
Socrates’ making sport o f the orators in fiv e words, and m oves right back to the subject at
/
hand. Indeed, in the Phaedrus, Socrates is again reproached for joking (îtaiÇetv) and for
not being serious (pi) a7tou8aÇeiv) when saying he is in ecstasy38 after listening to
Phaedrus recite Lysias’ speech (Phdr. 234 d-e). I f Socrates is not taken seriously when he
responds in this way to the orators, what does Plato hope the reader to take away from his
inclusion o f such a long response in the M enexenusl
A s inform ed readers o f Plato, w e know that elsewhere Socrates does not fall for
the w iles o f the orators and sophists, but instead turns them on their heads; Protagoras,
Gorgias, and Hippias39 are all unable to maintain their opinions dr answer questions
satisfactorily in their discussions with Socrates. H ow ever, Plato does show us that this
\

type o f hysteria isn’ t com pletely fabricated. In the Phaedrus, Socrates says he knows that
Phaedrus kept after Lysias, begging Lysias to repeat his speech to him, and even after
that, he read the speech again and again until he knew it by heart (Phdr. 228a-c). Socrates
is therefore making light o f those w ho fall prey to the charms o f speeches. It is obviously

38 V lastos 1981:189 n.93 also notes Socrates’ remarks about his frenzied response to the
speech.
39 A ll three try to make their way through the Socratic interview in their eponym ous
dialogues.
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not a behaviour he approves o f, since it w ould disregard the maxim prjdev dyav. The
listeners should be able to resist the influence o f the speakers on their souls.40
The ‘ sorcery’ language used to describe oratory and its effects recalls the
discussion between Socrates and Glaucon in Republic X . B efore m oving on to further
discussion o f the soul, the tw o discuss (and confirm ) their earlier decision to exclude
poetry when founding their city. ‘ Imitative’ (pijiTynicri) poetry is able to distort the
thought (Siavoia41) o f the listeners, unless one possesses a drug, to (pappaicov, to
counteract its effects (R. 10. 595b). These imitative poets have no real knowledge o f what
is being imitated, and their imitation is a kind o f game (iraiSid) that is not to be taken
seriously (ou cncouSfj, R. 10.602b). The w ords o f the imitative poet are m ost dangerous to
the listeners when the listeners are in grief: in this state, they lose the capacity o f rational
deliberation (R. 10.604b-d).42 T o protect on eself and one’ s soul from the destructive
effects o f poetry, one must repeat a countercharm or incantation, srapSrj, o f the truth
about poetry, being on guard not to take it seriously (& 10.608a-b). H owever, Socrates
allow s hymns to the gods and eulogies to g ood people into the city (R. 10.607a). W hile
\

the funeral oration could be classified as a eulogy to good people, the dangers are still
there in the epitaphios. Although Socrates and Glaucon are discussing the effects o f
poetry, in the Gorgias, Socrates and C allicles, when discussing oratory, determine that if
one should strip away m elody, rhythm, and meter from poetry, all one w ould be left with
w ould be speeches, and that it is oratory that the poets practice in the theatres ( Grg. 502cd).

40 [oi prjTopeq] yor|TSUoocnv i|pc5v zaq \|/U3£a<;, Mnx. 235a.
41 This is actually a part o f the soul, and so poetry, like oratory, also harms the soul.
42 Presumably, the loss o f ‘ rational deliberation’ w ould cause one to lose track o f him self,
be struck dumb, or be at a loss, all effects w hich are attributed to oratory as well.
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The danger o f the epitaphios is n ow clear: this oratory, as Socrates describes,
ensorcels the soul, and since it is like poetry, it specifically ensorcels a very important
part o f the soul: the Sidvoia; Socrates h im self is partaking in the act o f pipricn^ by
repeating A spasia’ s words, and admits that by repeating them, he w ould be playing
(mxi^siv, Mx. 23 6c); and the audience o f the epitaphios is especially vulnerable since they
w ould be m ourning, as w ould be expected o f them by the Patrios Nomos and by
/
Athenian burial custom s (and b y m ourning they w ould ignore the m axim jxrjSev dyav),
and they w ould therefore lack the ability o f rational discourse (to (pappaicov) to
determine what is true and what is not in the speech. I f the audience lacks the ability to
discern the truth, then Socrates’ (Aspasia’ s) speech is especially troubling: riddled with
anachronisms, om issions, and falsities, the ‘ truth’ about Athens’ history in his version is
difficult to find. H ow ever, at the end o f the speech, neither Menexenus nor Socrates
appears to have been ensorcelled.43
W ith all these dangers present, h ow is this possible? It is possible that since
M enexenus is part o f Socrates’ circle,44 he may know the dangers and how to repeat the
countercharm (n eroaSrj) to hims e lf to protect his soul. H owever, from Socrates’ defense

43 Carter (1991: 230) believes that Socrates has ensorcelled him self during the delivery o f
his speech, and it is M enexenus speaking that snaps him back to reality. I believe that
Socrates’ m atter-of-fact statement at the end o f his speech (“ There you have it,
M enexenus, the speech o f Aspasia the M ilesian” , 249d) shows that he is quite aware o f
him self, and indeed is able to carry on a conversation with Menexenus immediately
afterwards. W ickkiser (1999: 70-1) agrees that neither Socrates nor Menexenus are
overpow ered by the speech. He instead notes the reason as the fact that they are outside
o f the ritual context: it is not a real epitaphios that Socrates delivers; these are words
“ without attendant actions” .
44 A s proved by his attendance at Socrates’ last hours in the Phaedo (59b), although at
this youthful age, M enexenus likely has not reached the end o f his philosophical training
(as indeed Socrates thinks at 234a) and m ay not be advanced enough to know the
countercharm.
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in the Apology, w e know he w ould never w illingly put one o f his ‘ follow ers’ into a worse
state (Ap. 25e-26a), so he w ould be remiss to put M enexenus’ soul at risk without
cautioning him about the dangers. The answer lies in how Socrates uses the oratory, and
in its content. In the Gorgias, Socrates notes that oratory has tw o parts: the first is
flattery, and the other is “ that o f getting the souls o f the citizens to be as good as possible
and o f striving valiantly to say what is best” (Grg. 503a). In the Apology, Socrates notes
/
that the greatest good (peyioxov ayaOov, Ap. 38a) is to discuss virtue daily— this indeed is
the aim o f philosophy. Plato has Socrates display the nobler part o f oratory discussed in
the Gorgias, using it to transmit philosophical ideas45 that w ill protect the soul from the
dangers o f ‘ im itative’ discourse. This type o f oratory, when coupled with philosophy, is
safe and beneficial for the listener, and so Socrates has no reason to warn Menexenus o f
what is to follow .
A fter M enexenus chides Socrates for making fun o f the orators and brings their
discussion back to the topic o f the C ouncil’ s selection for the epitaphios, he expresses
how difficult it must be for a speaker to have such short notice to deliver a speech.
Socrates responds notably, “ For i f it is necessary to praise the Athenians w ell among

l
Peloponnesians, or the Peloponnesians am ong Athenians, there w ould be need o f a
r

persuasive and highly esteemed orator. But whenever som eone com petes am ong those
men w hom he praises, it is no great thing to seem to speak w ell” (Mx. 235d). In the

Gorgias, when Socrates is examining C allicles, he says “ each group o f people takes
delight in speeches that are given in its ow n character, and resents those given in an alien

45 The philosophical ideas are tacit throughout the historical account o f Athens, but once
Socrates resumes speaking in his ow n (or Aspasia’ s) voice and in the voice o f the
deceased, this exhortation to virtue is stronger (Mx. 246a-249c).
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manner” ( Grg. 513c). It is likely for this reason, that people take delight in their ow n type
o f speeches, that Plato decided to experiment with the exclusively Athenian epitaphios to
expound his feelings about Athens. It is also likely that the ch oice o f the epitaphios has
afforded Plato m ore freedom than other genres w ould. H is history o f Athens at first
glance, although distorted, appears favourable to Athens. But upon closer examination,
Athens’ m otives for actions are untrue, and she acts oppositely to ideals attributed to her.
/
(For exam ple, at Mx. 242d, it is expressed that it is appropriate to fight those o f thé same
stock only to the point o f victory, but to bring barbarians to utter destruction. H owever, at

Mx. 246a, the Athenians have saved the Great K ing o f Persia, but have driven the
Spartans, fellow Greek-speakers, clear out o f the sea.) H owever, since Plato is speaking
o f Athens am ong the Athenians, it is not difficult to please them, and they are perhaps
wont to hear only the “ praise” bestow ed upon their polis.
Since it is apparently not difficult, according to Socrates, to com e up with a
speech on short notice and praise Athenians am ong Athenians, Menexenus asks Socrates
i f he thinks he w ould be able to deliver the speech i f the C ouncil chose him (Mx. 235e).
Socrates replies that it wouldn’ t be a surprise i f he could, since he has a fine teacher o f
rhetoric (Aspasia). This response may com e as a bit o f surprise for the inform ed reader,
since elsewhere Socrates expresses his inability to make speeches. W hen speaking with
G orgias, Polus, and C allicles, Socrates asks many times for his interlocutors to keep their
responses short (e.g. Grg. 4 6 Id ), asking them to respond how he prefers. In the

Protagoras, Socrates almost ends the discussion since Protagoras does not want to
engage in shorter discourse. Socrates claim s he isn’ t able to make the long speeches and
contend with Protagoras in paKpoXoyia (Prt. 335c), when in truth, he does outdo
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Protagoras in speech.46 In the Phaedrus, Socrates notes he has no art o f speaking (oh

T8xyn<; Tivoq too Xeyeiv jiexoxo«;, Phdr. 262d), and instead holds the local gods
responsible for his delivery o f the tw o earlier speeches. H owever, when they discuss
Lysias’ speech, Socrates has m ore know ledge o f the rhetorical techniques and technical
terms than Phaedrus (Phdr. 266d ff.).47 I f in actuality, Socrates is perfectly capable o f

paKpoXoyia and delivering rhetorical speeches, why does he profess inability in the
/
Gorgias, Protagoras, and Phaedrus? The answer lies in the interlocutors. A s seen in
other dialogues (e.g. the Hippias M inor), Socrates must be careful in how he interacts
with his interlocutors48 lest they cease to participate in the discussion (as Protagoras
threatens to do). Socrates is attempting to allow them to preserve their social face by
“ yielding” to them in giving speeches. Gorgias is a fam ous orator, Protagoras, likewise, is
a (self-adm itted49) sophist, renowned at paKpoXoyia50, and although Phaedrus isn’ t in a
position o f losing his ow n social face, it is Lysias (although absent) w ho must be
protected on behalf o f Phaedrus, w ho looks up to and admires hiin.T f Socrates bested his
speeches and admitted to being able to produce finer works than Lysias, Lysias w ould
lose social face to Phaedrus. In the Menexenus, how ever, there is no one other than the
nameless orators w ho present a challenge. Here Socrates is able to safely show his
rhetorical ability with M enexenus: they are alone, in a liminal situation, w hich is
obviously secluded enough that Socrates w ould be obliged to strip naked and dance,

46 Coventry 1 9 89 :4.
47 Ibid.
48 A t least those w ho are ‘ esteem ed’ . Indeed, those w ho have (the appearance o f)
know ledge are those that Socrates is the m ost interested in as interlocutors. C f. Ap. 21b-c
ff., where Socrates describes how he attempted to refute the oracle by going to examine
“ all those w ho had any reputation for know ledge” (Ap. 21e).
49 Prt. 317b-c
50 Prt. 335a
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should M enexenus ask him to (M t.236c-d). A lso, although he attributes the speech to
Aspasia, it w ould appear that he is unable to fo o l M enexenus (Me. 249 d-e) into thinking
that he is not the real author o f the speech.
M enexenus now asks Socrates what he w ould say i f he was chosen. Socrates says
he heard Aspasia the day before giving an appropriate speech for the occasion (Me. 236ab ). This attribution to som eone else (w hile not necessary as discussed above), is
/
paralleled in the Phaedrus, where Socrates attributes his tw o speeches to Phaedrus and
Stesichorus ( Phdr. 244a). M enexenus asks Socrates i f he w ould remember Aspasia’ s
speech, and Socrates replies that he learned it from her, and that he narrowly escaped a
beating whenever he forgot the w ords (Me. 236b-c). A forgetful Socrates also begs o f
Protagoras to not speak at such lengths: “ I tend to be a forgetful sort o f person, and i f
som eone speaks to m e at length, I tend to forget the subject o f the speech” ( Prt. 334cd).51*It w ould seem that Socrates w ould be a difficult student o f rhetoric for Aspasia.
Socrates does, how ever, bring out frustration in all his teachers. Connus, Socrates’ m usic
teacher, gets angry with him whenever Socrates doesn’ t give in to him, and he has less
\

effort to teach him since he thinks he’ s stupid (apaOrjc;, Euthd. 295d).

Diotim a, too, gets

frustrated with Socrates, but does not call him stupid or strike him (Smp. 204b, 207c).
Socrates is thus reluctant to engage in education in the manner prescribed to him by his
teachers. Oratory and rhetoric were at the forefront o f education o f the sophists, not
necessarily o f philosophy. H owever, since the epitaphios provides a listening audience,
Plato is able to utilize it for education. Plato too, gets frustrated with Athens, as proven

51 A lso noted by
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.

Coventry 1989: 6.
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by the criticism in the ‘ historical’ account o f Athens— but he is able to set it aside to
encourage the Athenians to do better in future generations, reminding them o f the glory
o f the past, and by inserting philosophical ideals so they can better serve Athens. Perhaps
Plato was aware that he could catch m ore flies with honey as it were, by showing the
Athenians the noble w ay to serve the polis through rhetoric and philosophy together.
Socrates is reluctant to repeat the speech for M enexenus, fearing that Menexenus
/
w ill laugh at him (Kaxayskav), i f he seems to still play (exi rcai^eiv) when he’ s an old man
(.Mx. 236c). Likew ise, Phaedrus plays co y , pretending to not want to recite Lysias’
speech, when “ he was going to recite it even i f he had to force an unwilling audience to
listen” (Phdr. 228 b -c). Since Socrates is a “ lover o f speeches” , it is possible to assume
that Socrates also w ould love the opportunity to tell M enexenus the speech. Although, he
does express the same sentiment at the start o f his defense, saying “ it w ould not be fitting
at m y age, as it m ight be for a young man, to toy with words when I appear before you”

(Ap. 17c).54 The use o f Ttai^stv has led som e to cite this as a reason why w e should not
take the follow in g speech seriously. H ow ever, there is yet another passage in Plato where
there is a conversation on what is and is not ‘ age-appropriate’ which I believe to be m ore
pertinent to this com m ent in the Menexenus.55 In the Gorgiás, Callicles is attempting to
persuade Socrates to m ove away from philosophy and towards politics. Callicles notes
that philosophy is fine, so long as it is done in moderation, and at the appropriate time o f
life, but i f one pursues it beyond that appropriate time, he w ill be inexperienced in

54 A lso noted by R osenstock 1994: 338 n. 12.
55 A lso in the Laches (201 a-b), Socrates, upon being asked w ho w ould make a good
teacher for the young boys, determines that he and his interlocutors all are still in need o f
education. H e suggests that i f anyone laughs at them for wanting to spend time in school
at their age, they should confront them w ith a line o f H om er (“ M odesty is not a good
mate for a needy man” , Od. 17.347).
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everything a man should know . He says it is not shameful to partake o f philosophy while
still a boy, but when one pursues it when they are older, it is ridiculous (icaxayeXaoxoi;).
He believes that men w ho philosophize are very m uch like men “ who speak haltingly and
play (rcai^eiv) like children” ( Grg. 484c-485e). It is this passage that is m ore pertinent to
the speech that follow s because the speech contains elements o f Plato’ s philosophy. By
dism issing the speech as irony, parody, or play, thus taking away any serious credence
/
from what follow s, w e w ould sell Plato short.
B efore Socrates obliges M enexenus’ requests to relate the speech, he notes that he

must oblige, since they are alone— and that even i f M enexenus bid him to strip naked and
dance, he w ould have to oblige (Mx. 236c-d). In the Phaedrus, it is Phaednis w ho uses
the fact that they are alone to force Socrates to deliver his speech (P/*dr. 236c-d).
Although Socrates again claim s that he w ill be ridiculous (yekoxoq), he does give in and
deliver his speech. This aspect o f lim inality, I argue, (being alone, whether outside the
city as in the Phaedrus, or in the city as in the M enexenus,) creates a ‘ safe’ environment
for Socrates to let his ow n front o f knowing-that-he-knows-nothing drop.
There are few er links to the other Platonic dialogues through the first section o f
the epitaphios, where Socrates recounts the historical exploits o f the Athenians, but that
is not to say that they don’ t exist. Early in the speech, Socrates utters the gnom ic
aphorism “ men are good because o f being bom from good men” (ayaBoi 5e sysvovxo 8ia
xo (puvai

ayaOcov, Mx. 237a). Likew ise, in the Alcibiades, Socrates and A lcibiades

make the inference that those “ w ho are b om w ell w ill turn out to be perfectly virtuous”

(Ale. 1 120e). Both dialogues go on to stress that it is not only because men are b om w ell
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that they are good, but they must also be nurtured w ell to be good.565
7In the Menexenus,
Socrates gives the first men sprung from the earth itself as an example, for w ho else is
better to nourish mankind than the earth w hich provides their 7nyyfi xpo(pf|q (Mx. 237d238a), and in the Alcibiades, Socrates speaks o f the lavish upbringing o f the Spartan and
Persian royal children (Ale. 1 121b-122b). W e can therefore make a final inference
ourselves from the similarities o f Socrates’ (and ultimately Plato’ s) words: in order for
/
men to be good, it is not a question o f g ood nature versus good nurture, but that it is
necessary for men to be good by their nature and their nurture.
A s Socrates continues through the speech, there are m ore similarities to the

Republic that com e up. Although Hie Republic is m uch later than the Menexenus, it is
possible that the thoughts that occur in our dialogue are either still being form ed by Plato,
or were com pletely form ed, but had not found their proper context until he wrote the

Republic. Plato is not hesitant to include stories from myth in his dialogues (e.g. the tale
o f Prometheus in the Protagoras). In the Menexenus, he relatesihe autochthonous origin
o f the Athenians (Mx. 237b-238b). This tale is m ore fitting for the poets than for the
historians. In the Republic, Socrates again uses the tale o f an autochthonous origin as a
“ noble falsehood” . B y persuading the city that he is founding that they were fashioned
and nurtured by the earth, their true m other, he hopes that the citizens w ill more
C -J

vigorously defend and protect their land, w hich is their mother (R. 3.414d-415a).

56 Perhaps this is the reason w hy Socrates stresses the proper education in philosophy for
M enexenus (and for A lcibiades): w e know he must be b om from good stock i f his fam ily
always provides a guardian (£7ap£Xsxf|g) for the city, but it is his upbringing that is just as
cm cial to his future actions.
57 C ollins and Stauffer (1999: 98) also note the autochthonous story in Republic 3.
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The second reflection found in the Republic com es at Menexenus 242d. Socrates
states that when warring against an enem y o f the same stock, the war should be fought
only to a point o f victory, whereas when warring against a barbarian enem y, the war
should bring the barbarians to utter destruction. W hen Socrates and Glaucon are
discussing their soldiers, they com e to the same conclusions: “ when Greeks battle with
barbarians or barbarians with Greeks, w e’ ll say that they’ re natural enemies and that such
/
■
hostilities are to be called war. But when Greeks fight with Greeks, w e’ ll say that they are
natural friends and that in such circum stances Greece is sick (voosTv) and divided into
factions (axaoid^eiv) and that such hostilities are to be called civil war” (R. 470c-d).
This is similar term inology to that w hich is used to (euphem istically) describe the civil
war in Athens in the Menexenus-. “ The civ il war was fought by us in such a way that i f it
were fated for men to engage in strife (oxacnd^siv), in no other way w ould they pray for
their ow n city to be sick (vooetv)” (Me. 243e). For Plato, war is only just against foreign
barbarians. Against one’ s ow n stock, that is, fellow Greek-speakers, war is a sickness that
is neither justifiable nor just.
A fter Socrates concludes relating Athens’ exploits, he turns to address the
listeners o f his speech (he is, o f course, im agining that there is a proper audience as there
w ould be at the Patrios Nomos, but all w ho read the dialogue can be counted among this
number). H e says that all who remember the deeds o f die war dead ought to exhort the
children “just as in war, not to leave the post (xa Bp;) o f their ancestors or fall back and
yield to v ice” ( Mx. 246b). Plato uses this turn o f phrase frequently in discussions o f
courage, w hich is by definition a part o f virtue. In the Phaedrus, when Socrates is5
8

58 A lso cited by Coventry 1 9 89 :13 .
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speaking o f the soul in terms o f a charioteer and his team o f w inged horses, the phrase o f
abandoning one’ s post describes the cow ardice and unmanliness caused by the
charioteer’ s (and the one horse’ s) fear (Phdr. 254c). In the Laches, where Socrates and
his interlocutors discuss courage, “ to remain at one’ s post (xa^ic;)” is Laches’ first
definition o f courage (La. 190e). During Socrates’ defense, he notes that “ wherever a
man has taken a position (xa^u;) that he believes to be best, or has been placed by his
/
com m ander, there he must I think remain and face danger, without a thought for death or
anything else, rather than disgrace” (Ap. 28d-e).59 Plato has the Laws use similar diction
in the CriYo, saying that i f the city com m ands you to do anything at all, one must obey,
and not leave on e’ s post (xafyq) or retreat, since it is im pious to bring violence against
on e’ s country (Cri. 5 lb -c ). Since the speech is over the war dead, one w ould expect
w ords on courage and valor to be spoken. H ow ever, Plato uses this term inology
elsewhere when discussing virtue60 (and courage), so when it is mentioned here, w e, the
inform ed readers o f Plato, are rem inded o f the different applications o f the term xa^ic;.
Socrates continues in the next sentence, saying that for his part, for the rest o f
\

tim e, whenever he meets with (¿vxuyxdvsiv) anyone, he w ill remind and exhort them to
be zealous to be the best they can be (dx; apiaxoi, Mx. 246b-c). Likew ise, in the Apology,
he vow s that as long as he draws breath and is able to, he w ill always practice philosophy
and exhort anyone he meets (svxoyxdveiv) to care for w isdom , truth, and the best possible
state o f their soul (6 naq (bq (ieXviovT] earai,A p. 29d-e).61 In the Menexenus, it is Plato

59 A lso noted by Coventry 1 9 89 :14 , and Dean-Jones 1995: 54.
60 C f. Grg. 506c-508b (esp. 5 0 6 e l-2 ), where Socrates asserts that virtue is a xo^iç (proper
order/arrangement).
61 A lso cited by Coventry 1 9 89:14, Dean-Jones 1995: 54, and C ollins & Stauffer 1999:
105 n. 43.
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w ho gives Socrates the breath to carry on, continually practicing philosophy, and
exhorting those w ho listen to him to care for their soul (knowing that philosophy is the
care o f the soul).

In the Protagoras, exhorting the youth to be as good as they possibly

can (cb<5 PsXtioxoi) is the w ork o f the parents, nurse, and tutor o f the child (Prt. 325d). In
the Gorgias, as noted earlier, Socrates mentions the tw o parts o f oratory, one o f which is
getting the souls o f the citizens to be as g ood as possible (dx; PsA/ciotoi, Grg. 503a). In
/
this w ay, Plato has chosen oratory to allow Socrates to carry out his avow ed work,
making Socrates into an e7tipeA,Tyn!j<; o f the citizens’ souls.
The connections from this point to the end o f the speech com e closer together, but
with not as many serious deductions being drawn. The references to Plato’ s philosophy
com e fast and furiously as the speech winds down. W hen Socrates acts as a proxy for the
dead men by relating what they w ould have wanted to tell their fam ilies and fellow
citizens, he tells the children that there is no one w ho w ould be the friend o f one w ho
shames his ow n people, either on the earth when living or underihe earth when dead (.Mx.
246d). Likew ise, in the Lysis, just before Socrates ends his examination o f Lysis, they
make the inference that unless one is w ise, useful, and good , he w ill have no friends, not
even am ong close relatives (Ly. 210d). B oth dialogues use examples o f those w ho w ould
be considered m ost likely to be a friend, nam ely fam ily members or gods, and explain
that even these figures w ould not be able to look past what one does wrong in order to
still care for them. A nd so, it is thus seen how Socrates (and Plato) believes that one who
is not good to his ow n people is also not g ood to him self; that man w ill lead his life alone6
2

62 W ith regards to using the rhetoric o f the Menexenus as a vehicle for philosophy, note
Socrates’ w ords: “ isn’ t the rhetorical art, taken as a w hole, a way o f directing the soul by
means o f speech, not only in the law courts and on other public occasions, but also in
private?” ( Phdr. 261a), and “ the nature o f speech is to direct the soul” (Phdr. 271d).
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and have no one to help him know what he does and does not know, giving no benefit to
his ancestors. In this vein, Socrates encourages the children o f the war dead that i f they
do anything at all, to practice it with virtue (ámcsTv ¡J£x’ ápsxfj<;,63 Mx. 246e). The
sentiment is repeated in the Gorgias, where Socrates concludes his story o f the judgm ent
o f the souls in the Underworld. Socrates tells C allicles that “ nothing terrible w ill happen
to you i f you really are an admirable and g ood man (icaXxx; icayaGó«;), one who practices
virtue” (ácncsív apstf|v, Grg. 527d). A s far as Plato is concerned, “ only the virtuous can
acquire philosophy” ,64 so the tw o (virtue and philosophy) g o hand in hand. B y exhorting
the children to lead their lives with apexfj, he is exhorting them to lead the philosophical
life. .

■:
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The dead m en continue to speak to their survivors through Socrates, encouraging
them to surpass them in renown (eincAnia, Mx. 247a). In the Republic, when Adeimantus
and Socrates discuss the education o f the citizens, they note that once the city is started
properly, it w ill continue grow ing in a pattern, since “ g ood education and upbringing,
when they are preserved, produce good natures, and useful natures, w ho are in turn w ell
educated, grow up even better than their predecessors, both in their offspring and in other
respects” (R. 4.424a-b). The consequence o f a poor showing by the descendents is
shame and ¿/^honour, since it is shameful for a man supposing he is something (xi sivai)
to allow him self to be honoured not for his ow n virtue, but for his ancestors’ (Mx. 247b).
It is this shame that Socrates does not want to fall upon his ow n sons. In his defense

63 W hile apexi) in this context, com ing from the mouths o f the deceased warriors, could
be interpreted by the audience as military virtue, i.e. bravery, like the application o f the
term xciZp;, apsxfj here w ould im ply (philosophical) virtue for the inform ed Platonic
reader.
64 Stem 1974: 508.
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speech, he exhorts the citizens: “ when m y sons grow up, avenge yourselves by causing
them the same kind o f grief that I caused you , i f you think they care for m oney or
anything else m ore than they care for virtue, or i f they think they are som ebody (xi sivai)
when they are nobody” (Ap. 41 e ).65 In actuality, Plato has allow ed Socrates him self to
exhort his ow n sons again66 (should they happen to m eet with the Menexenus) by giving
him this address to the children o f the m en w ho died on behalf o f Athens.67
/
Socrates continues, now turning his attention to the parents o f the war dead. He
encourages them to bear their g rie f as easily as possible, by observing the maxim pr|8èv
ayav (nothing in excess), because the man w ho depends on him self, and not on other
people, is w ise, courageous, and prudent (Mx. 247c-248a). This D elphic inscription
provides a basis for the philosophic man according to Plato. For example, in the

Republic, the decent man is m ost self-sufficient in living, and has the least need o f
anyone else. He also w ill be the least likely to give w ay to lamentations (i.e. is not
excessive), and he w ill bear his m isfortunes m ost quietly (R. 3.387d-e).68 This man is the

65 A lso noted by R osenstock 1994: 340.
Dean-Jones (CQ 1995) sees the M enexenus in the Menexenus to be Socrates’ youngest
son, and not the Menexenus that is an interlocutor in the Lysis and present in the Phaedo.
This other ‘ identity’ o f Socrates’ interlocutor w ould only be able to be apparent to the
reader after Socrates describes historical events beyond his execution. I w ould like to
believe that Plato w ould intend these tw o identities to coexist: on the main level, it is the
M enexenus o f the Lysis w ho Socrates ‘ plays’ (itai^stv) with, inserting his philosophical
ideas, whereas for his son M enexenus (a frame o f identity behind the main level),
Socrates is m ore serious, giving direct advice to the son who was but an infant when he
died.
Plato w ould have seen Socrates’ death as a death on behalf o f Athens— he continuously
worked to im prove the souls o f the citizens, like a gadfly, even though the Athenians
were too ignorant to understand that his Socratic dialogue was not intended to shame and
embarrass people, but to bring the participants closer to the “ G ood” . C f. Ap. 38c ff. where
Plato has Socrates him self describe what fate w ill befall the Athenians follow ing his
execution.
68 A lso noted by Collins and Stauffer 1999: 111.
<*<7
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type o f man who does not fear death i f it is necessary to die in the present moment (Mx.
248b). Indeed, this man is truly w ise, since “ to fear death is no other than to think on eself
w ise when one is not, to think one knows what one does not know. N o one knows
whether death may not be the greatest o f all blessings for a man, yet men fear it as i f they
knew that it is the greatest o f evils” (Ap. 29a-b). Socrates is encouraging the parents o f
the deceased m en to be the epitom e o f the philosophical man expressed elsewhere in
Plato: he must be moderate, sensible, and w ise— to know what he knows, and what he
does not know.

Having reached the end o f the dialogue, it is now clear that the Menexenus cannot
sim ply be a parody, nor is it only showing philosophy as necessary for politics (see n.
12). The Menexenus itself uses ‘ inserted’ genre to demonstrate philosophy that can be
seen elsewhere in the Platonic corpus. Through the links to other dialogues (fourteen
other dialogues, in fact), the content o f the Menexenus and othefw orks is made clearer,
thus putting the Menexenus squarely in a position o f a ‘ philosophic’ dialogue, and not
\

m erely a o n e -o ff departure into the Funeral Oration.
Since the Menexenus does not contain a typical elenchus as many o f the other
Platonic dialogues, where the same topics o f virtue are wont to spur the same
conclusions, the similar fragments from the other dialogues occurring in the epitaphios
are evident as they occur throughout the work. It is especially o f note that the fragments
that occur are specific examples o f com m on themes: the need o f education, rhetoric,
nature versus nurture, courage, and virtue. These topics com prise som e o f the themes that
are explored elsewhere in Socratic/Platonic philosophy. Even when he is working with an
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inserted genre, Plato consciously chooses to write the w ork specifically making mention
o f those topics that are critical to him , and ultimately to the character o f Socrates. These
reflections in the Menexenus from other w orks in the corpus have, as demonstrated
above, brought issues o f the Menexenus into clearer view in addition to clarifying things
from other dialogues. In this way, the M enexenus itself is like Aspasia’ s epitaphios:
partially com posed on the spur o f the m om ent, and partially prepared by stringing
/
together bits and pieces from other dialogues.

35

C h apter

Two

The A pology o f Socrates: Plato as Logographos

In the previous chapter, I examined the Menexenus, and argued that it cannot be
separated from the philosophic Platonic corpus as a o n e -o ff departure into the genre o f
the epitaphios. In that dialogue, Socrates (and Plato, by extension), is doing something
/
significantly philosophical, and not just rhetorical, by “ inserting” the Funeral Oration
genre. In this w ay, the Menexenus presents a philosophical orator. That is to say that
Plato presents Socrates as delivering an oration for the sake o f delivering an oration, but
Plato sim ply does not allow his Socrates to deliver it without the typical philosophy that
is critical to his character. In the A pology o f Socrates, I argue, we are presented with an
oratorical (rhetorical) philosopher.12 In this work, Socrates presents him self as a
philosopher, asking the jury to accept him speaking in his accustom ed manner, since he is
inexperienced in forensic oratory (axe'/y&q ouv ^svcoc; sx® T'l(5

“ I am

therefore sim ply a stranger to the manner o f speaking here” , Ap. 17e). Again, as in the

Menexenus, Plato has set aside the Socratic interview to present another “ inserted” genre.
Similarly to the Menexenus, what is presented on the surface does not always hold
true under scrutiny. The A pology is presented as a w ork (in the form o f a speech, since
for the m ajority o f its duration, Socrates does not have an interlocutor) in w hich Socrates
represents and defends his entire life ’ s w ork to the Athenians. O f course, Socrates’ life ’ s
w ork has been his philosophy, and reality was kind enough to present to Plato an actual
realm where he could have his literary Socrates explain his beliefs. Socrates claim s that

1 “ In the proem ium , the orator stands in for the philosopher.” (Leibow itz 2 0 1 0 :1 3 )
2 A ll translations are m y ow n, unless otherwise noted.
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he w ill defend him self in his usual w ay, and indeed he does use a b rief elenchus to refute
M eletus, but is that claim able to hold true in a courtroom speech? Historical events
aside, w hy w ould Plato insert a genre only to deny using it? Som e have resolved this
con flict by sim ply explaining the defense in the A pology as not to be taken seriously, and
labeling it a parody.3 1 believe that Plato has indeed used many topoi and methods o f the
orators in Socrates’ defense speech.4 Just as philosophy can be found in the Menexenus,

/
so too can strong links to forensic oratory be found in the Apology, in contrast to
Socrates’ claim that he w ill speak in his usual way— the way he speaks in the
marketplace and around the city. Plato, as seen in the Symposium, had a “ masterful ability
to imitate other prose stylists” ,56
7and the defense speech in the Apology has been described
as a “ rhetorical masterpiece” . The A pology has also been described as a parody, like the

Menexenus. In the first part o f this chapter, I w ill argue that Plato has com posed Socrates’
defense to be rhetorical. Plato makes use o f the traditional topoi o f forensic oratory, and
even em ploys specific intertextual parallels with G orgias’ Defense o f Palamedes—
Socrates expresses similar beliefs to Palamedes, and in the same manner. These
similarities show Plato seeking to fit into a literary tradition o f written defense speeches.
A fter demonstrating the strong oratorical presence in the Apology, I w ill then argue
against the b e lie f that Socrates has lied about his intentions (with respect to oratory) in
his defense. Plato has Socrates redefine the terms o f his engagement with oratory, and

3 Feaver, D ouglas D . and John E. Hare. 1981. “ The A pology as an Inverted Parody o f
R hetoric.” Arethusa 14:2 0 5-1 6 .
^
4 W hether o f not Socrates him self used these topoi in his historical speech is beyond the
scope o f this work. The fact that Plato used them in his w ork is sufficient for m y thesis.
5 Brickhouse & Smith 1989: 51.
6 Ober 1998: 168.
7 Burnet 1924: 67, Feaver & Hare 1981: 205.
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therefore Socrates is consistent with his use o f oratory in the Apology and his discussions
o f it elsewhere in the Platonic dialogues. Finally, because Socrates’ use o f oratory is
required to com m unicate with his audience that does not understand his philosophy, I
argue that the label o f ‘ parody’ cannot be applied, and w e are to take Plato’ s use o f the
inserted forensic genre as serious.

Although these tw o dialogues share a particular trait in the inserted genre o f A ttic
oratory, the A pology 8 differs from the Menexenus in many other aspects. Whereas the

Menexenus is one o f the lesser-known w orks o f Plato, the Apology has been widely
studied.8
9 For the purpose and scope o f this thesis, w hich does not undertake to make a
com plete and exhaustive study o f the A pology, but a study o f specific aspects o f it, an
entire survey o f scholarship on the A pology is not appropriate: a general overview o f the
scholarship (with som e specific works m entioned) w ill have to suffice.10 For many
students o f Ancient Greek, the A pology is one o f the first texts o f ‘ real Greek’ that they
encounter, and thus there are sim ple commentaries with basic grammatical notes.11 There

8 From this point on, I shall refer to the ‘ A pology o f Socrates’ , its full title, as sim ply the
A pology .
9 This is not to say that the A pology is any less difficult than the Menexenus to
understand, just that many m ore attempts have been made. N or does it necessarily mean
that the A pology is any m ore ‘ clear’ after all the scholarly discussion.
10 For large bibliographies on a variety o f issues in the Apology, see especially
Brickhouse & Smith (1989), Socrates on Trial. (For m ore recent bibliography, see M iller
& Platter [2009], P lato’s Apology o f Socrates?)
11A selected list: Burnet, J. 1924. P lato’s Euthyphro, Apology o f Socrates, and Crito;
H elm , James J. 1981. Plato. A pology: Text & Grammatical Commentary, M iller, Paul
A llen and Charles Platter. 2010. P lato’s A pology o f Socrates: A Commentary, Riddell,
James. 1877. The A pology o f Plato.
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are also countless translations, som e with minimal

or full commentary.

B eyond this,

there are works that present a full analysis o f the dialogue, generally proceeding in a
linear fashion through the text,1
2
1
3
14 som etim es also with a full com m entary.15 There are also
monographs that look at the A pology not as a w hole, but at specific aspects o f it,
collections o f essays,16 various topical journal articles, and works that use the A pology as
a means to explain Platonic philosophy as a w hole, or various aspects o f the Platonic
/
dialogues.17
There are nearly as many theories about and interpretations o f the Apology as
there are publications. Unlike the Menexenus, the A pology has not been questioned on its
authenticity.18 The uncertain ‘ authenticity’ o f the speech lies in Plato’ s account o f it: has
he recorded what Socrates actually said, what he wished Socrates w ould have said, or,
like Thucydides’ aim ,19 has he written what he remembered and was appropriate to say?
Plato deliberately tries to create an im pression o f historicity in this dialogue: there are no
.

"

'

v

12 E .g., A llen, R.E. 1984. The Dialogues o f Plato (V ol. 1); W est, Thomas G. and Grace
Starry W est. 1998. Four Texts on Socrates: P lato’s Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito, and
Aristophanes ’ Clouds.
13 E .g., Stokes, M ichael C. 1997. Plato: A pology o f Socrates.
14 Brickhouse, Thomas C. and N icholas D . Smith. 1989. Socrates on Trial, and 2004.
Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Plato and The Trial o f Socrates; Leibow itz, David.
2010. The Ironic D efense o f Socrates; W est, Thomas G. 1979. P lato’s Apology o f
Socrates: An Interpretation, with a new Translation.
15 Strycker, E. de. 1994. Plato's A pology o f Socrates: A Literary and Philosophical Study
with a Running Commentary. (Edited and com pleted by S.R. Slings).
16 E .g., Reexamining Socrates in the A pology. 2009. Eds. Patricia Fagan and John
Russon.
17 A selected list: Nightingale, Andrea. 1995. Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the
Construct o f Philosophy; Ober, Josiah. 1998. Political Dissent in Democratic Athens:
Intellectual Critics o f Popular Rule; Schofield, M alcolm . 2006. Plato: Political
Philosophy.
18 “ There is virtually universal agreement am ong scholars that Plato did indeed write the
A pology that has com e dow n to us under his name” (Brickhouse & Smith 1989: 1).
19Thuc. 1.22
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anachronisms (as in the M enexenus), he h im self is present at the proceedings (Ap. 34a,
38b), and it is narrated as direct action202
1(i.e., no ‘ story-within-a-story’ ). Although other
accounts o f Socrates’ defense (X enophon, A pology) differ in som e aspects, they agree on
}
many main aspects, and other ancient sources seem to accept Plato’ s w ork as a reliable
account. A .E . Taylor suggests that Plato “ revised” Socrates’ speech as Demosthenes
w ould revise his ow n before publication,

01

whereas W .K .C . Guthrie argues that i f Plato

/
did alter the speech, it was to provide a fuller picture o f “ what he saw in Socrates” , in
order to defend his life “ as a w hole” .222
3M . Schofield com es to the conclusion that I
believe is the best guiding principle fo r a study o f Platonic dialogues (and specifically the

A pology) from the aspect o f Plato as an author :

“It is obvious... that even if Plato accurately reproduces the main topics
covered in their original order, the detailed development each receives and its
concrete literary and argumentative texture will have been at least as much
Platonic as Socratic, however faithful to Socrates he intended to be. This is
what makes it appropriate to treat Apology... as in some sense a crystallization
o f Platonic reflection on Socrates, not simply Socrates’ selfcharacterization.” 24

Other issues o f debate on the A pology are the use and extent o f irony in Socrates’

20 L eibow itz 2010: 6.
21 Taylor, A .E . 1960. Plato: The Man and His Work. p. 156
22 Guthrie, W .K .C . 1986. A History o f G reek Philosophy, vol. 4: Plato: The Man and His
Dialogues: Earlier Period, pp. 72-80. L eibow itz (2010: 6) adds that perhaps Plato’ s
desire to defend Socrates made him conceal som e o f what he saw, rather than add more
detail.
23 I.e., m y main intent is not to examine the validity and claim s o f Socratic philosophy,
but how Plato went about presenting those claim s. The fact that Plato is the author o f this
Socratic w ork is enough to examine m y thesis o f oratory in Plato’ s works.
24 Schofield 2006: 21.
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speeches,252
6how w ell he defends his charges (and the D elphic Oracle story), the structure
o f his speech(es), and how the A pology can be used to understand other dialogues.
Unlike the funeral oration, forensic oratory cannot claim its roots in the city o f
Athens. It was the dem ocratic reform s in the fifth century and the democratization o f the
legal system that caused a demand for forensic oratory there.

A s Athens was

characterized by her dem ocracy, and in turn, her system o f litigation, forensic oratory
/
becam e therefore characteristic o f Athens. For an Athenian citizen, it was not enough to
be able to speak before assem blies (deliberative oratory), since actions taken in the
political arena could easily find one in the courts, and failing to defend oneself
successfully could have meant the end o f a political career. The courts were staffed with
citizen jurors, w ho were “ extensions o f the com m unity at large, sharing the same social
values as the litigants” .27 In this w ay, forensic oratory answered a need for the
dem ocracy, and was always addressed to the dem ocracy.
Aristotle, when classifying the three types o f oratory (epideictic, deliberative, and
forensic), distinguishes the three by their addressed audience and by their reXo<;.
V

Deliberative and forensic oratory are addressed to judges, whereas epideictic is addressed
to spectators (Rhet. 1358b8-13). Deliberative oratory has the “ expedient and inexpedient”

25 L eibow itz (2010), as one can tell from his m onograph’ s title (The Ironic D efense o f
Socrates), believes that irony played a key role in Socrates’ defense, contra see
Brickhouse & Smith (1989), w ho believe that Socrates was earnestly trying to get an
acquittal, and irony (because o f its danger o f being misunderstood) was only used where
it did not affect the outcom e o f his case.
26 C ooper, Craig. 2007. “ Forensic Oratory.” Pp. 203-219 in ^4 Companion to Greek
Rhetoric, edited by Ian W orthington, p. 205
27 Idem 204. A lso D odds (1959: 202): “ Greek juries were very large, and were thought o f
as representing the w hole body o f citizens in its judicial capacity” . A lso, “juristic silence”
was not expected in Athenian courts, jurors could v oice their (dis)approval, and since
courts w ere sem i-open spaces, spectators could crow d around and watch the proceedings
(C ooper 2007: 209); Athenian courts were very transparent.

)
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as its xskoq, forensic has “ the just and the unjust” , and the xskoq o f epideictic is “ the
honourable and shameful” (i?/zeL 1358bl3-29). Since forensic oratory was about justice
and equity, and what is just is the truth, in order to succeed in court the “ truth sometimes
needed rhetorical assistance” .28*
B efore I proceed to the defense itself, it is important to place Plato’ s
representation o f the event in the A pology in its proper historical context, since the

/

29

A pology relates a historical event that actually happened.

In May/June 399 BCE,

Socrates was indicted under a ypatpfj daeJ3eia<; (charge o f im piety) by M eletus, with the
support o f Anytus and L ycon.30 D iogenes Laertius (2.40) has preserved the wording o f
the indictment: “ This indictment and affidavit is sworn by M eletus, the son o f M eletus o f
Pitthos, against Socrates, the son o f Sophroniscus o f A lopece: Socrates is guilty o f
refusing to recognize the gods the state recognizes, and o f introducing other new
divinities. He is also guilty o f corrupting the youth. The penalty demanded is death” .313
2
The trial w ould have had a preliminary hearing o f sorts (dvdKptov;) before the or chon

basileus32 to determine whether the case was fit for trial,33 and both parties w ould have
had to take an oath (dvTOopxxria) at the hearing to swear the truth o f the case.34 Evidently,

28 Idem 214.
G iven the inconsistencies and anachronisms o f the Menexenus, it is not a possibility
that Plato is relating the funeral oration h ow Socrates actually w ould have told it.
W hether or not Socrates actually recited a funeral oration in a private conversation cannot
explain w hy Socrates relates events after his ow n death.
30 For biographical inform ation on Socrates’ three accusers, see N ails, Debra. 2002. The
People o f Plato: A Prosopography o f Plato and Other Socratics.
31 Transl. Brickhouse & Smith 1989: 30. For a discussion o f the indictment, see
Brickhouse & Smith 1989, pp. 30-36.
32 This is what Plato dramatizes Socrates heading to do in the Euthyphro.
33 Brickhouse & Smith 1989: 24-5.
34 Idem : 42. H owever, neither party was required to swear an oath in court to tell the truth
(although Socrates claim s he w ill) since peijury only applied to witness testimony. A t the
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M eletus’ indictment met the requirements o f the av&Kpioiq, and the trial was forwarded
to the Eliastic court (TlXiala), w hich heard cases o f im piety.35 A jury o f 500363
7was
assem bled

and first the prosecutor and then the defendant each presented their cases by

means o f tim ed speeches.38 A fter the speeches, the jury cast their votes, and Socrates’
guilty verdict was announced. The ypa(pt| aosPsia«; was an aytbv xipr|T6<;, w hich meant
that the law did not have a fixed penalty. Thus, after the verdict was announced ‘ guilty’ , a
/
second stage o f the trial began with the tw o parties each presenting com peting proposals
for punishm ent The jurors voted again on the proposed penalties, and M eletus’ proposal,
death, prevailed.39 Socrates was taken to the state prison to await execution.40 Under
normal circumstances, the execution w ould have been carried out as soon as possible, but
Socrates’ trial was held in Thargelion (M ay/June). During this month the Athenians sent

preliminary hearing they were swearing to the truth o f the charges brought or the
innocence o f the charges.
35 Idem : 24.
.
36 There has been debate over the number o f jurors (see R iddelhl877, introduction).
Often an odd number (501) has been believed, but that odd number appears to be derived
from a system o f jury selection from later in the fourth century (Brickhouse & Smith
1989:26: “ A ll w e k n ow ...is that Socrates addressed a sizable number o f ju rors.... Other
sources give us other information, but attempts to render all such information consistent
seem doom ed to fail” ).
37 Jurors were paid 3 obols per day, a lo w rate com pared to what an ‘ able-bodied’ man
could earn in a day (approxim ately 1 drachma). This allow ed for a fair representation in
the jury o f poorer citizens, but it also m ade a disproportionate representation o f age
groups: many m en w ho volunteered for ju ry duty were old and no longer able to w ork (a
sort o f “ old age pension” , Brickhouse & Smith 1 9 89 :26 -7 ).
38 Ober 1998: 165.
39 Idem 165-66. It was rare for ypacpai to end in the death penalty; monetary fines o f
various amounts, such as Socrates proposed, were m ore normal (O ber 1998:166 n.21).
For a discussion o f Socrates’ proposed counter-penalty o f 30 minas, see Brickhouse &
Smith (1998: 226-230). Although som e scholars have w rongly suggested that 30 minas
was a relatively small sum (estimating its value by the current price o f silver), in truth,
the sum Socrates proposes w ould have equaled eight and a half years’ wages for a skilled
artisan (1 drachma/day).
40 Plato places the Crito and Phaedo in this waiting period. The Phaedo ends with the
death o f Socrates.
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the sacred “ ship o f Theseus” to D elos (Phd. 58a-b), and execution in the city was
forbidden until its return.41 A nd so, about a m onth after his trial, Socrates was executed
by drinking hem lock.
Plato has Socrates present the tw o speeches that the litigation demands, his
defense (Ap. 17a-35d), his dvraipTicng (Ap. 35e-38b), as w ell as a third speech (Ap.38c42a), w hich Socrates delivers to the jury before he is led away to prison. A s mentioned
/
above, there is no fram ing dialogue to the A pology . It begins after the prosecutors have
finished their speech. Socrates notes that they spoke persuasively, but not truthfully. He
begs the jury to accept him speaking in his accustom ed manner (i.e., not in the high
rhetorical style o f his opponents), and says that he w ill speak “ the w hole truth” (rcaaav
xfjv dXfjGexav), and they, the jury, must judge according to the truth (Ap. 17a-18a).
Socrates defends him self against the charges in tw o parts: first against his “ first”
accusers,42 the slanders and m isconceptions that have been attached to him for a long
tim e, and then the charges at hand brought by M eletus, Anytus, and Lycon, the later
accusers. H is defense against the first accusers (Ap. 18e-24b) includes his denial o f
natural philosophy (he is not the ‘ Socrates’ in the Clouds43), his denial that he is a sophist

41 N ails 2002: 322.
42 One must note that the slanders from these accusers are not technically in the
indictment brought by M eletus, but that for Socrates, these slanders are the source o f the
charges o f the “ second” accusers. H e must dispel these preconceived notions so that the
jury m ay ju dge him impartially and understand from where the later charges arise.
43 A s regards the “ first” or “ earlier” accusers, Socrates notes that one cannot even charge
anyone specifically for these long-standing slanders, unless he happens to be a writer o f
com edies (im plying Aristophanes, Ap. 18c-d). He also later specifically mentions
Aristophanes’ character Socrates from the Clouds', xauxa yap ¿copaxe Kai auxoi sv xfj
Apioxocpavoxx; KcoprobiQt, ScoKpdxq xiva eksi rcepiipepopevov, cpdcncovxd xs aepo|3axeiv Kai
dAlr|v rcoXlfiv (pXuapiav (pXuapouvxa, wv syro oubev ouxs peya obxe apixpov rcspi sjiaTm.
(“ For you yourselves have seen these things in the com edy o f Aristophanes, som e
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(he does not take m oney, nor teach virtue), his adm ission o f “ human” wisdom , the
D elphic oracle tale, and his interrogation/refutation o f politicians, poets, and craftsmen,
all o f w hich explain w hy he is hated, w hy the youth fo llo w him (they enjoy hearing
people questioned), and where M eletus’ charges arise from . His defense against the later
accusers (Ap. 24b-34b) includes an elenchus refutation o f M eletus,44 an imagined
questioning (“ som eone m ight say...” ), the benefits o f Socratic philosophy (gadfly
/
analogy), the explanation o f his Saipdviov, an account o f his service for the Athenians
and reasons why he is not in politics, and his denial that he is a teacher o f anyone, all o f
w hich are designed to show that he has led a dangerous way o f life in service to the god
(and therefore is extremely pious), that he is not the type o f man Meletus presents him to
be, and that he has been continually working for the benefit o f Athens and her citizens.
He concludes his defense with a refusal to beg, supplicate, or seek the jurors’ pity in
order to secure an acquittal (Ap. 34b-35d). The avTmjj.r|oi<; begins with Socrates
expressing his surprise that the margin o f votes for conviction Was so close to acquittal.
He at first proposes his ‘punishment’ to be meals in the Prytaneum (Ap. 36d-e), since he
has spent his life in service to Athens. H e dism isses exile as a possibility for punishment,
since he w ould sim ply go elsewhere, perform his philosophy, and be met with the same
reaction as in Athens (trial), and at first proposes a fine o f one mina, before Plato, Crito,
Critobulus, and A pollodorus bid him to raise his proposal to thirty minas. A t last, after he
has been condem ned to death, Socrates addresses his third speech to the jury. A t first he
addresses those w ho voted for his death (Ap. 39c-d), saying that they may be rid o f him,

Socrates being carried about there, saying that he was walking on air and talking a lot o f
other nonsense about things o f w hich I know nothing at all.” Ap. 19c.)
44 N ot only is Plato inserting the genre o f forensic oratory into his Socratic dialogues, but
he inserts a Socratic dialogue into forensic oratory!
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but there w ill be m ore people to test them. He then addresses those w ho voted for his
acquittal, calling them friends (Ap. 39e-41c), saying that death (since it is unknown) is
not to be feared— perhaps he w ill find h im self in the afterlife, being able to converse with
great m en o f myth. A t last he exhorts the jury to care for his children (41 d-42a), spurring
them to virtue as he has Athens, before he is led away.
W hat counted as rhetorical in forensic speeches? A s with the funeral oration,
/
there were specific stylistic methods and topoi that were expected by the audience.
Traditionally, ancient speeches were divided into four parts.45 The introduction
(7tpooipiov) should set out the matter at hand, seize the attention o f the audience, and
secure its goodw ill. The narrative (8ifjyri<TK;) should display the speaker’ s version o f
events clearly and persuasively. The p ro o f (7cioTu;) should give witness to the narrative,
i
and the epilogue (sjr& oyoi;) should summarize the argument and make an em otional
appeal to the audience.46 M any speeches o f A ttic oratory deviate from this four-part
structure, e.g., the narrative is sometimes com bined with the arguments (7ticm<;),47 but the
techniques and topoi for each section consistently occur— even in Socrates’ defense.48
\
The A pology's first speech, Socrates’ defense speech proper, can be roughly divided into
these categories49: introduction, 17a-18a; (proposition 18a-19a); two-part narrative, (old

45 In the Phaedrus (266d-267d), there are also 4 parts: introduction, narrative, p roof, and
recapitulation (¿7tdvo8oc;).
46 de Brauw, M ichael. 2007. “ The Parts o f the Speech.” Pp. 187-202 in A Companion to
G reek Rhetoric, edited by Ian W orthington, p. 187. D e Brauw further notes: “ The
schem e... is best suited to judicial speaking.”
47 Idem: 193,199.
48 This is not to say that Socrates’ entire speech is rhetorical, but that from time to time he
uses these com m onplaces, contrary to his claim to speak in his usual fashion.
49 Other divisions see: Burnet 1924: 66-149, Strycker 1994:22-24.

46

accusers) 19a-24b, (new accusers) 24b-28a50; p ro o f (digression), 28b-34b; epilogue, 34b35d.
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The Jtpooijuov is perhaps associated with m ost o f the rhetorical topoi.51 3
5
2Here we
find speakers flattering the jury, claim ing their inexperience or ineptitude as a speaker,
their disadvantages from status (age, poverty) or character, their opponent’ s advantages
(preparation, cleverness, lack o f danger), giving m otives to their opponent, and
em otionally appealing to the jury.

52 Indeed, w e/ do see som e o f these topoi in Socrates’

introduction. H e notes the advantage that his opponents have in their persuasive speech
( outod jnGavmg skeyov, “ they spoke so persuasively” , Ap. 17a3) and high tones
(KeKaAli£7cr|pevouq koyou«;. ..prjpaoi te Kai ovopacnv KEKoaptipsvouq, “ using high
language...stylizing with phrases and w ords” , 17b9-c2), and his disadvantage due to his
age (err) ysyovdx; ¿pSopfiKovra, “ being at the age o f seventy” , 17d2). Although Socrates’
refusal to deviate from his standard m ethods is seen elsewhere,

and is characteristic o f

him , here his request for the indulgence o f the jury to tolerate his usual speech (sav 8ia
tc5v

am&v X oyov aKOutyts pou a7iokoyoupevou...pfixe Oaupa^eiv prjTS OopuPeiv, “ i f you
v

hear me defending m yself in the same w ord s.. .d o not be surprised or raise a ruckus” ,
1 7 c7 -d l) is also a standard topos o f the rcpooipiov. W hile Socrates does not flatter the
jury, or appeal to them em otionally, he does ask that they give him a fair hearing, and
ju dge based on the truth o f the matter (Ap. 18a3-5).

50 Socrates at tim es blurs his narrative and proof.
51 de Brauw 2 0 07 :19 2 .
52 Usher, Stephen. 1999. Greek Oratory: Tradition and Originality, pp. 22-23
53 E .g., Socrates insists on his elenctic style o f discussion rather than paxpokoyia with
Protagoras (Prt. 335b-c), Gorgias (Grg. 4 4 9c), and Polus (Grg. 461d-462a).

47

These topoi, so critical to the orators, have been recognized by scholars before in
the 7ipooijj,iov o f the Apology. R iddell notes the links, saying in his introduction that the

A pology “ m ay be com pletely paralleled, piece by piece, from the Orators” ,54 but w e do
see that Socrates has refused other com m onplaces o f the Orators (e.g. the emotional
appeals) seen elsewhere. These links spur Burnet to conclude that the introduction is a
parody, and Socrates’ disclaim er o f know ledge o f forensic oratory is a piece o f Socratic
/
irony, “ to be taken cum grano salis” , since Socrates w ould naturally use the orators’ ow n

topoi to m ock them.55 Other scholars have inferred from the 7tpooipiov that the entire
speech is a parody.56 H owever, even though the similarities exist between the Platonic
w ork and the inserted genre, it does not necessarily fo llo w that Plato intended to write a
parody. T o sim ply categorize the A pology as a parody o f a forensic defense w ould be to
do it the same disservice as those scholars w ho have dism issed the Menexenus as a
sim ple parody on the funeral oration. A fter all, “ parodies cannot be so close as to be
indistinguishable from what they parody” .57 A nd again, as mentioned in the previous
chapter, w hile Plato may intend to parody or criticize the inserted genres, he “ remains
open to the possibility that a genre may in fact make a positive contribution to the
philosopher’ s enterprise.” 58 What, i f any, benefit oratory has for the philosopher’ s
enterprise w ill be examined in the final chapter o f this thesis. For now , however, it must

54 R iddell 1877: xxi.
55 Burnet 1924: 67.
56 Feaver & Hare 1981:205. Specifically, a “ parody inverted. For whereas parody is
usually a lesser piece than its object, in this case Socrates intends his speech to succeed in
a way that no traditional piece o f rhetoric could ever d o.”
57 Brickhouse & Smith 1989: 51.
58 Nightingale 1995:12.
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be noted that the npoolpiov o f the A pology, with its traditional rhetorical topoi, is neither
straightforward nor necessarily m erely parodie.
A fter the 7tpooipiov, Socrates inserts a proposition (Ap. 18a-19a), a section not
norm ally included in the traditional theoretical sections o f a speech. H owever, Lysias,
Isaeus, and Demosthenes used the proposition relatively frequently. Its function was a
type o f partition between the introduction and narration. It is generally short (no m ore
than ten lines), but it can be longer.59 The proposition (rcpôOecnç) should state the case
that the speaker w ill attempt to prove.60 Here Socrates says that he w ill defend him self in
tw o parts, first against the earlier accusers, and then against the current accusers:

Sixxouç pou xoî>ç KaxTiyôpouç yeyovévai, éxépouç (xév xoùç apxi
KaTTiyopfjaavxaç, éxépouç 8è xoi>ç îcàA,ai ouç èya> Xéya), ical oifi&rixe Seïv 7tpôç
sksîvouç Jipwxôv pg à7toXoYiiaaa0av
My accusers are o f two kinds: those accusing me now, and those who have
been accusing me for a long time, which I mention, and I think it fit to defend
m yself first against the latter. (Ap. 18d-e)
A fter the proposition, Socrates proceeds to his narration (Ap. 19a-28a), in w hich
he often m ixes his proofs. The “ narrative” is typically a “ continuous, discrete narrative” ,
w hich is often introduced by a “ form ulaic transition sentence” (e.g., T wish to recount
these matters from the beginning’ ), and then begins with the particle yap.61 Indeed, this is
just h ow Socrates begins his narrative: àvotXdp©pev ouv êÇ à p x fiç tîç f| Karnyopia
ea riv ... (19a8), but he substitutes ouv for yap. For Aristotle, the narration should deal
with the interpretation o f the facts (since the prosecutors w ill have already displayed the

59 Strycker 1994: 44-5.
60 Idem 43. The proposition is a sort o f metadiscursive feature, w hich is not unlike many
Socratic dialogues, where Socrates discusses with his interlocutors about how they should
ask/answer questions (e.g., Grg. 449b-c). This feature w ould also serve a practical role in
assisting the jury to fo llo w along with the defense speech.
61 de Brauw 2007: 193.
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“ facts” ) w hile displaying the speaker’ s m oral character (rj0o<;) and his moral purpose
(rcpoaipeou;), since the “ quality o f the purpose determines the quality o f character” .626
3For
Isocrates, the narration should tell the event, to 7tpaypa, what preceded it, xa 7ipo xou
Ttpaypaxo«;, and what follow ed it xa pnxa xo npaypa, and make the intention o f the
parties’ actions clear.

Socrates’ narration conform s to this Isocratean pattern, rather than

the style o f narration in the Orators.64 Socrates makes his refutation o f those reputed to be
/
w ise his ‘ event’ , the D elphic oracle is ‘ what preceded it’ , and the slander, hatred, and
m isconceptions o f the Athenians is ‘ what follow ed it’ . The way that Socrates reports his
actions is intended to lead the jury to think that his actions must have been as he says,
since that is the kind o f person he is— likew ise he must be that kind o f person because his
actions prove it. In this way, “ the narrative functions as a form o f p ro o f in and o f its e lf’.65
This is w hy the p ro o f (7riaxiq) seems to overlap with the narrative.66 Socrates’
digression (Ap. 28b-34b) is indeed further p ro o f for his argument. It is in this section that
he explains his actions (“ I exhort people to care for their soul” ),''he explains how his
8aipow ov is his reason for leading a private life, and gives an account o f his personal
actions. These all conform to the tw o species o f p ro o f in oratory: biographical p ro o f and
character types.67 Socrates is using his biographical account to give o f f an im pression o f
his character. Socrates also uses proofs in the form s o f “ argument/argumentative

62 Strycker 1994: 59 (Arist. Rhet. 1417a). Interestingly, after Aristotle makes this
assertion, he cites the Socratic dialogues as an exam ple that depicts character, since they
are concerned with moral questions (1 4 17 a l9 -2 3).
63 Idem : 60.
64 Ibid.
65 de Brauw 2007 :19 5 .
66 Ibid.: “ The means o f persuasion that rhetoricians describe as pistéis, such as arguments
from probability or citations o f docum ents, do indeed cluster in the p ro o f section. But
they are not lim ited to that section, nor do they com prise all o f it.”
67 Usher 1 999:24.
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form ulae” and “ figures o f thought” w hich are typical in Greek oratory.

co

He uses a

dilemmaton6
8
69 argument when he is examining M eletus and he com es to the refutation:
“ either I d o not corrupt [the young], or i f I do it is unw illingly, so that you are lying in
either case” (aXk' ij ou 8ia«p0eipca fj, si SiacpGeipco, aiccov, (Sots ou ye Kax’ apxpoxspa
\|/su8p, 25e6-26a2). In this conclusion, Socrates also somewhat uses a reductio ad

absurdum, since it w ould be ridiculous (ignorant) for Socrates to harm one o f his
/
associates deliberately. O f course, the refutation itself is an interrogation, which is
another form o f argumentative proof. From the interview, Socrates shows that M eletus is
uPpumiq Kdi aKokaoToq, wanton and licentious, and that he brought his indictment out o f
“ insolence, intemperance, and youthful fo lly ” (26e-27a). Therefore, his charges cannot be
trusted or taken seriously. In addition, Socrates uses “ figures o f thought” proofs, such as
rhetorical questions (e.g. 28d, |xtj auxov [A chilles]70 oisi (ppovxioat Gavaxou xai
kivSuvou;

“ do you think he gave thought to death and danger?” ) and a question and

answer o f his ow n (28b, icon; 8 ’ av oov eutoi xiq..., “ perhaps then, som eone w ould
s a y ...” ).71 W hile Socrates does avail h im self o f his usual m ethod o f p ro o f and

68 Idem: 24-5.
69 A dilemmaton ( ‘ double-catch’ ) argument presents “ two conditions, one o f which must
be fulfilled, though the fulfillm ent o f either is bad for the speaker or his opponent” (Usher
1999: 365). He gives the example o f Tisias and Corax: Tisias w ould pay Corax, his
oratory teacher, for his fees after his first successful case, but then refused to do so. Corax
brought a case against him, and argued that i f Tisias managed to persuade the jury, he
w ould be absolved from payment, and i f he failed to persuade them, Corax’ s teaching
w ould have been proven useless, and then no fee was due (1999: 3).
70 The A chilles reference is itself a paradeigma (“ exam ple or precedent, usually
historical, to illustrate or justify an argument” , Usher 1997: 366).
71 In his counterproposal for punishment, Socrates uses another rhetorical form o f
argumentative p roof: a “ pathetic paradox” . This is Usher’ s original term for an argument
that com bines em otion and logic. E .g., “ is it not (w ould it not be) shocking (shameful,
terrible, absurd) if, when X , w hich is undesirable, is not allow ed to happen, Y , w hich is
far m ore undesirable, is allow ed to happen?” (1999: 367). C f. Ap. 37e-38a, where
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refutation,727
3the Socratic interview, in his narration and p ro o f he also em ploys the
typically rhetorical methods o f refutation, thus showing that he is capable o f using styles
o f refutation m ore suited to forensic oratory.
The epilogue (¿7ri^oyoq), according to Aristotle, has four functions: to earn the
favour o f the audience (and turn the audience against one’ s opponent), to m agnify or
m inim ize the facts, to rouse up the em otions (7cd0t|) o f the audience, and (m ost
/
73
importantly) to recapitulate the main points o f the speech (Rhet. 1419M 0-13). Although

Socrates has used rhetorical techniques through the rest o f his defense, his £7iiA,oyo<; (Ap.
34b-35d) does not aim to do any o f the functions listed by Aristotle, although he may
inadvertently have achieved one function. Socrates does not seek to gain the favour o f the
jury, since they should not be relying on favour to determine their verdict: “ He
[individual juror] sw ore not to grant ju stice as a favour to those w ho seem g ood to him ,
but to judge according to the laws.” (icai opropoKsv on xdpisiaOai olq av 8oicfi aura», akXa
Sncaaeiv Kara xouq vopoug, 35c). He does not attempt to m axim ize, m inim ize, or even
recapitulate the facts. Instead, he spends his epilogue denouncing those who try to rouse
\

the em otions o f the jury by weeping or bringing his fam ily and friends into court to rouse

Socrates is explaining that exile is not a possibility for him: i f it is im possible for him to
remain in Athens and keep quiet (i.e. not philosophize), how could he possibly go to
another city and not philosophize?
72 This small example o f the Socratic interview itself could be interpreted as a piece o f
evidence displayed to the jurors, to show what it is that he professes to do.
73 D e Brauw notes that epilogues are not always this succinct in reality: emotional
appeals are not always lim ited to the end o f the speech and the length o f the epilogue is
not always proportional to the speech (2 0 0 7 :1 9 8 ).
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pity.747
5
6
*Indeed, since this was a typical feature o f the courts, his refusal to fo llo w the
traditional trope may have aroused the em otions o f the jury against him.
This rhetorical analysis o f Socrates’ defense speech in the Apology shows that
Plato did have his Socrates include the traditional topoi o f forensic oratory in his
deliverance. H ow ever, w e are also able to read a certain intertextuality or allusion with
another defense speech. Gorgias’ D efense o f Palamedes,15 a hypothetical defense speech
for the w rongfully condem ned H om eric hero,
o f g ood legal arguments.

provided potential students with a series

There are elements o f the Palamedes

that are similar to the

Apology. I f allusions to the Palamedes can be established, w e can gain a greater
understanding o f how Plato intended Socrates’ defense to be read. I believe a significant
reason w hy the Palamedes was targeted for allusion is because it is a literary (that is,

written) defense speech, as Plato’ s A pology is. Plato then attaches him self to this
(relatively new )79 literary tradition and one o f the m ost famous orators in fifth-century
Athens (albeit that he was a ‘ flattering’ orator). These allusions'are not intended as

74 But he does acknowledge that he has a fam ily with young children while denying that
he w ill seek the pity o f the jurors. C ould this not be a m inor form o f praeteritiol
75 This is one o f the tw o works by Gorgias that are extant in their entirety (the other being
the Helen). They have been transmitted in the A ttic dialect, but that is m ost likely due to
an Athenian editor or transcriber (Usher 1999:4-5). Scholars generally accept these works
as G orgias’ ow n. The Greek text used is Gorgias, Frag. 1 la , Diels-Kranz (Pre-Socratic
Philosophers).
76 For the story o f Palamedes, see [A pollodorus], Epitome 3.7-8, Hyginus, Fabulae 105,
V ergil, Aeneid 2.81-85.
77 C ooper 2 0 0 7 :2 0 4 . C ooper notes that technically the D efense o f Palamedes was an
epideictic speech.
7®From here forward, I shall refer to the "Defense o f Palamedes' as sim ply ‘Palamedes'.
79 C f. Introduction on the relation o f oratory in the noXu; and the advent o f writing.
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parody, or critique, but are meant in earnest by Plato, w ho, at the start o f his career, is
seeking to fit into a tradition o f works o f literary discourse.
I w ill not proceed through all the noted similarities to the Palamedes,

but I w ill

note ten allusions. The first is that Palamedes also makes a m ove in his speech that w ould
have the potential to w ork w ell in his favour, were it not for prejudices against him. He
calls the ju ry as witnesses to his claim s, since they know his past life: “ That I am telling
/
the truth, I present m y past life as a witness, and to this you yourselves can be witnesses.”
(cog 8 ’ &A,r|0fi Ley©, papxupa 7Uc t 6 v rcape^opai xov 7tapoi%opevov ptov- X© 8e papxopi
papxupeg bpeig qxe, Pal. 15). Likew ise, Socrates calls the jury to be witnesses to the fact
that he does not discuss the things that the Socrates o f the Clouds does (papxupag 8s
am ong bpcov xong 7ioLLoi>g itapexopai, “ I present the m ajority o f you as witnesses,” Ap.
19d). A lso with respect to witnesses, both m en challenge their accusers to bring forward
witnesses against them.8
0
8
1
82 This m ove w ould likely be detrimental to their respective cases,
v
80 C alogero (1957) believes that these similarities show Socrates’ debt to Gorgias as a
teacher (w hich I find baffling), Coulter (1964) believes Socrates is rejecting Gorgianic
oratory, Seeskin (1982) is convinced that Plato is parodying Gorgias. H owever, (as w ill
be argued below ), Socrates has redefined the terms o f his use o f oratory, and he is using
the Palamedes in support o f his defense. Since the A pology is one o f Plato’ s first works,
i f not the very first, I believe it w ould make sense for Plato to look for examples o f his
intention (a written defense speech on beh alf o f a w rongly accused man), and make use
o f them in accordance with his beliefs.
81 For other surveys see: Calogero, C. 1957. “ Gorgias and the Socratic Principle Nemo
suasponte pecca tP JHS 7 7 :1 2 -1 7 ; Coulter, J.A. 1964. “ The Relation o f the Apology o f
Socrates to Gorgias’ D efense o f Palamedes and Plato’ s Critique o f Gorgianic Rhetoric.”
HSPh 6 8 :2 6 9 -3 0 3 ; Seeskin, K. 1982. “ Is the A p ology o f Socrates a Parody?” PhilLit 6:
94-105; Feaver & Hare 1981.
82 E i 8e xou pexexovxog aKoucag, oaxtg eaxiv, auxog eL0ex©, (pavfjx©, papxupqaax©.
7naxoxepov yap oux©g saxai xo Kaxqyopripa papxopqGev (“ But i f you heard [the facts]
from a collaborator, w ho is he— let him com e forward, reveal him self, and bear witness.
For the charge w ill be m ore credible i f there is a witness.” Pal. 22); Kai aLLoug TtoXkotq
ey© ex© upiv eksTv, ©v xiva expfiv paLiaxa pev ev xfij eauxou Adycp mpaa%eaQai
MeA,rixov papxupa- ei 8e xoxe e7ieXa0exo, vuv rcapaoxsaO© (“ A nd I can name many
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were they not both telling the truth.
A s to the charges at hand, both m en find issue with the accusation itself, and how
they must g o about defending it. That is, both Socrates and Palamedes find that the
charge their respective accusers bring is self-contradictory, and present the logic,
Palamedes by hypothetical questions, Socrates by elenctic refutation, that proves it.
Palamedes puts the contradiction clearly: Kaxr|yôpr|aaç 8é pou 8ià xœv sipqpévœv Xôyav

/
8uo xà évavxubxaxa, aocpiav Kai paviav, ©7tsp où% oîov xe xôv aûxôv àv0pamov s^siv (“ In
the proceeding speech, you have accused m e o f tw o m ost contradictory things: w isdom
and madness, both w hich the same man is not able to have.” Pal. 25). A fter his
hypothetical questioning, he concludes: oukouv 8T ap<poxspa av sirjg v|/st>8fj<;
(“ Therefore, you are wrong on both counts.” P a/. 26). Socrates, as so often in his other
refutations o f interlocutors in other dialogues, states that there is a contradiction before he
proves it through the elenchus. Here he tells the jury: ouxoç yàp êpoi çaivsxai xà évavxia
Xsysiv aùxôç éaoxâ> év xfj ypacpfj (“ For he seems to me to be saying self-contradictory
statements in the indictment.” Ap. 27a). Socrates too concludes that his accuser is sim ply
w rong.83 On defending the charges at hand, both m en also plead for more time, since in
the little time allotted they are not able to sufficiently persuade the jury o f their
innocence.84

others, som e o f w hom surely M eletus ought to have brought in as a witness in his ow n
speech. But i f he forgot to do so then, let him bring the witness forward now .” Ap. 34a).
83 IQg psv sycb ouk dSucfij Kaxa xqv M eXqxoo ypatpfjv, ou 7toMijg p oi 8ok£i eivai
&7toXoyiag (“ It does not seem to m e to require an extended defense to prove that I am not
in the w rong according to M eletus’ charge,” Ap. 28a.)
84 xo psv ocopa xoupov cpuXd^axe, xov 8s 7iXsi© ypovov sm psivaxs, psxa 8s xfjg dXt|0siag
xrjv Kpicnv 7toifjoaxs (Put a guard on m y body, wait a longer time, and make the
judgem ent on the basis o f truth), Pal. 35; stisî, è q sycppat, si rjv upiv vôpoç, ©arcsp Kai
aA loiç àv0p©7toiç, 7cspi 0avàxon pfj piav fipspav pôvov Kpivsiv àKkà noXkaq, £7csia0rixs
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Both speakers, in trying to show their character (a rhetorical topos o f gaining the
trust o f one’ s audience), profess similar beliefs. Both Socrates and Palamedes claim
apexrj is the source o f good things for mankind. For Palamedes, dpsxf| brings about
honour (w hich w ould be the best thing in an honour-focused society and culture): an
dpsxfjg yap ook cord KaKoxqxoq a i xipai (“ For honours com e from virtue, not from
wickedness.” Pal. 16). Socrates is a bit m ore general, in that virtue brings ypripaxa Kai xa
/
aXka ayaOa xoiq dvGpoimoic; ajtavxa Kai i8ia Kai 8r|poai^ (“ m oney and all other good
things for m en both privately and publicly,” 858
6Ap. 30b). Both men also profess their b elief
in obeying commands. For Palamedes, he says he does what is commanded, obeying
those w ho are in pow er (rcotcov xo xaoaopsvov, 7tei0o|xevo<; xotc; apxoocnv, Pal. 32), for
Socrates, a man must remain in the position he thinks best or has been com m anded to
hold, without considering any risks or the chance for death (Ap. 28d).

One o f Socrates’

m ost quoted beliefs from the Apology (6 8e ave^exaaxog pioq on Picoxdq avGpdmcp, “ The
unexamined87 life is not worth living fo r a man,” 3 8a) is also paralleled by Palamedes.88
For Palamedes, (Mo<; 8e on Piooxoq maxscoq eoxepripevtp (“ L ife is not worth living for the

av- vuv 8 ’ od pqSiov ev xpovtp 6Xiyq> peyaXac; Siapolaq d7roXoea0ai (Since, as I suppose,
i f w e had a law on capital cases, just as m any other men do, that they are not decided in
one day but many, you w ould be persuaded. But now , as it is, it is not easy to refute great
slanders in only a little tim e), Ap. 37a-b. (A lso noted by Feaver & Hare 1981: 208,
Seeskin 1982: 97.)
85 Or, alternatively: “ virtue makes wealth and everything else good for men, both
individually and collectively.” Trans. G .M .A . Grube. (In [ed.] Cooper, John M . 1997.
Plato: Complete Works.)
86 (on av xi<; eanxov xd£p i|yr|odpsvo<; PeXxiaxov eivai q w t’ dpxovxoq xa^Gfi, evxahGa Set,
raq epoi 8 okeT, pevovxa iav8nveneiv, pqSev n7toXoyi^opevov pfjxe Gavaxov pfjxs aKko
pt|8ev jrpo xoh aiaxpou.) Although this b e lie f holds true fo r Socrates at Potidaea,
A m phipolis, and Delium , and for his insistence on being true to his philosophy no matter
the situation, he notes that he does not obey the oligarchs (read: o i apxpvxeg) when they
com m anded him to take Leon into custody (32c-d).
87 M eaning, a life without elenctic refutation.
88 A lso noted by Feaver & Hare 1981: 208.
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one w ho has lost his credibility.” Pal. 2 1 ).89 Thus, not only does Plato show Socrates
expressing som e o f the same beliefs as Gorgias has Palamedes express, but they express
them in sim ilar w ays.90
Furthermore, Palamedes and Socrates have som e similarities in the way they
present the potential outcom e o f their trials to the jurors. Both men, after styling
them selves as suepysxai for their fellow countrym en (Pal. 30, Ap. 36c-d), proceed to
/
claim that i f they are convicted, it w ill harm the reputation o f those w ho condem ned
them.919
2Palamedes notes that, “ for [the jurym en] w ho appear unjust, there is a great
danger o f losing their reputation (So^a) and acquiring another” ,

and says, “ i f you kill

m e unjustly, it w ill becom e known to m any; for I am not unknown, and your wickedness

89 In his com m entary, Strycker (1994: 374-5) does not think that this link is significant at
all (or the m ajority o f similarities found between the A pology and Palamedes). He argues:
“ i f [Palamedes] had been a traitor to the Greeks, his life w ould have been ru in ed.... The
sentence in the Apology means som ething quite different: it is a concise form ulation o f
the Socratic ¿TaxfiSsupa as set out in the w hole o f the Apology. The passage from the
Palamedes is one o f the numerous arguments attesting to the defendant’ s innocence; it
has nothing to do with Palamedes’ conception o f life ...” . W hile I understand the point
Strycker is making, here I believe the similarity is significant. It is the loss o f the greatest
personal value for each man (for Palamedes, honour; for Socrates, philosophy arid
refutation) that makes life not worth living. Strycker thus ignores the reference to
philosophy, when Plato is having Socrates say something substantive, but in the fashion
o f oratory.
90 Seeskin (1982: 97) sees Palamedes also exhibiting the “ Socratic Paradox” ( ‘ no one
w illingly does evil’ , Ap. 25d-e), when he says “ ouSeig yap PouXexai itpoiKa xorig
peyiaxoug KivSuvoug KivSuveuetv ouSs xfjv peyiaxr[v KaKoxr|xa etvai Kaiaaxog” (Pal. 13).
H ow ever, this point o f com parison runs backwards in time, since certainly w e cannot
credit Gorgias with the innovation o f one o f Socrates’ oddest beliefs. This b e lie f for
Socrates (or, perhaps m ore correctly, for Plato) com es proven though dialectical
refutation (cf. Socrates’ and Polus’ discussion in the Gorgias, 461 b -4 8 lb ).
91 A lso noted by Feaver & Hare 1981: 208 and Seeskin 1982:97.
92 'YpTv psv yap peyag 6 idvSovog, aSixoig (paveim 8o^av xqv gsv K axapaM v, xfiv 8e
KxaaaaOai (Pal. 35).
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w ill be w ell known and conspicuous to all the Greeks” .93 Socrates also prophesies (after
his condem nation to death) that the Athenians w ill gain ill fame (ovopa) and guilt (avria)
for having sentenced him to death.94 It is interesting that with these statements, both
Socrates and Palamedes im ply that it is their fate that can control the reputation o f all
Athens or G reece. In addition to this response to the jurors, the tw o characters also deny
something that was characteristic o f courtroom defenses. Both men forego any em otional
appeals,95 since they feel it is not proper to persuade the jury by anything other than the
truth o f the case. Palamedes notes that he w ill rely upon the clearest justice, and avoid the
charge by means o f the truth alone, and not deception.969
7Likewise, when Socrates begins
his case, he notes that he w ill speak all the truth (upsTq 8s p oo otKouosaGs Ttaaav xriv
aArjGeiav, Ap. 17b), since he believes that what he says is just (m cxeu© yap Sucaia stvai a

Xtfd), Ap. 17c). A ll o f these allusions are difficult to discount as nothing, especially when
som e (such as the refusal to see the jurors’ pity) are fairly unique to the Palamedes and

A pology .97

v

93 ’Eav 8b aSiKcog diroKxeivrjxe ps, 7toM.oic; yevrjoexai rpavepov- ey© xs yap <ouk> ayvdx;,
uucov xs 7tacnv "EX^qai yv©pipo<; f| KaKoxn? Kai tpavepa (Pal. 36).
94 'O vopa s^sxs Kai aixiav xmo x©v PouXopsvcov Tqv TtoXtv XoiSopsTv dx; E©Kpaxr|
&7teKxovaxs (Ap. 38c).
95 Pal. 33, Ap 34b-35c.
96Kklh xtp aacpsaxaxq) SiKaicp, 8i8a^avxa xdA,riGs^ ouk a3taxfiaavxd ps 5si SiatpuysTv xijv
aixiav xauxqv (But it is necessary for m e to escape this charge by relying on the clearest
justice, explaining the truth, not by deception. Pal. 33).
97 In turn, it seems that Isocrates borrow s from the A pology in his Antidosis, but that is
outside the scope o f this thesis. For discussions o f the Antidosis, see Nightingale 1995
(Chapter 1: “ Plato, Isocrates, and the property o f philosophy” ) pp. 13-59, and A llen, R.E.
1980. Socrates and Legal Obligation, pp. 33-6.
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So

what do w e make o f these allusions? W hen Socrates mentions Palamedes989as

another w rongfully convicted soul at the end o f his third speech (Ap. 41b), is Plato trying
to signal to the jury (and readers) what he has referenced throughout his sp eech ?" Plato
treated Gorgias as the “fans et origo o f the influence o f rhetoric on his
contemporaries” ,100 and Plato is no stranger to alluding to or even quoting other
authors.1011
0
2
3A s mentioned above, these allusions have led som e scholars to interpret Plato
as parodying the Palamedes, or that his use o f oratory

is ironic.

Other scholars

sim ply do not believe the allusions to be significant in the least.104 W hile Plato does
elsewhere parody the genres he is inserting,105 that is not necessarily the case with
forensic oratory in the Apology. Nightingale notes: “ ‘ Each instance where Plato
incorporates poetry (or rhetoric) into his dialogues...deserves a separate investigation” .106
From the above investigation it is clear that not only has Plato inserted the genre o f

98 Palamedes is only mentioned three other times in the dialogues, and once in Plato’ s
letters, but he is nowhere else m entioned for his w rongful conviction. A t Laws 611d he is
m entioned for his mythical inventions/discoveries, at Phaedrus 261b-d his name is used
as a sort o f pseudonym for other intellectuals, at Republic 522d he is noted for being a
wise warrior (one w ho stands up to Agam em non), and in the Second Letter, he is
m entioned as being coupled with Odysseus by the poets.
99 The actual historical jury probably w ould not have been aware o f any allusions (since it
is possible that it is only in Plato’ s A pology that the allusions are present), but Plato’ s
readership may have been m ore aware o f what he has put in Socrates’ speech (Usher
believes the Palamedes to belong to the very early years o f the fourth century
[1999:363]).
100 Feaver & Hare 1981:207.
101 E .g., Hom er, H esiod, Euripides, Aristophanes, Thucydides, etc.
102 That is, all o f his use o f oratory throughout the Apology, not just that which can be
paralleled in the Palamedes.
103 Feaver & Hare 1981.
104 Strycker 1994.
,
105 Cf. Nightingale 1995, Chapter 2: “ U se and abuse o f Athenian tragedy.” pp. 60-92.
106 Nightingale 1 9 95:92 n. 84.

59

forensic oratory in the Apology, but he has also used typical rhetorical topoi

1A7

and even

has Socrates allude to one o f the m ost fam ous rhetoricians o f the time in Gorgias. I w ill
now turn to the second part o f this examination o f oratory in the Apology: are Socrates’
claim s (w ith respect to oratory) true, h ow can he em ploy oratory in good conscience
(since elsewhere he condem ns it), and i f the A pology cannot be labeled as ‘ parody’ , what
are w e to say about the insertion o f forensic oratory?
Socrates claim s he w ill make his entire defense based on the truth alone. He
denies that he is 8 eivo<; Xsyetv, and instead says, “ But you w ill hear from m e the w hole
truth.. .fo r I believe that what I say is just” (upcig 8 e poo dKonosoGs mxaav xf|v
aXijGeiav.. .maxed© yap Sucaia eivai a Xey©, Ap. 17b-c).

Thus, it is clear that Socrates’

defense lies in his true account o f him self, since the truth is just. But this is the truth as
defined by Socrates him self. In the preceding sentences w e have seen him redefine a
claim made by his accusers: he is Ssivoq Xeysiv, i f by ‘ clever speaking’ they mean
speaking the truth. 1078109 This approach is in contrast to what Socrates and Phaedrus note is
regular for the courtroom orator. They say that in court, no one cares (psXeiv) for the
truth, but they only care about what is convincing (xov mGavov), and this is called the

107 “ [Plato] portrays a Socrates thoroughly fam iliar with the com m onplaces o f judicial
oratory.” (Kennedy, George. 1963. The A rt o f Persuasion in G reece, pp. 151-2) Kennedy
reasons that this is due to the fact that “ traditional” rhetoric was so ingrained in the Greek
consciousness that it was im possible to deviate from it. H owever, in general, “ traditional”
rhetoric was what was the problem for Plato (in that it was flattery). I f Plato is then using
oratory in the Apology, Plato deliberately includes it for a specific purpose— he w ould
consciously avoid “traditional” rhetoric otherwise, lest it harm his ultimate purpose.
108 Contrast the Gorgias, where Socrates and C allicles are discussing the philosophical
and political lives. Here, i f self-preservation is the goal (as winning the court case w ould
be, since M eletus has set the penalty at death), sycophancy is the only option for the
orator (Grg. 51 la -5 13 c). But, Socrates is not an ‘ orator’ , even though he may use their
methods.
109 Ap. 17b

60

“ likely” ( to sixog, Phdr. 272d-e). L eibow itz believes that this claim to the truth is
im m ediately unraveled, since in the opening o f his defense, Socrates lies four times: he
lies in saying he w ill speak the truth haphazardly (since he speaks ‘ cleverly’ ); he lies in
saying that his accusers lied in calling him 8 eivd<; Isysiv; he lies when he said they w ould
be refuted by him in deed; and he lies when he claim ed the virtue o f an orator is to speak
the truth.110 H ow ever, Leibow itz fails to account for the fact that Socrates has redefined
/
the pertinent terms: he is speaking the truth according to him self, which means that he is
only 5eivo<; Xeysxv in as m uch as he speaks the truth, w hich in turn means the accusers
w ill be refuted in deed (since he w ill not use the fancy turns o f phrases1111
2
) , but w ill speak
as things com e to him (w hich could refer to how he chooses to arrange his thoughts, not
1 1

only his turns o f phrases, etc.).
Indeed, for Socrates, telling the truth is the virtue (dpexf|) o f the orator, and it is
the virtue o f the juror to determine i f the orator speaks justly (abxo 5s xobxo otco7T81v Kai
tootg) tov vouv 7cpoosxsiv,

si Siicaia key® fj pfj- Sucaaxou psv yap auxri dpsxrj, prjxopot;

110 L eibow itz 2 0 1 0 :1 2 . Leibow itz also m uses whether Socrates may tell “ not the w hole
truth, but only the truth” and thus conceal any condem ning inform ation ( 1 1 ), but then we
w ould have to deal with the naaax dX.rj0£uxv that Socrates claim s. James Crooks (2009.
“ Inventing Socrates: Truth, Jest, and Care in Plato’ s A pology .” Pp. 102-114 in
Reexamining Socrates in the A pology, eds. Fagan and Russon) refers to H eidegger’ s
concrete meanings o f key words. B y taking the alpha as privative in aXfjGeia, it means
“ dis-closure” or “ unforgetting” : “ The essence o f truth, H eidegger claim s, is revelation”
(104-5). I f this aspect is present at all in Plato’ s use o f aAijOsia, we cannot believe that
Socrates w ould be concealing anything in his account o f him self.
111 Socrates does not deny any know ledge o f forensic oratory. Strictly, he says that he is a
“ stranger” to it (¡qsvaq e%siv), which w ould im ply that he knows what it is, but does not
have m uch experience o f it. W hile it is his first appearance as a party to a case, he does
admit to som e knowledge o f standard courtroom practices (as those defendants w ho bring
in their pitiable fam ilies to secure acquittal, 34c ff.).
112 I f Socrates is lying here, I can only think that he w ould be using a ‘ noble’ falsehood
(as is discussed in Republic 389b-d), one that w ill help the jurors to understand his
innocence o f the charges against him . A fter all, to have any falsehood in one’ s soul is a
bad thing (R. 382a ff.), and Socrates w ould never w illingly harm anyone (Ap. 25e-26a).

61

5s xdXr|0fj Xeystv, Ap. 18a). B y this definition, Socrates has made it clear that i f all parties
(defendant and jurors) perform their proper duty, he should be acquitted. It is evident,
how ever, that Socrates is not certain that all o f the jurym en w ill adhere to the virtue o f
their position.

Throughout his speeches, he avoids addressing the jurors as such, and

instead addresses them by © avSpeg, or © av&psq AGrjvaToi. It is not until his third and
final (prophetic) speech to the jury, when he addresses them in tw o groups, those who
/
voted to condem n, and those w ho voted to acquit, that he addresses them as co dvSpeq
Sucaaxai.113114 It is this second group w ho have perform ed their dicanic duty properly
according to Socrates. They have judged Socrates’ account o f his ¿mxrjSsupa (w hich is
his philosophy115) to be just, and therefore true. A s for the other jurors, w ho, perhaps for
their lack o f understanding, voted to condem n Socrates, they remain dv 8 pe<; AGqvaioi
(38c).
These uneducated jurors made Socrates’ case very difficult to plead. H ow could
he successfully present the truth o f his philosophy to an uneducated ju ry? From what he
says, w e know that the prejudices that cam e about for him were because his philosophy
was m isunderstood .116 The danger for Socrates is that M eletus, while he knows nothing
o f the truth, w ill prevail before a jury w ho doesn’ t know any better since he spoke

113 Strycker 1994: 35.

114 © avSpeg SiKaaxal—ujia<; yap Sucaaxa«; KaXcov op0©<; av KaXoiqv, 40a (and further at
40e, 41b, 41c). There is one exception at 26d, where Socrates addresses the jury as
8ucacjxai, as he v oices his astonishment at M eletus’ responses (M a AT, © avSpeg
Sucaaxai... Ava^ayopou oiei Kaxqyopeiv, to cpiXe MsA-qxs;). Perhaps this instance is due to
his em otional outrage.
115 M any scholars (e.g., Strycker 1994: 45) see Plato making the Apology as a defense o f
Socrates in general, since his philosophy (w hich was misunderstood and therefore
brought about false charges) is the reason he is under fire.
116 The bystanders to his refutations believed he possessed the w isdom that his
interlocutors did not have, nor did they see that his aim was not to best his opponent, but
to show him to care for his soul (Ap. 23a).
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mGavmg with his oratory. It is just as in the analogy o f the pastry baker, w ho aims at
pleasures, and the doctor, w ho knows what is best for the body:
... el §¿01 ev 7caiol Siaycovi^eoGai o\i/ojioiov ts Kal iaxpov, ij ¿v dvSpamv ouxcoq
avofjxoiq (BGTtep oi 7taT5e<;, Ttoxepoq ercatei rcepi trov xpriaxtov cnxioav Kal
7tovT) prov, 6 iaxpo^ f) 6 oyoTtoiog, ?apcp av ajcoGavsTv xov Iaxpov.
“ i f it were necessary for a pastry baker and doctor to compete in front o f
children, or in front o f men just as senseless as children, to decide which o f
the two, the doctor or pastry baker, was the expert in matters o f wholesome
and worthless foods, the doctor w ould die o f starvation.” ( Grg. 464d-e)

/
The point o f Socrates’ analogy is that orators, w ho do not have real knowledge o f the
.

.

,

matters about w hich they speak, can prevail over those w ho truly have knowledge before
an ignorant group, since orators do not instill know ledge in their listeners, but conviction
(xo maxeustv) . 117 A nd so, M eletus, w ho spoke mGavcog, w ill surely prevail over Socrates
and the truth in court.
In order for the jury to correctly deem Socrates’ actions just, they w ould need to

know that he is telling the truth. But, i f Socrates and M eletus are in the same shoes as the
doctor and the pastry baker, what chance does Socrates have ofacquittal? He is not able
to examine each o f the jurors as interlocutors and bring them to realize his innocence for
them selves. H owever, in the Gorgias, when Socrates is speaking with Callicles, they
com e to the distinction that there really are tw o parts to oratory: the one part is flattery
(KoXaKsia) and shameful popular oratory ( 8 ruJX|yopia), and the other part is admirable
( kcxXov), w hich gets the citizens’ souls to be as g ood as possible, and tries to say the best,

117 (Grg. 454e:) Socrates: W hich type o f persuasion, then, does oratory produce in law
courts and in other gatherings concerning just and unjust things? The one that results in
being convinced without knowing or the one that results in knowing? Gorgias: It’ s clear,
I presume, that it is the one that results in conviction.
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regardless o f the feelings o f its audience (Grg. 503a).118 It is in this second part o f oratoiy
that Socrates finds his deliverance. W ithout an interlocutor (save the b rief refutation o f
M eletus), Socrates is able to retreat into (the right kind o f) oratory ,119 since his only aim
is to encourage his fellow citizens (and jurors) to care for w isdom , truth, and the best
possible condition for their souls (Ap. 29e, 38a).
Socrates denies that he w ill use the stylized phrases o f his accusers, but w ill speak
sucfj, “ at random” , and in the manner he is accustom ed to in his regular life .120 G iven that
his defense rests on the jury understanding his philosophy, something that has been
m isconstrued and parodied 121 previously, it is in Socrates’ best interests to keep his
methods o f explanation sim ple. In the Phaedrus, Socrates and Phaedrus determine that
recognizing the soul o f the audience is crucial in order to successfully (and artfully)
deliver a koyoq. First, the author o f the speech must know the truth o f everything he tells,
and second, he needs to understand the “ nature o f the soul” o f the listener, and com pose
V

118 si yap Kai xobxo eaxi SmAouv, xo psv exepov 7too xouxou KoXctKsia av svr| Kai aiaxpa
8 rijj.riyopia, xo 8 ’sxepov Kokov, xo TiapaaKsud^siv O7tox; ax; PsXxiaxai saovxai xcov
7toX,ixdav at \(n)xai, Kai SiapaxeaGai Xsyovxa xa PeXxiaxa, sixs fjSicD sixs arjSsaxepa eaxai
xoig aKououCTiv.
119 C f. Nightingale 1995: 83: “ C allicles’ refusal to participate in the conversation [in the

Gorgias] forces Socrates to retreat into rhetoric” .
120 It seems to m e that many scholars m ay have misinterpreted Socrates as saying that he
w ill only use com m on language to deliver his speech, since he says, “ I f you hear m e
making m y defense in the same Xoyoi as I am accustom ed to use in the agora by the
bankers’ tables, where many o f you have heard m e, or elsewhere, do not be surprised or
create a ruckus on account o f this” (1 7 c). H ow ever, even in his usual A,6 yoi, he is able to
pick up on other styles in his conversations in public. E .g., Grg. 467b (d) Xq>oxe ncoXe),
where he imitates the Gorgianic style (cf. also 476d, xoiouxov xo xpfjpa xspvexai xo
xejrvopevov oTov xo xepvov xepvei;), and although the Menexenus places the epitaphios in
a private setting, this too w ould have likely occurred in a public place. His accustom ed
manner o f taking up aspects as they com e along in discussions may also apply to his
defense speech, unlike his opponents w ho have taken time and thought carefully
(cleverly) about what they w ill say; Socrates w ill sim ply proceed in his usual manner.
121 C f. the “ first” accusers, and Aristophanes’ Clouds.
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his Xóyoq accordingly: an em bellished and elegant Xóyoq for the com plex soul, and a
sim ple and straightforward Xóyoq for a sim ple soul (Phdr. 277b-c). Thus, it is crucial, I
submit, fo r Socrates, w ho now must use the noble part o f oratory to plead his case, to
ensure that he tailors his Xóyoq to the understanding o f his audience. In this case, since
the jury is unacquainted with the real purpose and cause for his philosophy (except,
perhaps, through hearsay or other false reports), Socrates must use simple language to
explain 122123the com plex nature o f his ercixiiSeopa.
N ow w e can understand that Socrates did not lie when he said he w ould speak in
plain terms (since this does not necessarily mean he w ill not use oratory), that he can use
oratory ‘ safely’ because his Xóyoq has to do with philosophy (w hich is getting one’ s soul
to be in the best possible condition), and that his deceptively simple

m ethod o f

presenting his defense is in the best interests o f his uneducated audience. This, then,
explains w hy Socrates presents him self as trying to persuade (neiGeiv) the jury on a
number o f occasions .124 Socrates’ self-acknow ledged efforts to persuade the jury in and
o f them selves should be a clue to us, the educated reader, that he actually is using
oratory. For oratory’ s general aim is successful persuasion that leads to conviction, but
conviction without know ledge .125 But Socrates is using the ‘n oble’ part o f oratory. D oes
this mean that he is able to produce conviction that com es from know ledge?

122 Using regular, ordinary language for his arguments is what A lcibiades charges

Socrates with in the Symposium’, ovouq yap Kav0T|Xiooq Xsyei xa i yaXiceaq xivàq icai
aKOTOTÓpouq kcxì PopooSéyaq, x a ì àeì 8 ià xrov aòxcov xà aura cpaivexai Xéyeiv (“ For he
goes on about pack-asses, blacksmiths, cobblers, and tanners; he always seems to say the
same things in the same ways,” 2 2 le ).
1231 say ‘ deceptively’ since it takes som e investigation, as above, to see all the rhetorical
topoi and methods in the Apology.
n%Ap. 30e, 31b, 36c, 37a, 38a
125 C f. on Gorgias 454e above, n. 117.
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I do not find this to be the case. I f the jury truly understood the truth in Socrates’
defense, he w ould have been acquitted. Indeed, Socrates failed to even persuade the
m ajority o f the jury. H owever, his surprise that the case was so narrowly decided (Ap.
36a-b), im plies that he did not believe he could have convinced the jurors o f the truth.

t

Socrates denies that he has ever been anyone’ s teacher (33a), but instead his philosophy
encourages individuals to care for their souls themselves. It is a self-realization (or
revelation) that must happen in order for the individual to com e to true understanding and
know ledge. Leibow itz sees Socrates’ effort to achieve this self-realization as an example
o f irony, w hich he believes is a necessary requirement for any speech .126127128He says that
Socrates’ speech to the jury is “ spoken in a double fashion so as to be understood one
way at first, another upon reflection, as their vulgarity diminishes” .

A nd Socrates

knows that this w ill be the outcom e: he prophesies that after he is gone, those who voted
to convict him w ill com e to the realization o f what they have done (ou 7toM no y' eveica
Xpovou, © avSpeg AGqvaioi, ovopa sfjsxs x a i aixiav...©<; E©kpaxr| arcsicxovaxe, avSpa
ao(p6 v. “ For the sake o f a short tim e, m en o f Athens, you w ill acquire the reputation and
guilt o f having killed Socrates, a w ise man” , Ap. 37c).
H owever, I argue that, as with labeling the A pology a ‘ parody’ , to leave the

A pology as ‘ irony’ alone is not sufficient. Strycker argues:

126 Or, that he knew that in this case, it was not possible to bring about the conviction
with know ledge, since it is not easy to achieve this (xa 8 e zyyx psv ouxcoq, ©q ¿y© cpr|pi, ©
av 8 pe<;, rcsiOetv 8 e on pqSiov, 38a), nor did he have sufficient time to bring about
conviction on the crucial points o f his case (pXka upa<; xouxo on 7tsi0 ©- oXiyov yap

Xpovov aMrjXoK; Sie&eypeOa, 37a).
127 For the reasons Socrates states in the Phaedrus: it is not fitting to say the same things
to everyone. Leibow itz believes that even the educated listener still begins “ under the
spell o f vulgar prejudice” (2 0 1 0 :1 8 ). I believe that this is not always the case for the
educated listener, but certainly for the uneducated one.
128 L eibow itz 2010: 18.

66

“Truly, [Socrates] is an axojtog...one is never sure whether one has
understood him; not, however, because he conceals anything: on the contrary,
he always says what he means, at the risk o f offending influential people. His
most characteristic feature is eipooveia, that curious blending o f cmouSfi and
rcaiSid, o f assurance and self-deprecation, o f exquisite manners, and a delight
in almost vulgar illustrations o f his id ea s...” 1291
3
0

That “ curious blending” o f OTrouSfj and jraiSia is exactly the serio-com ic aspect to this
dialogue. Socrates goes to great lengths, especially in his refutation o f M eletus, to show
that M eletus (w hose name im plies care, psXstv, and seriousness) cannot be taken
. ■
/ ,
seriously,

since he has no care for the youth, and therefore cannot seriously bring

charges on their behalf.131 W hereas Socrates acknowledges that he may com e o f f as
jok in g (x a i iaax; psv 86 4 © Tiaiv opc&v rcai^stv, and perhaps I w ill seem to some o f you to
be playing, 2 0 d), he is very serious about the truth and especially the truth o f his
philosophy .132

W hat then, may w e conclude about the Apology, and the genre o f forensic oratory
inserted into it? Plato has indeed used som e o f the traditional topoi o f Athenian forensic
oratory, that m uch is clear. He has also had his Socrates blatantly refuse other topoi o f the
Athenian courtroom s, since they are in con flict with his philosophical beliefs and his way

129 Strycker 1994: 73.
130 “ I say, m en, that M eletus jests (xapisvTi^soOat) in serious matters (a7iob8rj), that he

brings m en to court lightly, that he claim s to be serious (orcooS&^eiv) and care for
(icrjSeiv) matters about none o f w hich he has ever been concerned (obSsv 7t©3iOTE
spe^rioev)” , 24c. C f. 7tsp i 7tXsiaToo 7toifj, 24c-d; psXov ys a o i...c o i obSsv pspsXiiKSV,
24d; oa(p©q ditocpaivsiq xfjv aaoxob apsAstav, o n obSsv a o i pspsAriKsv, 25c; outs psya
outs apucpov 7t©7iOTS spsA,T]asv, 26b; (in M eletus’ v o ice :) spou xapisvn^opsvou xa i
svavri’ épaut© Xsyovxoç, 27a; Kaixoi xoûxô s o n îraiÇovxoç, 27a; xoux av sitj o ey© cpr|pi
o s aivixxeoGai x a i xapisvxi^saGai, 27d.
131 Ober (1 9 9 8 :1 7 0 ) and Feaver & Hare (1 9 8 1 :2 1 1 ) also note the lack o f care attributed
to M eletus.
132 Socrates attaches the greatest im portance to carrying out (his interpretation o f) the
oracle’ s directive (i.e., his philosophy): ôp© ç 8s àvayKatov sSoksi sivai to too Osou 7tspi
7tXsioxou 7coisîa0ai (2 le ).
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o f life. Scholars have seen a defense o f Socrates and for

1

Socrates m the Apology,

Plato’ s portrait o f Socrates, and an exhortation to philosophy .13134 A ll these interpretations
are possible, depending on how one reads the Apology. H owever, the argument that the

A pology is a simple parody o f forensic oratory (or o f G orgias’ Defense ofPalam edes)
cannot remain. This reading rests on the b e lie f that Socrates has lied about his intentions
in the speech. M oreover, it fails to account for oratory as Socrates defines it. Oratory is
/
able to have a ‘ noble’ use, w hich fits perfectly with what Socrates is trying to defend. His
way o f life, cp&ocjoqna, has been m isunderstood, and in seeking to prove its (and his)
worth for the city, he is able to make use o f this ‘ noble’ oratory, one that does not require
a qxxppaicov in the souls o f the listeners.135 On this reading, Socrates does not contradict
his claim s to speak naaav Tqv aXrjOsiav, in contrast to other interpretations where his
intentions have been misunderstood by scholars. Even though Socrates is misunderstood
by the jury as jok in g (rcai^eiv), it is a serious use o f forensic oratory that Plato intends: a
serious use (m isunderstood as com ic) fo r serious ends— that o f getting one’ s soul to be in
the best condition possible. I agree with Brickhouse and Smith, w ho believe that Socrates
is earnestly trying to gain his acquittal, and w ill do so by any means consistent with his
beliefs .136 Plato shows us that Socrates’ ultimate aim is to gain acquittal (likely so that he
m ay continue to philosophize in Athens), and that Socrates is not making light o f the
Athenian legal system, in contrast to M eletus. H owever, in having Socrates make his

133 The genitive in the title ÂîtoXoyia ZcoKpaxouç could be objective as w ell as subjective,
w hich could allow it to mean “ A p olog y o f Socrates” (i.e., “ Socrates’ ow n defense
speech), or “ Plato’ s A p ology o f Socrates” (i.e., “ Plato’ s speech in defense o f Socrates” .
W est 1979: 219.)
134 Strycker 1994: 8-13.
135 See Chapter 1, pp. 19-20 above.
136 Brickhouse & Smith 1989: 9.
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defense, Plato has Socrates use oratory. A nd w hile Socrates condem ns oratory elsewhere,
in this case, Socrates cannot be charged w ith being self-contradictory and not agreeing
with him self, since in the Apology, Socrates has (re)defined oratory to fit consistently
with his (and Plato’ s) beliefs.

/
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C h a pte r T hree
Plato and the Polis: Plato’ s U se o f A ttic Oratory

The previous tw o chapters have argued against som e o f the inadequate or
insufficient interpretations o f the inserted genres in the Menexenus and Apology currently
held by scholars. M any students o f Plato have had a hard time reconciling Socrates as an
/
orator in the Menexenus with Socrates the philosopher that is seen elsewhere in the
Platonic dialogues. From the survey in Chapter 1, it is clear that the Menexenus is
philosophically significant with its oratory, as it displays— and contributes to— Socratic
philosophy expressed elsewhere in Plato’ s dialogues, and as such, it cannot sim ply be a
parody or satire not to be taken seriously. Chapter 2 demonstrated the counterpart to the

M enexenus: in the Apology, w hich has been traditionally read as Socrates’ simple
profession o f his philosophic w ay o f life, Plato has com posed Socrates’ defense to be
rhetorical. The traditional topoi and themes o f forensic oratory are found in the Apology,
in addition to a specific intertextuality w ith the D efense o f Palamedes, one o f the extant
works from Gorgias, the m ost influential orator at die end o f the fifth century BCE. But, at
the outset o f his speech, Socrates denies that he is an orator or that he w ill speak in any
way other than his usual manner. Because Plato has Socrates use som e typical methods o f
oratory, the A pology has also been seen as a parody, satire, or ironic version o f this
inserted genre. H ow ever, that is not necessarily the case. Plato com poses Socrates’ words
in such a w ay that Socrates’ claim s anent oratory can be true: he redefines the terms for a
“ clever speaker” so that he can em ploy oratory in g ood conscience, when he elsewhere
condem ns it. From this investigation it is clear that the Apology cannot sim ply be labeled
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as a ‘parody’ or ‘ satire’ o f forensic oratory— this reading rests on the b e lie f that Socrates
has lied about his intentions in the speech and it fails to account for oratory as Socrates
(re)defines it.
In this final chapter, the frame o f focu s w ill be widened in order to examine how
Plato, as an author, intends his use o f (A ttic) oratory in these tw o dialogues. I have
already determined that the Menexenus and A pology make use o f both philosophy and
oratory. Examining the claim s put forward and agreed upon by Socrates in the Gorgias
w ill determine whether there is a virtue at all for oratory, since it’ s evidently not a true
TEXyn. Is i| pTixopiKfi xexvTj good, bad, or in between, neither good nor bad? I argue that
oratory in and o f itself is neutral ( ‘ in betw een’ ) for Plato— whether it is good or bad
depends on the manner in which it is used. In Plato’ s case, he has inserted oratory in the

Menexenus and the A pology to present a critique and commentary on Athens, and to
relate his philosophy to the 7iokiq. This final chapter w ill also return to the question o f
‘ seriousness’ , and argue that in these tw o cases o f inserted genre, the categories o f
‘ parody’ , ‘ satire’ , and ‘ irony’ , as currently defined cannot be appropriately applied, since
these interpretations rely on the view o f only seeing oratory or philosophy in the works,
and not necessarily both. It is the serio-com ic nature o f the dialogues that has been
misinterpreted with respect to these two dialogues. In conclusion, as I shall argue, in the
case o f these tw o works, w hich focus on the raft-iq as a central character, Plato
consciously uses Attic oratory to com m unicate m essages consistent with his philosophy
to the Twftiq, thereby proving that oratory is not only the tool o f the politician, but that
philosophy too (by means o f oratory) can be capable o f political action.
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In a discussion o f oratory in Platonic works, I w ould be remiss not to include the

Gorgias,12especially because o f the links to the Menexenus and Apology in particular. The
M enexenus has been described as an afterpiece to the Gorgias and a satyr-play to the
tragic trilogy o f the Gorgias.3 It is also very hard to ignore the dramatic irony inherent in
the Gorgias when C allicles says to Socrates,

vuv yap ei Tig oou A,a|36p£vog ft aA^ou oxououv x©v toioutqv sig to
5eo[uovf\piov curayoi, cpdcKCov aSucsiv
aSiKOuvxa, oic0’5xi oinc av 8%oig
5xi xprjaaio oaux®, dXA,’iX,iyyui)Tig av Kal xaopxpo oinc excov 5xi EiTioig, Kaieig
t6 SiKaaxrjpiov avafldg, Kaxtiyopou xux©v 7idvo (pabAou Kal pox^npoo,
djioGavoig av, ei PouXoixo Gavdxou aoi xipaoGai.
N ow as it is, i f someone got hold o f you [Socrates] or o f anyone else like you,
and led you away to the prison on the charge that you’ ve acted unjustly when
you haven’ t, know that you would not know what to do with yourself. Y ou ’ d
become dizzy, and your mouth would gape open because you wouldn’t know
what to say. And having come up for trial, meeting with some petty and
entirely rascally accuser, you would be put to death, i f that’ s what he wanted
to set as your penalty. ( Grg. 486a-b)4

The fact that oratory in the Gorgias is investigated in relation to the rcoAig and Sfjpog—
oratory addressed to audiences making decisions— also makes its discussion especially
x
pertinent to the current study o f A ttic oratory. The Gorgias itself has been studied many
tim es over, on various aspects o f the dialogue .5 H ow ever, for the purpose o f this

11 also realize that the Phaedrus includes a discussion o f oratory, but in a way it is m ore
technical in its treatment o f oratory, and it is m ainly on epideictic oratory and persuasion.
In contrast, the Gorgias discusses the use o f oratory in connection with the 7côAiç, as the
epitaphios w ould be, and specifically addresses the use o f oratory in the Athenian courts.
2 Guthrie 1986 [vol. 4 ]: 317.
3 D odds 1 9 59 :24 . Because it is generally assumed that the Gorgias and Menexenus were
written by Plato in a close period o f tim e, it is also possible ( if not probable) that many o f
Plato’ s contem poraries may not have read the Gorgias prior to reading the Menexenus
(H enderson 1975: 25). W hile it remains possible that Plato could have intended the tw o
dialogues to be read closely together, I d o not believe that the reason for the Menexenus’
com position can be sim ply boiled dow n to a practical demonstration o f the Gorgias,
discussion on flattering oratory, as D odds argues (1959: 24).
4 A ll translations are m y ow n, unless otherwise noted.
5 A selected list w ould include: on the dialogue as a w hole, D odds’ 1959 commentary in
many ways remains unsurpassed; both Guthrie 1975, History o f G reek Philosophy, vol. 4

72

argument, the discussion w ill focus on what is actually asserted about oratory in order to
determine i f there is a virtue at all for oratory as far as Plato is concerned.
Like the Menexenus, the Gorgias is unclear about its dramatic date.6 It seems to
have been written in the early 380s,7 roughly around the same time that Plato wrote the

Menexenus. What we can infer is that Plato is com m enting on a m ore generalized Athens,
one free o f “ chronological specificity ” ,89and that the situation the reader is supposed to
/
9
understand is a “ generic post-Periclean dem ocratic Athens” . The freedom o f the dates

puts the characters in a (tem poral) lim inal situation, and thus allows Socrates, Gorgias,
Polus, and C allicles to carry out their discussion o f oratory on a m ore general basis,
w hich in turn allows us to apply the inferences from the Gorgias to Plato’ s philosophy
from other works. What does Plato have Socrates assent to or assert in the dialogue? I
have com piled a summary o f thirteen points as follow s:
1. Oratory (p ) is used for defense/self-preservation and to boast ( Grg . 448e).
2. p and its actions’ validity rely on subjectivity (45 ld-e,~ whereas Gorgias asserts it
is the greatest good, peyioxov ayaOov, 452d).
3. p is the ability to produce persuasion about what is just and unjust in die souls o f
the audience (452e, 454b).
4. p produces conviction without know ledge (454e).

(pp. 284-311) and Rutherford 1995 The A rt o f Plato (pp. 141-178) present summary
overview s with discussion on specific issues; on its relation to Athens and her
dem ocracy, Schofield 2006 Plato: Political Philosophy (esp. pp.51-99), Ober 1999
Political Dissent in Democratic Athens (pp. 190-206), and Yunis 1996 Taming
Dem ocracy (pp. 117-171) are the m ost authoritative and useful; in a condem ning
response to the Gorgias’ ‘ attack’ on rhetoric, V ickers 1988 In D efense o f Rhetoric (pp.
83-147) presents the alternative side to the case (although I cannot agree with m uch o f his
argumentation, I appreciate that he attempts to take Plato on from another angle).
6 For a concise discussion o f the expressed dates, see D odds 1959:17-18.
7 Yunis 1996:117.
8 Ober 1999: 191.
9 Idem 192. Likew ise, Yunis describes the significance as “ Pericles is gone and disaster
loom s” (1 9 9 6 :1 1 9 ).
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5. p makes the orator appear m ore persuasive before those who don’ t have
know ledge, but does not make the orator knowledgeable about what he persuades
(459a-c).
6 . p is a knack (éprteipía) for producing gratification and pleasure (462c).

7. p is a p a rt o f flattery; specifically it is the spurious version o f ju stice (SiKaioaúvrj),
the genuine corrective xsxyn o f the soul (463a, 463d).

8 . p ought to be used to justly obtain punishment for on eself and others i f necessary

'

(480c-d ).

9. p is what the poets practice in the theatre (poetry without rhythm, meter, m elody =
8 r)pr|Yopia [popular oratory/claptrap] = prixopucrj, 502c-d).
1 0 . p has tw o parts: ( 1 ) flattery and shameful popular oratory, and ( 2 ) the admirable

part, w hich aims to make the souls o f the citizens to be as good as possible by
saying what’ s best for them (503a).
11. The skilled and good orator w ill only make use o f the admirable part o f p, to bring
justice, temperance, and excellence into the souls o f the citizens (504d-e).
12. The g ood orator w ill be just and know ledgeable in what is just (508c).
13. p a n d e v e r y o th e r a c t iv it y is t o be u s e d in s u p p o r t o f w h a t is ju s t , n a m e ly t o
p r a c t ic e v ir tu e (a o K s iv

apexfiv, 527c-d).

~~" ~

From the conclusion, [10] that oratory has tw o parts for Socrates, a bad part, w hich
flatters, and an admirable part, w hich im proves souls, all the other inferences about
oratory can be classed into these tw o parts. W hen oratory produces something bad (or
‘ bad’ as Plato w ould see it), as in [l]-[7 ] and [9], it can be explained as being part o f the
flattering oratory. W hen oratory is beneficial, as in [ 8 ] and [11-13], it can be explained as
being part o f the ameliorative oratory. But this is not what the typical Athenian (or
visiting Greek) w ould think o f oratory, as is shown by the reactions o f Socrates’ pro
oratory interlocutors: no one is convinced by his refutation. Socrates’ argument that
“ public speech caters indiscriminately to the desires o f the many (thereby corrupting
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them) w hile simultaneously serving to corrupt the speaker and to enslave him to the
multitude” 10 w ould ruin Gorgias’ and P olus’ business as teachers o f oratory, and w ould
rob C allicles o f the future pow er he believes he can gain. The craft that these three men
believe to be source o f pow er for their social position, according to Socrates, is a base
knack that corrupts both the orator and his listeners.
I f Plato does not follow the traditional view o f oratory, is there, then, a virtue at
/
all for oratory as far as Plato is concerned? Despite its label, (fj pr|Topiicf| [xsxyq]) Plato
does not allow it the status o f a xexyn: “ the systematic, scientific application o f a body o f
know ledge to reliably achieve the highest degree o f excellence in a practical task” .11
Socrates explicitly labels oratory ‘ ejm eipia’ , a ‘knack’ ( Grg . 462c), but since it has two
parts, is oratory itself able to be classed as something good, bad, or in between, neither
g ood nor bad? On this point it appears that scholars are somewhat divided. Yunis
believes that Plato insists no political discourse is neutral in its effect on the listeners’
souls ,12 and thus agrees with what Socrates presents in [10], thakoratory has tw o parts.
These tw o parts are described as sham eful and admirable— there is no third, ‘ neutral’ ,
part. C olaiaco argues that Plato is not opposed to oratory p er se, but that he is opposed to
the sophists’ use o f it, and instead he has created a new rhetoric.13 This statement w ould

10 Ober 1998:190.
11 Yunis 1996:122. Tsxvn is a notoriously difficult w ord to translate, since ‘ craft’ , ‘ art’ ,

or ‘ skill’ in English does not quite cover the entire meaning o f the word.
12 Idem 121.
13 C olaiaco, James A . 2001. Socrates Against Athens: Philosophy on Trial, p. 31-33.
C olaiaco terms this different kind o f rhetoric “ philosophical rhetoric” (32). He also
considers whether Plato w ould have regretted the fact that his “ beloved mentor” did not
use rhetorical devices by whatever means necessary (w hile maintaining his integrity) to
secure his acquittal (31). H owever, Plato w ould not have wanted Socrates to act in any
other w ay than he did; to see his “ m entor” betray his ow n personal standards and use
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account fo r Plato’ s (apparent) condem nation o f oratory, but not his use o f it elsewhere in
his works. Another view o f Plato’ s opinion on oratory is that Plato sim ply sees the value
o f oratory being dependant on its subject matter, that it is, in a way, a tool that is
‘ neutral’ .14 For Plato, oratory in and o f itse lf is indeed ‘ neutral’ , that is, neither good nor
bad, but, I argue, it is not a new rhetoric that he presents in the Gorgias; rather, Plato
submits a new use o f rhetoric. This interpretation allow s the philosopher to appropriate
oratory for his ow n purposes. It is the philosopher w ho can truly use it justly, because it is
the philosopher who truly knows the just (and doesn’ t ju s t appear to know ). Attributing a
new use o f oratory to Plato follow s on the conclusions [12] and [13] above. The good
orator must be just and knowledgeable in what is just, and this knowledge, in Plato’ s
opinion, cannot be gained without philosophy. A lso, this interpretation is supported by
Socrates’ closing w ords to C allicles, [13] that oratory and every other activity are to be
used in support o f what’ s just (to practice virtue, àcncétv apexfjv), that is, oratory is to be

used as a means to an end. Oratory itself is not able to achieve o r affect a just soul.
H owever, in the hands o f a philosopher like Socrates, w e can now see that in the
\

Menexenus and Apology, oratory is used with a final purpose in mind.
B efore I leave the Gorgias behind to turn to Socrates’ methods and use o f oratory
in the Menexenus and Apology, there is a specific issue that appears in the Gorgias that is
traditionally interpreted as a contradiction to the Apology. Socrates tells Callicles that i f

flattering oratory w ould not leave Plato to describe him as apioxoi;, (ppovipcbraroq,

(Phd. 118a).
14 Kennedy 1975: 75, Vickers 1988 :14 7 . Kennedy adds the caveat that the best oratory is
in the dialectic o f the philosopher. V ickers notes that Plato view s oratory as corrupt
because the Sfjpoq uses it corruptly.
SiKaioxaxoq, “ the best, w isest, and m ost ju st m an”
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he does com e to trial, he w ill be at a loss, that he w on’ t be able to point out any benefits
he has provided to the court, and says,

edv xs xiq pe ij vecoxepouig <pfj 5ia<p08ipeiv ajtopeiv Ttoiouvxa, rj xoix;

;

7tpeaPuxepou(; KaKriyopeiv Xeyovxa 7ciKpoi>g Xoyoix; fj iSig fj Sripoaia, ouxe x6
aA,r|0e<; e§co ewtsiv, 6xi “Ancaiax; jr&vxa Tauxa eyd) Xsyro Kai npaxxco”— to
ijpexepov 8f| xaoxo— “ © dvSpsq Sncaoxai” , ouxe aXko ou8evI f someone charges that I either corrupt younger people by causing them to be
at a loss, or slander older people by speaking bitter words against them either
publicly or privately, I will not be able to tell the truth by saying, ‘I say and do
all these things justly, men o f the jury’ (to'use your expression), nor will I be
able to say anything else. (Grg. 522b-c)
This passage has been interpreted as Socrates professing that he w ill be silent at his trial.
Schofield concludes from this passage that Socrates cannot say anything, because
“ In this revised version o f his trial [the Gorgias\...he will recognize that it
would be pointless to do so [i.e., show concern for the Athenians’ true good]
even before he begins to speak— and so will be unable to say anything. That
(Plato is now saying) is how a Socrates who perceived his true situation at his
trial— and more generally assessed realistically the situation o f philosophy-—
would have to have behaved.” 15
A ccording to Schofield, Socrates is silent because he realizes his defense w ould be
hopeless when he considers how the Athenians perceive philosophy. Ober presents
another interpretation: Socrates defends h im self in court in the Way that he wanted, not
V

because o f how he w ould have been constrained to speak through a lack o f oratorical
skill. It is C allicles’ prediction that is flaw ed: “ i f Socrates is not the pathetic com erhuddler o f C allicles’ imagination, perhaps he is not a helpless victim either” .16
H ow ever, as is often the case in Plato’ s prose, what one speaker says is closely
related to the exchanges preceding or im m ediately follow ing. Just after Socrates makes
t

the above com m ent o f having nothing to say, he remarks, “ I f I should com e to m y end
because o f a lack o f flattering oratory, I know w ell that you w ould see m e bearing m y

15 Schofield 2006: 29-30.
16 Ober 1998: 202-3.
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death with ease.” (ei 8 e KokaKucij^ pt|xopiKfiq evSeiqi xeXeuTcprtv eycoys, eu 018 a oxi p<?8 i(D<;
ISiog av jxs «pepovxa x6 v Gavaxov, Grg. 522d) It is entirely possible that when Socrates
says he w ill have nothing to say, he does not necessarily mean that he w ill be silent, but
instead that he w ill sim ply have nothing rhetorical to say. In this w ay, Socrates redefines
the terms, just as he does at the beginning o f his actual defense. The discussion that
com es before this particular exchange should also influence the interpretation o f the
/
passage. Socrates again has returned to the im age o f a doctor and pastry baker on trial in
front o f children, saying that even i f the doctor told the truth, the children w ould make a
great, loud uproar (avapoav) and the doctor w ould be at a loss (m iopia) o f what to say

(Grg. 522a-b). It is this same situation that Socrates means w ould happen to him : the
“judges” w ould laugh at him, and he then w ouldn’ t know what to say. It is possible that
Plato here means that Socrates w ouldn’t be able to speak the truth in court without his
judges causing an uproar. Socrates h im self in his defense begs the judges not to shout or
cause an uproar during his defense (Ap. 17c, 20e, 21a), and recognizes that although he is
telling the truth, the judges may think he’ s jok in g (Ap. 20e). In this way, the assertion
Socrates makes in the Gorgias does not necessarily contradict Plato’ s presentation o f him
in the A pology, but rather is consistent w ith and reinforces Socrates’ defense speech in
18
the terms that he has defined.1
7
8

17 xoiouxov pevxoi x a i ey<b o i 8 a oxi 7ia0og 7td 0 oipt av eiasXGrav siq Sncaaxipiov. “ I know

ju st such an experience w ould happen to me too, i f I cam e to court.” (Grg. 522b)
18 One must note that scholars see Plato as having a ‘ darker’ or ‘ harsher’ view o f Athens
in the Gorgias, and see this as supporting the view o f Socrates’ futility on trial for his
life. I cannot imagine though that Plato w ould have rather had his Socrates be silent— this
w ould be contradictory to the Socrates presented elsewhere, w ho shows no concern for
what others think o f him , but stays true to his love, philosophy.
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Having concluded from the Gorgias that Plato has a new use o f oratory in mind, it
is now possible to examine how he has Socrates use oratory in the Menexenus and

Apology, since these particular uses are o f the admirable part o f oratory.192
0Yunis notes
that in the Gorgias, Socrates rejects Periclean oratory, but proposes no other solution to
mass political education.

H owever, although Plato may not propose an explicit solution,

he has, I argue, proposed a new use o f oratory that w ill allow him to bring about
/
education. Scholars have noted that Socrates redefines oratory in a very similar way to
the traditional Socratic dialectic: it aims to im prove the audience without regard to their
desired wishes.212Summarized in a m ost basic statement, the tw o previous chapters have
shown h ow Plato has Socrates encourage his audience to lead the philosophical life in
both exam ples o f inserted genre. On a w ider scale, all Socratic discourse (not just
oratory) avoids flattery, unless ironic, and aims at the improvement o f the audience.

The

goal o f the Socratic elenchus is refutation in order to im prove oneself— to make one
agree not necessarily with Socrates, but with oneself. From the Gorgias we see that
oratory only has pow er before an audience that is ignorant,23 since a knowledgeable
audience w ill be able to recognize that the speaker only possesses a means o f persuasion.
Since the intended audience in Socrates’ epitaphios and defense speech is ultimately the
7tó^ig o f Athens, what does Plato think she is ignorant o f? H ow is she out o f tune and not

19 See above, Chapter One, pp. 2 1 ,3 0 , Chapter Two, p. 62.
20 Yunis 1996:146.
21 Rutherford 1995: 156; Sedley, D avid. 2009. “ M yth, punishment and politics in the
Gorgias.” pp. 51-76 in Plato ’s Myths, edited by Catalin Partenie. pp. 5 9 ,6 5
22 Rutherford 1995:157.
23 Grg. 459a-c, see also Yunis 1996:128.
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in agreement with herself? W hat does Socrates hope his audience to understand from his
actions as a pfyrap?24
Socrates has always noted that he is a ‘ private’ citizen, that is, he does not
norm ally involve him self in the political affairs o f the city, preferring to carry on his
private refutations in search o f one w iser than he. H owever, this is not to say that
Socrates is unaware o f and disengaged from the political affairs o f Athens: he took part in
/
battles o f the Peloponnesian W ar (Potidaea, A m phipolis, Delium , Ap. 28e), and served on
the prytany when it was his tribe’ s allotted time (Ap. 32a-b). Socrates also admits that he
heard Pericles advising the Athenians on the m iddle w all (Grg. 455e). It is clear then, that
when Socrates is critical o f Athens and her citizens, he does not do so from ignorance or
indirect know ledge.25 Plato and his Socrates have sometimes been interpreted as an anti
dem ocratic,26 but when this issue is examined, that is not found to be the case.27 W hile

24 W riting on the Apology, Ober notes, “ Socrates portrays him self as a civic-m inded
activist w ho seeks to im prove the polis and him self (3 Id ) through verbal engagement
with his fellow s. Thus his position initially appears quite analogous to that claim ed by the
ordinary Athenian politician, the rhetor” (1998: 168). I f Socrates is acting in a typical
manner o f the politician, then by his critique and exhortations to Athens, he is fulfilling
that role in his ow n terms.
25 Ober 1998: 195.
26 V ickers 1988:102. D odds (1 9 5 9 :1 3 ) notes that C allicles is “ anti-democratic in
principle” , and speculates that Plato has crafted C allicles to represent him self had he not
chosen to abstain from politics, an “ unrealized Plato” (14).
27 See V lastos, G. 1983. “ The Historical Socrates and Athenian D em ocracy.” Political
Theory 11: 495-516. (A discussion on the Platonic vs. Xenophonic portrayals o f
Socrates.) Vlastos concludes that in contrast to X enophon’ s Socrates, the Platonic
Socrates “ never attacks any other Athenian institution, never says a w ord against election
by lot, never says, or directly im plies, that know ledge o f statecraft is a condition o f
legitim ate civ ic authority.... He does not question the m oral authority o f the court which
condem ned him even though he thinks its verdict m ost unjust.” (511). He also points to
the fact that Socrates had a close and longstanding friendship with Chaerephon, a
staunchly loyal democrat, and that he kept the admiration o f Lysias, w ho also identified
with the dem ocratic cause (ibid.). One also notes the discussion Socrates has with the
Laws in the Crito, where he accepts their authority, even to his ow n destruction.
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Socrates may have been (theoretically) critical o f dem ocracy, “ whether his theoretical
critique o f dem ocracy was matched by a desire for a practical alternative seems
doubtful” .

If, then, Socrates was in favour o f dem ocracy, and was aware o f Athenian

political affairs, what did he disagree with about Athens’ actions? The limits o f this thesis
do not allow for a com plete and in-depth study o f the commentary on Athens that Plato
provides in the Menexenus and Apology. A few specific observations and general
/
com m ents w ill suffice for the purposes o f the present study.
< JQ

The Menexenus has often been interpreted as a critique o f Periclean Athens

or

Periclean oratory.2
8
2
9
30 This is a m ore general way o f interpreting the dialogue as a whole,
and indeed, for m ost citizens o f the late fifth century BCE, Periclean Athens was their
Athens.31 H owever, Plato does make som e m ore specific comments on Athens in his

epitaphios. Certainly, his account o f Athens cannot be matched in the degree o f errors,
om issions and distortions,32 but one must remember that in the epitaphioi that w e possess
it is typical to see defeats remembered as victories,33 and unpleasant aspects o f Athens’
history glossed over.34 Plato consciously om its m ention o f the Athenian (naval) empire,

28 Strauss, Barry S. 1993. Fathers and Sons in Athens, p. 200
29 M onoson 2000 (205), Collins & Stauffer 1999, Salkever 1993.
30 Yunis 1996:136 (specifically, Periclean oratory as represented in Thucydides).
31 Pericles was the lead statesman in Athens from the late 460s BCE until his death in 429
(N ails 2002: 223-7). It was his expansionist policies that lead to the Athenian empire and
her involvem ent in the Peloponnesian W ar. Likely, even as late as the 380s (when the
Menexenus was likely written), his leadership w ould have characterized and defined the
generation immediately preceding, and Athenians w ould have seen lasting effects o f his
dem agogy daily in the m agnificent w orks o f his building programme. W hile Plato
questions Pericles’ political leadership ( Grg . 516b), he does elsewhere praise Pericles’
rhetorical abilities (Phdr. 269a, e; Smp. 215e).
32 Henderson 1975: 40.
33 Thomas 1 9 8 9 :2 0 3 ,2 1 6 .
34 Plato portrays Athens’ w hole history as based upon the defense o f safety and freedom
(242a, 244c, e).
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but when speaking o f Spartan hegem ony after the Peloponnesian War, they are described
as “ enslaving” the other Greeks (KaxaSouXouoGai, Mx. 244c). A long with the sentiment
from 242d, w e can conclude that Plato did not see any benefit to Athenian imperialism,
and considered this to be a fault for Athens. Another specific example o f critique o f
Athens is at 246a, where he praises the (Athenian) m en w ho saved the Great K ing, and
drove the Spartans clear out o f the sea. Here Athens acts in clear contradiction to the
/
ideal attributed to her: to fight against barbarians to a point o f destruction, but only fight
fellow Greeks to the point o f victory (Mx. 242d). A t 246a, Athens has provided aid to the
barbarian Persians, and destroyed the Spartans at sea. Thus w e can see how Plato sees a
discrepancy between how Athens appears and how she actually is: Athens is not in tune
with herself.
Doubtless, Athens w ould not be able to defend her contradictions i f she engaged
in dialogue with Socrates. This is indeed what Plato intends to show the Athenians in his

epitaphios. B y pointing out her self-contradictory actions, and exhorting her to
philosophy, he is showing the proper rem edy for her actions, since philosophy w ill never
lead one to be self-contradictory.35 But until Athens recognizes the folly o f her ways, she
w ill remain reproachable in Plato’ s eyes. Perhaps one o f the m ost com m on complaints
from Plato against Athens com es in the opening dialogue between Socrates and
M enexenus. W hen Socrates speaks o f the orators o f his day, w ho attribute both deserved
and undeserved praise, thus ensorcelling the souls o f their audience ([prixopeq] oT ouxcog
KaX<»<; 87taivouow, raaxe xai xa 7tpoaovxa x a i xa pfj rcspi SKaaxou Xeyovxs^ ...
yoqxeuooaiv f|jud&v xa<; yu /a^ , “ they praise so very admirably that they ensorcel our souls,

35 C f. Grg. 482a-b.

(
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attributing to each man both praise he merits and praise he does n o t...” Mx. 234c-235a).
These orators are the same men w ho advise Athens on public affairs (Grg. 456a), and
they are leading by falsities and persuading with flatteries. In the Menexenus, then, Plato
is presenting an Athens w hose appearances do not match with her actions: she is out o f
tune with herself, she has engaged in activities that brought temporary glory,36 but
ultimately brought her harm, and she has placed herself at the m ercy o f those w ho lead by
•
flattery and do not care for the truth.

/

In the Apology, our other example o f inserted genre, Plato launches a critique o f
Athens based upon her legal actions. A lthough Socrates does follow along with som e o f
the topoi o f typical forensic oratory, he explicitly rejects other courtroom antics that
w ould have been expected by the Athenians: throughout his w hole defense he refuses to
address the jurors as “judges” (Sucaaxai),37 and refuses to make an emotional plea for
his acquittal by bringing in the (w eeping) members o f his fam ily to arouse pity (Ap. 34b
ff.), noting that the jurors should convict the man w ho does this because he makes the
city into a laughingstock (KaxaysXaoxoq,Ap. 35b). Plato criticizes the Athenians for not
only partaking in these unjust actions, but for actually expecting them; in his view (and in
Socrates’ ), those m en are not truly judging based on what is just, and therefore do not
deserve the title o f ‘ Sucaaxai’ . During the refutation o f his accuser, Meletus asserts that
the politicians38 im prove the young m en o f Athens and it is Socrates alone w ho corrupts
them (Ap. 24e-25b). H owever, in carrying out his duty to the god o f Delphi, Socrates has

36 A s the (unexpressed) Athenian Empire w ould have.
37 Instead he refers to them as “ Athenian men” . See above, Chapter Two, pp. 60-1.
38 Specifically M eletus says the jurym en, C ouncil m embers, and the assemblymen all
im prove the young (24e-25a). These three positions entail political offices and duties o f
the Athenian citizens.
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pro ved that the politicians, w ho appear to be w ise, have no actual wisdom , but just think
they are w ise (Ap. 21c-22a). Since these m en are the instructors o f the young, the
im plication is that the Athenians are in actuality corrupting the youth themselves, because
for Plato, even i f these young men are b om w ell,39 they cannot becom e good men without
a g ood education. The Athenians, plainly, do not care for their ow n souls (Ap. 29e), and
instead spend their time and effort in the pursuit o f pow er, wealth, and status. This is
/
why, according to Plato’ s portrait, the Athenians put Socrates, w ho spends his time in
pursuit o f virtue and know ledge, to death. In this w ay, the Athenians act as the tyrant in
the Gorgias, w ho does what he wants, and does away with those who stand in his way

(Grg. 513a).40 Plato again stresses that the Athenians are not consistent in their actions, in
contrast to Socrates, w ho is ever consistent,41 since they changed their minds and
regretted their actions at the trial o f the generals from Arginusae (Ap. 32a-b), and
Socrates prophesies that they w ill regret killing him in time too (Ap. 38c). Through these
com m ents on the Athenians, Plato shows that they perform (and expect) unjust actions,
that they harm their ow n citizens with their ignorance, that they make the 7coA,iq into a
tyrant, and that they are not consistent in their actions (i.e., they are out o f tune with
them selves).

3Q

See above, Chapter One, pp. 26-7 for the discussion on the need for good nature and
good nurture fo r m en to be good.
40 ei yap o fea 0s ouroKxeivovxsi; dvGpdmou«; sm oxrjaeiv too 6vei8i£etv n v a opiv o n ook
op0co<; £fjxe, oo Ka^coq 8iavosTa0e- (For i f y ou think that by killing men you w ill stop
anyone from reproaching you for not living properly, you ’re thinking w rongly.), Ap. 39d.
41 aXk' eyo) 8ia 7tavxd<; too (Koo Sppoau? xe s i 7too n srcpa^a xoiooxoi; cpavoopai, x a i iSia
6 aoxo<; ooxo«; (But through m y w hole life, i f I engaged in any public activity, I am that
same man in m y private life.), Ap. 33a.
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W hile Athens and her dem ocratic constitution were renowned in the Greek w orld
for their parrhesia

,4 2

and no one exercised that right m ore than Socrates,43 one wonders

how the Athenians w ould view these criticism s o f her ‘n oble’ actions. W ould the
Athenians seriously contemplate the criticism s, or w ould they just chalk it up to Plato
being Plato (or Socrates being Socrates)? Certainly, m uch o f what is criticized in the

A pology w ould have been along the same lines o f commentary (the historical) Socrates
■"
:
■ .
;;
y : '. ■ ■■.
;
.
"■■■
w ould have made, that is, the same kinds o f com m ents that landed him in court on trial
for his life.44 Although the Athenians m ay have ended up regretting sentencing Socrates
to death, the fact that Plato refuses to actively enter into Athenian politics in his life likely
shows that the Athenians, w hile regretful, were not shamed into changing their political
ways. For the 8fjpo<;, fickle as ever,45 is always concerned with the present pleasures, and
does not care to undergo the difficult (and perhaps painful) changes necessary in order to
becom e truly just. From the case o f Socrates and the Apology, it is clear how the
Athenians received these kinds o f criticism . It was easier for thenj to put an innocent man
to death than to turn towards them selves and seek to better their souls.

42

C f. Grg. 461e-462a, Socrates (to Polus): ôetvà pevxdv rcàGoiç, co PsA/tiais, si ÂÔfjyaÇs
oupiKÔpsvoç, ou xfjç 'EXXaSoç îiXsiaxri éaxiv éÇoucria tou Xéystv, sirevra où évraôOa
toutou pôvoç àTUxnaaiç. (It w ould be a horrible thing for you, m y good man, i f upon
com ing to Athens, where there is the m ost freedom o f speech o f all o f Greece, you alone
should m iss out on it here.)
43 Schofield 2006: 70 (“ .. .one Athenian w ho stuck true to his dem ocratic parrhesia to the
end was Socrates h im self...” )
44 On the Athenian reception o f Socrates’ trial see: Hansen, M ogens Herman. 1996. “ The
Trial o f Sokrates— From the Athenian Point o f V iew .” pp. 137-70 in Colloque
International Démocratie Athénienne et culture, edited by M . Sakellariou.
45 C f. Grg. 481d-e.
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But what about the Menexenus, an epitaphios oration with the history that
displayed the Athenian officia l tradition?46 It w ould appear that the Athenians chose to
hear the praise Plato bestowed upon the city m ore than the criticism . Cicero tells us that
the Athenians o f his day, perhaps as part o f the Genesia,47 recited Plato’ s epitaphios
every year.48

nec solum in iis sermonibus qui SidXoyoi dicuntur ... sed inpopulari oratione,
qua mos est Athenis laudari in contione eos qui sint in proeliis interfecti; quae
sic probata est, ut earn quotannis, ut scis, illo die recitari necesse sit.
(Cicero is saying that like Thucydides, Plato permits hiatus:) not only in those
speeches which are called ‘ dialogues’ , but also in his popular/democratic
oration, which is the custom o f the Athenians in an oration (before an
assembly) to praise those who are killed in battles; this [oration o f Plato’ s] is
so esteemed that, as you know, it has to be recited every year on that day.

(C/c. Or. 44.151)

Although C icero stands a few centuries rem oved from the Athenians o f Plato’ s day,49 i f
the criticism s im plicit in the Menexenus w ere seen as the defining factor o f the speech,
surely the speech w ould not have been recited yearly. Even i f Plato’ s account o f Athens’
history includes errors, om issions, and distortions, his w ork achieves all the aspects o f a
successful funeral oration: he praises the ancestry o f the war dead (and citizens), recounts
the historical actions o f Athens in favourable terms,50 and consoles the parents and

46 On the epitaphios as officia l tcoXk; tradition, see Thomas 1989, Chapter 4 (“ O fficial
Tradition? Polis Tradition and the Epitaphios” ), pp. 196-238.
47 The Genesia (Annual Celebrations) w ere annual com m emorative rites in honour o f the
deceased (not necessarily war dead, but fam ily m embers).
48 Dean-Jones notes, “ The claim may not be true, but the important point is that Cicero
thought it could be” (1995: 51 n.3), Huby (1957: 105-7) takes the claim to be true
(apparently along with Jacoby).
49 C icero was apparently in Athens in the winter o f 79/78 BCE, and again in 51 and 50
(Huby 1957: 106,106 n. 3).
50 It is interesting to note that the only other epitaphios extant that covers roughly the
same amount o f historical detail is that o f Lysias, w hich is believed to have been written
at about the same time as the Menexenus (see Henderson 1975).
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children left behind. Since people enjoy hearing speeches given in their ow n fashion

(Grg. 513c), perhaps the Athenians o f Plato’ s day (and those o f C icero’ s) were simply
pleased upon hearing the praises o f Athens, and chose not to further scrutinize how Plato
presents an Athens w ho is out o f tune with herself.515
2
3
Ober notes that Plato has his Socrates use speech “ not to demonstrate conform ity
with and a subm ission to a dem ocratic ethos that emphasized equality among citizens and
.
y .
••
their collective w isdom , but as a form o f provocation and cultural criticism .”

But, as w e

have seen, along with criticism , Plato includes exhortations to virtue, and ideas o f his
philosophy in the Menexenus and A pology P But couldn’ t Plato have Socrates still
critique Athens in his regular way, by means o f a Socratic elenchus? It w ould not be out
o f character for Socrates to engage in a discussion with a personified interlocutor (as the
Laws in the Crito), and i f he directly refuted Athens (instead o f leaving the contradictions
im plicit for the reader to discern), his critique w ould have m ore power. For example,
Socrates: M y dear Athens, do you say that there are things that a d ju st?
Athens: Y es, Socrates.
Socrates: W ell, then, there must also be things that are not just?
Athens: O f course.

51 Socrates comments on ‘praise’ in the Symposium (198d-e) after hearing the speeches o f
his fellow symposiasts. He says that to praise is not telling the truth about the object o f
praise, but “ to apply the greatest and m ost admirable qualities to the object o f praise,
whether he has them or not; and i f they are falsities, it’ s no big deal” (to ac, peyiaxa
ávaxiGévaixq>Ttpáypaxix a ico g xaK kiaxa,éáv xsf|ouxcogsxovxas á v xspf|- si8e\|/eo5fj,
oi>8sv ap' rjv Ttpaypa). In this way, by sim ply accepting the falsities without further
thought, the Athenians respond to the ‘ praise’ o f Athens as they w ould praise o f anything
else.
52 Ober 1998: 177-8.
53 Contrast Guthrie: “ philosophy can only be seriously pursued through oral discussion
and living com panionship” (1975: 56-7). B y show ing his philosophy in the speech, Plato
hopes the listener to contemplate him self, and consider whether he is in agreement with
him self. Socrates is (partially) successful at achieving this goal, when he didn’ t think he
could: he is surprised at the number o f votes from the jury that voted for his acquittal (Ap.
36a-b). It appears that Socrates’ persuasiveness was greater than he knew, and that som e
Athenians were m ore open to his m essage (O ber 1998:177).
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Socrates: And we say things are just when they are good and beneficial, and unjust
when they are bad and harmful?
Athens: Necessarily so.
Socrates: Is it possible for one to be just when they have done unjust things?
Athens: N o, for the one who is just would only do just things.
Socrates: I believe you are right to say so, Athens. D o we say that there are just and
unjust things in war? Or is war itself just or unjust?
Athens: I think the former is true, that there are just and unjust things in war. For war
itself can be just or unjust.
Socrates: And what is just in war?
Athens: To destroy one’ s enemy when they have acted unjustly.
Socrates: And so die opposite is true for what is unjust? I mean, to destroy one’ s
enemy when they have not done anything wrong is unjust.
Athens: Y es.
Socrates: So in order to act justly in war, one must always destroy all enemies when
they have done wrong?
Athens: N ot quite, Socrates. It is not just to destroy one’ s fellow-Greek speakers,
only to destroy barbarians. For that is just.
Socrates: So, then, to be just in war, one must fight barbarians to destruction, and
feilow-Greeks only to, I suppose, a point o f victory?54
Athens: Y es, you’ re right now.
Socrates: So when you acted against the Persians when they attacked under Darius
and Xerxes, and drove them out o f Greece, you acted justly?
Athens: Entirely so, for they were unjust to attempt to enslave us and take what does
not belong to them.
Socrates: And when you captured the Spartan generals at Sphacteria, you acted
justly because you did not kill them, but instead made peace and returned
them still living?
Athens: Y es, for we had won our victory justly, and there was no need to destroy the
generals.

X

Socrates: Then what are we to say o f your allying with the Great King against the
Greeks?
Athens: W ell, that’ s different...
Socrates: But according to your earlier definition, you did not act justly in that
situation.
Athens: W hat? How?
Socrates: I f you were acting justly, you would have fought against the barbarians,
no?
. Athens: Socrates, you’ re talking nonsense...

I f Socrates (and Plato) had wanted to, it w ould have been just as easy ( if not easier) to
show Athens’ contradictory actions by means o f a Socratic elenchus either with a
personified Athens, or a character w ho strongly believed in the ‘ ideals’ o f the city and
w ho saw her as just in every way. So why does Plato choose to declaim against Athens

54 C f. Mx. 2 4 2 d ..
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by means o f oratory? In the case o f the A pology, the historical situation presented the
opportunity for Plato to write the speech o f Socrates (or, m ore likely, a speech fo r
Socrates, based on his actual w ords).555
6Since the genre o f the epitaphios held so much
(political) currency in Classical Athens, perhaps in the case o f the Menexenus, Plato was
hoping to draw upon its status as contributing to the ‘ officia l rcôXiç tradition’ . For most
Athenians, the yearly epitaphios presented the only opportunity to hear o f the exploits o f
Athens’ history.

56

/

'

There w ould be m ore im portance to hearing this particular type o f

speech than just another political oration on w hich architect ought to be chosen for the
next building project. A lso, since the epitaphios and forensic orations were specifically
directed at the îiôXiç as a w hole,57 perhaps Plato is hoping to reach a wider audience than
his private Socratic dialogues w ould have.
I f Plato is using these Athenian genres as a means to criticize Athens, does that
automatically mean that w e can classify the Menexenus and Apology as parody, satire, or
irony? Bakhtin defines the use o f inserted genre as parody \vhen4 he inserted genre “ is a
com pletely passive tool in the hands o f the author w ielding it. He takes, so to speak,
som eone else’ s m eek and defenseless discourse and installs his ow n interpretation in it,
forcing it to serve his ow n new purposes.” 58 H ow ever, the inserted genre is not parodie

55 W e must always remember that even though Socrates was a historical figure, o f whom
Plato had first-hand know ledge, the Socrates is the dialogues is a character, com posed
and constructed by Plato. I f the A pology o f Socrates was billed as a live-action drama, or
re-enactment, perhaps w e w ould be w ise to add the disclaim er “ based upon a true story” .
56 Thom as 1989: 235. She notes, “ this could be cru cia l.... Individual traditions gain their
place in w ider polis history by being attached to polis traditions— The funeral speeches
propagated both the officia l traditions o f Athens and a pow erful group o f ideals about
Athens w hich determined the picture o f history found there.” (235-6).
57 N oting that the jury is supposed to be representative o f the entire civ ic state (D odds
19 59 :20 2 ).
58 Bakhtin, M .M . 1984. Problems o f D ostoevsky’s Poetics, p. 197
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when the “ author grants the alien59 genre full semantic autonomy.” 60 The Oxford English

Dictionary defines satire as: “ A poem , or in m odem use sometimes a prose com position,
in w hich prevailing vices or follies are held up to ridicule. Sometimes, less correctly,
applied to a com position in verse or prose intended to ridicule a particular person or class
o f persons, a lam poon.” 61 Vlastos makes a distinction in Socratic irony between “ sim ple”
and “ com plex” irony: “ In ‘ sim ple’ irony what is said just isn’ t what is meant: taken in its
/
ordinary, com m only understood, sense the statement is simply false. In ‘ com plex’ irony
what is said both is and isn’ t what is meant: its surface content is meant to be true in one
sense, false in another.” 62 From m y previous arguments about the Menexenus and

Apology, it is clear that all o f these terms cannot be com pletely applied.
M any scholars fail to see any serious aspect to either the Menexenus or Apology,
m incing terms between ‘parody’ , ‘ satire’ , and ‘ irony’ , at times seem ingly em ploying
them without distinction.63 T o take Bakhtin’ s definition o f parody o f an inserted genre,
w e can see that Plato does indeed use these genres to a different end, to communicate
philosophy, but that is not the only way in w hich he uses them. Indeed, the Apology is a
defense speech for Socrates (though unsuccessful), and the Menexenus fulfills the
requirements o f the epitaphios genre. It must be noted that “ parodies cannot be so close

59 That is, ‘ inserted’ genre.
60 Nightingale 1995: 148.
61 OED, Second Edition (1989, online 2010), satire [I. l.a ].
62 V lastos, G. 1991. Socrates: Ironist and M oral Philosopher, p. 31
63 On the Menexenus: D odds 1959 (cf. p. 24 n.2, where only the “ stupidest” reader w ould
take the Mx. seriously); Henderson 1975; Guthrie 1975 (p. 320, the Mx. “ is o f no great
im portance save as an illustration o f Plato’ s versatility” ); Thomas 1989 (esp. a parody o f
Lysias’ epitaphios)', Yunis 1996; et al. O n the A pology : Burnet 1924; Feaver & Hare
1981; Seeskin 1982; Leibow itz 2010 (focusing on the ironic aspect); et al.
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as to be indistinguishable from what they parody.” 64 W e can say, then, that these genres
are not only “ passive tools” for Plato, since they are still allow ed to retain their regular
purposes as w ell. W hile Plato does include critical commentary on Athens in both works,
he is not m ocking the 7toX.i<; by any means. I f anything, the exhortations to philosophy
make these uses o f inserted genre m ore protreptic (i.e., designed to instruct and
persuade)65 than satirical. W e cannot, then, sim ply take these works as satires o f the
/
epitaphios and forensic oratory genres either. D oes this mean that we are to read both the

Menexenus and Apology as purely serious w orks? There are few scholars who do believe
these tw o works to be meant seriously, and in earnest by Plato.66 Indeed, we have
evidence that the ancient critics o f these works read them as serious: both Dionysius o f
Halicarnassus (end o f first century bce) and Herm ogenes (second century ce) read the

M enexenus as a genuine funeral oration,67 and the A pology was obviously taken seriously
i f defense speeches o f Socrates becam e, in a way, their ow n genre. In matter o f content
and context o f the tw o orations, the issues at hand are very serious; a eulogy for the
deceased and a capital trial are not occasions for meaningless jokes, m ockeries, or jesting.
\

So how do the scholars end up at opposing interpretations o f the inserted genres in
the Menexenus and Apology ? Indeed, none o f the opinions are held without their reasons,
but the fact that the same evidence can give rise to polar opinions is striking. I believe

64 Brickhouse & Smith 1989: 51.
65 So Kahn (1 9 6 3 :2 2 5 -6 ) thinks o f the Menexenus.
66 Kennedy (1 9 6 3 :1 5 9 , 162) understands the Menexenus to be serious, and Brickhouse &
Smith (1989) interpret the Apology as serious, and argue that Socrates must be careful
and avoid any irony, since it could possibly be misinterpreted by the jurors (1 9 8 9 :4 1 ,
43).
67 A llen 1984: 3 2 1 .1 w ould cite also the evidence from C icero presented above that the
Athenians o f his day (first century bce) took Plato’ s epitaphios as serious. W hy w ould
they use a m ocking parodic w ork to honour their deceased at the annual celebrations?
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that the singularly exclusive opinions o f parody/satire/irony versus seriousness are based
on misunderstandings o f Plato’ s intention in these works and o f his view o f the
philosopher in general. I have mentioned before that the Platonic dialogues are, by their
nature, serio-com ic works. Tim e and time again throughout the dialogues, Plato shows
serious and playful aspects side by side. The Sixth Letter closes by encouraging the
addressees to swear an oath a7rooSfi xe ap a pf) dpoiiacp Kai xfj xfjg O7iou8fi<; aSsXxpfj
7tai5 ia (with an earnestness that is not out o f tune, and with the playfulness that is the

sister o f earnestness, Ep. 6 . 323d).68 For Plato, play “ had its place in the serious w orld,”
since children ought never to be forced to learn, play was educationally valuable.69
Perhaps the m ost pervasive image o f seriousness and play in the dialogues is the
philosopher him self. Although the philosopher is m ost definitely in earnest about his
pursuits, he does not appear to be serious and respectable to those who do not know
philosophy. In the same way that C allicles says Socrates is a laughingstock because he
pursues philosophy beyond the appropriate age (Grg. 484c-e); Sqcrates admits it too: o i
ev xdu; (piloaocpiaig noliw %povov 8 iaxpi\|/avx£<; si<; xa Sncaaxiipux iovxs<; ye^oioi

\
(paivovxai pfjxopsg (M en who have spent a great amount o f time in philosophical pursuits

68 O f course, as is the case o f nearly all the letters, authorship is an ever present issue.

H ow ever, with regard to the Sixth Letter, Guthrie notes, “ I f this letter was not written by
Plato, I w ish w e had more w ork by its unknown author. He was capable o f writing like
Plato at his best.” (1975: 62 n.3)
69 Guthrie 1975: 61 (cf. R. 536e, yoxtI 8 s (3iaiov ouSev sppovov pd& npa.-M riG fi, equp-Mf| xoivov pig, eurov, cg apiaxe, xoug naldaq ev xoiq paGrjpamv a lia Ttai^ovxa«; xpscps,
Socrates'. Nothing learned by force remains in the soul. Glaucon: That’ s true. Socrates'.
Then, m y good man, do not use force to train the children in these subjects, rather use
play instead.)
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appear ridiculous when they appear as orators in the law courts, Tht. 172c).

This is, in a

way, the essence o f Socratic irony (eip oveia): a “ curious blending o f crcouSfi and roxiôià,
o f assurance and self-deprecation, o f exquisite manners and a delight in almost vulgar
illustrations o f his ideas” .7071 It is only the philosopher who is able to em body these tw o
aspects at once:
“ We may recall that the philosopher alone knows the nature o f the noblest and
best life, so that he alone can knowingly imitate it in logos. Since such a life
will inevitably appear com ic to the multitude, his tragic figure will just as
inevitably be popularly comic. Thus he creates at once true tragedy and
popular comedy, and is the only one capable o f doing so by knowledge or
techne.” 72
For Socrates, îtaiÇeiv is the “ mask” o f philosophy, whereas for a character like M eletus,
7taiÇsiv conceals cleverness. Socrates is mistaken for a “jester because he is the jester’ s

mirror im age .” 73
I f the philosopher is characterized by both seriousness and play, and Plato
presents Socrates elsewhere as jok in g in earnest about things, can we not apply the same
serio-com ic label to Socrates as an orator in the Menexenus and A pology! To return to the
quote from the Gorgias that I cited in the Introduction,74 when Callicles asks, erne p oi, to
\
Xaipetpcov, orcouSa^ei Tania £coKpdrr|c; ij 7tai£si; (tell m e, Chaerephon, is Socrates serious
about these things or is he jok in g ? Grg. 481b), are these our only two options? In view o f

70 C f. Tht. 172c-175b for the full discussion between Socrates and Theodoras on how the

philosopher appears to the ignorant, and h ow he shines over and beyond the ignorant
when there is an issue to be dealt with o f a non-practical nature (e.g., “ is a king happy?” ).
71 Strycker 1994: 73 (quoted in full, above Chapter Two pp. 65-6). C f. also Guthrie
(1975: 60-1), “ A lon g with the accusation o f eironeia against Socrates went the com plaint
that he was always playing, never serious. Here w e begin to see that Plato can use the
w ord ironically, not him self im plying any criticism , since he certainly did not think o f
Socrates as a frivolous person.”
72 Patterson, Richard. 1982. “ The Platonic Art o f Com edy and Tragedy.” Philosophy &
Literature 6 : 76-93. p.84
73 C rooks 2009: 110.
74 See Introduction p. 5.
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the serio-com ic nature o f the dialogues, it becom es clear that Callicles, not knowing
philosophy, does not understand the nature o f the philosopher and instead only sees the
‘jester’ . This is in direct contrast to Chaerephon’ s response, êpoi pèv Soksî, ©
KaMdicXsiç, vjtepyvôç onovôâÇ eiv (he seems to m e to be exceedingly serious, Callicles,
481b). Chaerephon, a long-tim e com panion o f Socrates, understands his philosophical
ways75 and knows that Socrates, even i f ‘ playing’ , is always serious. The antithesis does
/
not hold true fo r Socrates, rather C allicles “ fails to see that you can jest and build up
paradoxes and create fantasies w hile still being, on another level, very serious about what
this kind o f ‘play’ im plies or serves to con vey .” 767In the Apology, Socrates hedges his
actions by repeating his serious intentions, even though he knows the jurors w ill laugh at
him like C allicles (e.g. Ap. 20d). T o the jurors, he appears as the philosopher in the

Theatetus. Likew ise, in the Menexenus, Socrates is hesitant to deliver Aspasia’ s
epitaphios lest Menexenus laugh at him i f he seems to play (M r. 236c). M enexenus’
reply, pr|ôapœç (not at all), signals to the (inform ed) reader that Menexenus, like
Chaerephon, is fam iliar with Socrates’ w ays. The epitaphios itself is a difficult genre to
place: “ the character o f the epitaphios, its form and conventions are very strange to our
eyes, stilted and highly artificial, as w ell as excruciatingly smug and congratulatory.”

In

addition to the com plex nature o f Plato’ s philosopher, the difficulties o f the inserted
genres them selves have added to the difficulty in interpreting Plato’ s intentions with the

Menexenus and Apology.

75 Chaerephon is so w ell acquainted with Socrates’ methods that he understands what

Socrates means when he is directed to begin questioning Gorgias at the start o f the
dialogue (447c-d).
76 Rutherford 1995: 157.
77 Thom as 1989: 208. C f. W ickkiser (1999: 71), w ho notes that out o f context, the
epitaphios can seem “ contrived and ineffective” .
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It is clear that these tw o works are not m erely parody, satire, or irony, or indeed
purely serious. M ore recent scholarship has begun to see that in the case o f these tw o
inserted genres,78 there is a presence o f both cmou5f| and 7tai8 ia .7980Since w e cannot apply
these labels o f ‘ parody’ and the like, how are w e to describe oratory in the Menexenus
and A pology ? I believe Schofield is the closest to defining this oratory. In regards to the

Menexenus, he labels the epitaphios a “ pastiche” in that it is a “ eulogy o f Athens and its
^

history, em ploying the full range o f the stock tropes o f the genre.”

sn

It is possible to draw

the same conclusion with respect to the A pology, since I have argued that Socrates does
em ploy various topoi o f forensic oratory, and delivers a speech that (for the m ost part)
adheres to the rhetorical expectations o f the audience .81 ‘ Pastiche’ is a good term for the
use o f inserted genre in these tw o works, since Plato does imitate the style o f the orators.
Imitation itself, how ever, is a form o f rcaiSia that is not to be taken seriously (on cntoodii,

R. 602b). Likew ise, these works display elements o f Plato’ s philosophy, w hich is by
nature a mixture o f anouSij and rcaiSid. ‘ Pastiche’ in and o f itse lf while better than
‘parody’ , ‘ satire’ , or ‘ irony’ alone, does not encom pass all the aspects in play when Plato
is inserting these tw o oratorical genres. I propose to define the Menexenus and Apology

78 Plato, o f course, does use other genres for parodic purposes, e.g. Attic tragedy in the

Gorgias (see Nightingale 1995, Chapter 2, “ Use and abuse o f Athenian tragedy” , pp. 6092). But not every inserted genre is used for parody: at the end o f her discussion,
Nightingale notes, “ ‘Philosophy’ w ill illuminate and be illuminated by different genres in
different ways. Each instance where Plato incorporates poetry (or rhetoric) into his
dialogues, then, deserves a separate investigation.” (p. 92 n. 84).
79 Salkever (1993) and Collins & Stauffer (1999) believe that the Menexenus cannot be
labeled as one or the other, but is both com ic and serious; likewise Strycker (1994) sees
the blend o f arcoudij and muSia in the Apology.
80 Schofield 2006: 72-3.
81 Discounting, o f course, his refusal to seek the pity o f the jurors and appeal to their
em otions, and way o f speaking in his accustom ed manner. But, such refusals (on their
surface, not as Socrates defines them) are also com m onplace in courtroom oratory.
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as examples o f an ‘ ironic pastiche’ , provided that ‘ ironic’ is understood to mean (along
with Strycker), eipcoveia as a com bination o f 0710081) and rcaiSia. A n ‘ ironic pastiche’
then, is a serious imitation o f the epitaphios and forensic orations, which sometimes
com es across (to the uninform ed Platonic reader) as playing and jesting; how ever, we
must understand that Plato is only using com ic means to a serious end.
Having established the use o f oratory in the Menexenus and Apology as
/
(playfully) serious, w e must now return to the relation o f this oratory to the 7toXig.
Elsewhere in the Platonic corpus when oratory is used as an inserted genre, specifically in
the Phaedrus and Symposium

, 8 2

the topic treated is a universal topic: love .83 H owever,

when Plato uses these tw o Attic genres o f oratory, the epitaphios and forensic genres, his
intended audience is none other than the Athenians them selves, and treatment o f Athens
is brought to the fore. M onoson notes that Plato “ appropriates” part o f the “ intellectual
m ission” o f the funeral oration for philosophy .84 W hile I agree with M onoson, I w ould
perhaps assert that it is m ore proper to say that the epitaphios, like Socrates’ forensic
defense, has been subordinated to becom e a further tool o f philosophy. Plato’ s new use o f
oratory allow s him to em ploy these A ttic genres to aid his (and Socrates’) ultimate goal
o f encouraging anyone w ho he encounters— with the text in this case— to care for their
soul and pursue virtue. Plato thus uses A ttic oratory to communicate his philosophy

directly to the itohc, on a grand and public scale. B y using genres outside his normal

82 B oth are examples o f the epideictic oratory genre.
83 In the Symposium, the revelers take turns giving speeches in honour o f L ove (the god).

Coincidentally, the proposer o f the topic is none other than Phaedrus. In the Phaedrus, he
and Socrates exchange speeches on erotic love.
84 M onoson 2000: 205.
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genre o f the Socratic interview, he has obtained the audience for his philosophy that truly
needs to heed the critiques o f the 7tóXiq: the Athenian citizens.
A ll o f this effort on Plato’ s behalf, to appropriate oratory for his ow n (redefined)
use, is in order to prove that oratory is not only the tool o f the politician, but that
philosophy too can be capable o f politics when it uses the appropriate mediums. I f we
believe C icero,858
6the Menexenus achieved success in the 7tóki<; by being recited yearly.
/
Socrates’ defense too, was m ore successful than he believed it could be, judging from his
surprise at the number o f jurors w ho voted for his acquittal (Ap. 36a-b). Loraux and
M onoson rightly agree that the Menexenus is a “ minor” dialogue only i f one fails to see
the epitaphios as characteristic o f civ ic discourse.

Those w ho w rongly dismiss the

importance o f the Menexenus for the Platonic corpus because o f its apparent lack o f
philosophy,87 its lack o f a proper elenchus, and its use o f oratory, could also dismiss the

A pology on those grounds as w ell. H ow ever, since the Apology presents Socrates’ trial,
an event w e can definitely say is historical,88 and gives an account o f his life, it is
(rightly) given great significance for the Platonic corpus. But both o f these examples o f

85 A s I do— that the Athenians centuries later w ould still practice the annual rites in
honour o f their (fam ilial) deceased is fairly certain. W hy w ould they not also include a
part o f the Patrios Nomos, from the classical glory days o f their noXiq? Even i f Plato’ s
epitaphios is a literary record, not actually perform ed in Plato’ s day, it w ould make sense
to choose a renowned author (even i f he is known for his philosophy), one w ho was
clearly Athenian (Lysias’ speech also has a sim ilarly detailed history o f Athens, but he
was a m etic). A fter all, as mentioned elsewhere, Plato’ s speech brilliantly achieves the
requirements o f the genre: Athens is eulogized in all her glory, her history is presented in
the m ost favourable way, and the survivors are consoled after the encom ium o f the war
dead.
86 Loraux 2006: 312, M onoson 2 0 0 0 :2 0 2 .
871 argue against this view in Chapter 1.
88 For all w e know, nearly all the other Platonic dialogues, perhaps excluding the Phaedo,
could be mere constructs o f Plato’ s authorial imagination, and not simply recollections o f
discussions during Socrates’ lifetim e.
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inserted genre have greater significance fo r Plato as an author, than they do for our
understanding o f the historical Socrates: they are demonstrations o f Plato’ s interaction
with the civ ic actions, policies, and beliefs o f the Athenians. He consciously chooses to
com m unicate with the Athenians through the mediums that they w ould identify with: the
funeral and forensic orations. B y means o f discourse that was familiar to the A thenians,:
Plato hoped to communicate the benefits o f the philosophical life spent in pursuit o f
.

/.

,

.

virtue and knowledge.
In the Seventh Letter, Plato w rites:89

Kal xou psv oKOTiefv pf| ajiocmjvca jiij 7toxs Spstvov fiv yiyvoixo rcspi xs onk&
xaika Kai 8f| Kal 7tepl xfiv Jtaaav Ttotaxeiav, xou 5s 7tpaxxsiv at) rcspi pevsiv ad
Kaipou?, xsXeoxc&vxa 5e vofjaat rcspi rcaacov xrav vuv rcoXscov oxi kokco? .
ouprcaoai rcoXixsuovxai... xauxbv 8fi Kal 7t£pi rcoksax; auxou Siavooopsvov
Xpf) £fjv x6v epcppova- Asysiv pev, si pfj KaX&q am& (paivoixo Jio^ixsusaGai, si
piAAot ptixs paxaicoq ¿pdv prjxs dno0avsTo0ai Xsycov, piav 8s 7taxpi8i
7toA,txsia(; psxaPoA,fi(; pfi tipoatpipstv...
And though I did not cease to reflect how an improvement could be brought
about in our laws and in the whole constitution, yet I refrained from action,
waiting for the proper time. At last I came to the conclusion that all existing
states are badly governed...This is the principle which a wise man must
follow in his relations towards his own city. Let him warn her, if he thinks her
constitution is corrupt and there is a prospect that his words will be listened to
and not put him in danger of his life, but let him not use violence upon his
fatherland to bring about a change of constitution. (Ep. 7.325e-326a, SSlc-d)90
W e know that although Plato was w ell aware o f the political activity in his native city o f
Athens, he did not endeavour to partake in the management o f the tto^u; (unlike som e o f
his relatives).91 It is possible to assume that Plato, like Socrates, still partook in certain

89 “ A com m on view is that i f Plato did not write the letter him self, the writer must have
been som eone close to him, probably an associate in the Academ y, so that w e can trust
the broad lines o f his narrative.” (S ch ofield 2 0 0 6 :1 9 )
90 Translated by Glenn R . M orrow , in (ed .) C ooper, John M . 1997 Plato: Complete
Works:
91 V lastos (1994. Socratic Studies. Pp. 128-131) sympathizes with Socrates (and likely
Plato as w ell) for not being m ore involved in the politics o f his day.

98

civ ic activities.929
3Although in the Seventh Letter, Plato says that he was waiting for the
right m om ent to engage in politics, it w ould appear that the right moment never came
along. H ow ever, in the second passage that I have quoted from his letter, he
acknow ledges that there is a safe way for the w ise man, i.e., the philosopher, to contribute
to his 7co>a<;. I f there is a chance that the city may heed his advice, he should warn his city
in a way that does not involve (or cause) violence. From the arguments I have presented
•
/
above, it is clear that this is how Plato intends his use o f the inserted genres o f Attic
oratory. B y using the regular channels o f discourse for the 7t6Xk;, Plato is speaking to the
Athenians in order to convince them to adopt the proper way o f managing the city and to
pursue virtue daily. B y criticizing (and thus warning) the Athenians o f the contradictions
present in her actions, and attempting to show her that she is out o f tune with herself,
i

Plato was attempting to contribute to state politics by means o f the oratory in his
dialogues. In the m ost general terms, the pqxopei; o f Athens were the politicians

who

attended m eetings, brought lawsuits, ran the councils, and advised the city on the right
course o f action. B y dramatizing Socrates as an orator, Plato has (by proxy) provided his
ow n advice to the Athenians, and thus his Socrates, w ho also claim ed to lead the private
life, becom es the true politician,94 since he alone can truly advise the 7c6X,k; on the just
and virtuous path.
Scholars have speculated on what led Plato to use these inserted genres in his
works. O f course it was not sim ply to beat the orators at their ow n game, as som e w ould

92 He appears to have knowledge o f the Eleusinian M ysteries (e.g . Euthydemus 277d).
93 Rutherford 1995:153.
94 C f. Grg. 5 2 Id, olp a i psx' okiym AGqvaicov, iva pfj eitko povog, S7nxeipstv xfj dx;
aXr|0(S<; 7toXmicfj xsxyfl *a i 7tpaxx£tv xa 7coXixuca povoq xcov vuv (I believe that I am one
o f a few Athenians, I w on’ t say the only one, but the only one o f the contemporary
Athenians, to take up the true political techne, and to practice politics.)
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believe,95 rather it is m ore likely that he had a specific purpose in mind, as argued above.
It is likely that the Apology, since it appears to have been written not too long after the
actual trial o f Socrates, came about because o f the outcom e o f that trial: “ a travesty o f
justice and an appalling indictment o f the political and educational system w hich made
such a misunderstanding or misrepresentation o f a g ood man and a philosopher
possible.” 969
7There is no doubt that the execution o f Socrates left a great im pression on
/
Q7
him . He was still a young man when Socrates died, and Socrates was obviously a man

w ho played a large role in his life. But what spurred Plato to again insert a genre o f A ttic
origin into his dialogues with the M enexenus is m uch m ore difficult to determine. It has,
perhaps rightly, been interpreted as an “ occasional p iece designed to comment and reflect
on a particular political event.” 98 W hat that “ occasion” w ould be has been guessed at:
Kahn believes that the conclusion o f the K ing’ s Peace (386

bce)

was the significant event

because it confirm ed everything Plato believed about the disastrous consequences o f
dem ocracy,99 whereas Huby believes the Menexenus to be a sort o f ‘ pamphlet’ in
response to the threat o f “ making econom ies in [Athens’ ] provisions for the dependents
V
o f those w ho had fallen in war.” 100 W hether or not w e can be so specific, it was likely
spurred in part by current circumstances that w e can no longer identify without further
evidence.101 This fact alone reinforces the fact that Plato was aware o f current events in

95 V ickers 1988:137.
96 Rutherford 1995: 35.
97 I f one follow s the traditional dates o f Plato’ s life, he w ould have been 28/29 in 399
b c e , i f one follow s the prosopography presented by N ails (as I do, her argumentation is
very thorough and convincing), Plato w ould have only been 25 years old.
98 Schofield 2006: 74.
99 Kahn 1963: 226-7.
100 Huby 1957:107.
101 Guthrie 1975: 317.

100
his city, and that he did respond to the Athenians and partake in a civ ic discourse, albeit
in a way that was com pletely different from the other politicians o f his day.102

The study o f Plato and inserted genres is an investigation that is far from com plete
or thoroughly explored in current scholarship. Platonic scholarship is often very specific:
examinations o f individual dialogues (or thematic groups o f them), studies o f Plato’ s
/
political theories, or explorations o f particular aspects o f Platonic philosophy. It is m ore
difficult to find a scholar w ho is attempting to take into account all aspects o f Plato’ s
w orks,103 including the philosophical political theories, along with knowledge o f Plato as
an author o f a particular genre and the characters portrayed, and placed within the
context o f know ledge o f the Athenian itokiq. Fortunately, som e scholars are pursuing
Plato and his Socrates along these lines (Andrea Nightingale, Sara M onoson, among
others), and w e are beginning to gain a greater understanding o f Plato’ s dialogues in their
full context. In this examination o f A ttic oratory in the Menexenu$ and Apology, I have
attempted to take into account all o f these aspects. I have argued that the Menexenus is
squarely in line with the philosophy o f Plato expressed in other dialogues, and that it is
able to enhance our understanding o f Plato’ s philosophical ideas instead o f sim ply being
a small o n e -o ff dialogue. I also argued that the inserted genres o f Attic oratory are in
keeping w ith the other examples o f funeral and forensic orations, and we are able to

102 Y et again, Plato has ‘ redefined’ the terms for him self and his engagement in Athenian
politics.
103 A nd also attempting to take into account the entire corpus o f Plato in their arguments.
I sincerely believe that Plato intended his w orks for an educated reader, for i f the reader
was not educated and already knew o f the philosophies, his written works w ould not be
o f m uch use to them (cf. the Theuth myth in the Phaedrus and the accom panying
discussion o f writing, 274c-277a).

101

better understand Plato as an author when w e do not confine these inserted genres to
parody, satire, or irony. Plato very deftly uses these tw o types o f orations as ‘ ironic
pastiches’ , the character o f w hich is in keeping with his portrayal o f the philosopher and
his philosophy: a fine blending o f cmoodrj and 7rai8iá, w hich has unfortunately been
hitherto misunderstood by scholars w ho w ish to place the oratory in Plato as completely
different from his philosophical elenchi. I have, in fact, shown that these inserted genres
/
are used in order to com municate Plato’ s philosophy to the Athenian 7tó)a<; as a w hole,
that by using Attic oratory, Plato is playing to his audience, w ho w ould love to hear
speeches given in their ow n manner.104 In this way, I have not held Plato as isolated,
writing alone in his Academ y, but I have placed him in the living, active city o f Athens,
accounting for the social and civ ic factors w hich bore influence upon his w ork and his
life. B y approaching Plato holistically, considering not just singular aspects, I believe that
m y conclusions from this thesis have presented the im age o f a Plato w ho by his ow n
terms, although he had m uch to criticize Athens for, was stiH'anx‘ active’ citizen o f the

nofoc,.

104 Grg. 513b

102
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